Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

Library of Congress Location Symbols

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P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

921
Altmann, Rüdiger. [THE ENEMY AND PEACE] Der Feind und der Friede. Merkur; deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, v. 22, Sept. 1968: 777-785.
AP30.M43, v. 22

Searches for the meaning of peace that is appropriate to the realities of the modern age. Altmann analyzes various notions of peace starting with Grotius' "Pax absentia belli" [peace is an absence of war], which does not suffice today because of the difficulty of defining war. Already Clausewitz' definition of war transcends interstate armed conflicts by including civil and other kinds of war as well. Altmann rejects definitions based merely on futuristic or utopian situations and believes the concept of peace should denote action. Only thus can the difference between peace as a normal condition and war as an exceptional one be narrowed and brought close to the increasingly complex reality. Peace contains possibilities for armed conflicts, including total nuclear war, but it preserves undisturbed evolution or change; it preserves the national existence. Closely related and sometimes central to this problem is the right of intervention or nonintervention, given the growing interdependence of nations. Altmann describes the enemy as "a disturber-negator of one's own existence" and points out inconsistencies in the application of this concept by the German Federal Republic's Constitution.

922
THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY. Paris, Atlantic Institute, 1967. 108 p.
DR48.5.A83
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--List of participants.--Foreword, by Walter Dowling.--Introduction.--Possibilities of evolution in the Soviet Union, by Michel Tatu.--Possibilities of evolution in the Balkans, by James Brown.--Possibilities of evolution in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, by Leopold Labedz.--The state of the Communist camp, by Klaus Mehnert.--Military aspects of the situation in Central Europe, by Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe and Robert Strausz-Hupé.--Policy factors in East-West trade, by Michael Kaser and John M. Montias.--Ideocracy and rationality, universalism and polycentrism, by Constantin Jelinski and Ambassador Pietro Quaroni.--Political aspects of East-West relations, by Pierre Hassner, Richard Löwenthal, Richard von Weizsäcker, and others.--The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the years to come, by Zbigniew Brzezinski.--The future shape of Europe, by Max Kohnstamm.

Papers presented to a conference on East-West relations sponsored by the Atlantic Institute at Rome in October 1966. The purpose of the conference was to identify the most critical issues in the relations of the Atlantic community with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, determine whether there are significant trends in the development of these issues, and assess the possibility and implications of internal changes in the Soviet bloc. The participants agreed that the most important political trend in Eastern Europe today is that toward the "Balkanization of Communism," but they differed widely over how the West can best take advantage of this development.

923
Axen, Hermann. [QUESTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND POWER RELATIONSHIPS] Zu Fragen der internationalen Lage und des Kräfteverhältnisses. Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild [1968] 31 p.
D849.A94
Bibliographical references included in "Anmerkungen": p. [32]

Partial contents.--The Soviet Union's and other Socialist countries' constant growth in power.--The further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and the increase in the aggressiveness of imperialism.--Defeat of the U.S. aggressors in Vietnam.

Excerpts from a lecture delivered on May 15, 1968, by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the [East German] Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Axen considers it folly to conclude from the growing strength of communism and the deepening crisis of capitalism that relaxation of international tensions in the world will come automatically. Capitalism can still muster enough strength to occasionally deal dangerous attacks against the Socialist camp; in the military area it is still quite strong.

924
Bartsch, Günter. [REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 1948 (PT. 1)] Revolution und Gegenrevolution in Osteuropa seit 1948 (I). Parlament, v. 18, Nov. 16, 1968: suppl. B 46/68. 39 p. D839.P3, v. 18

Analysis of the centrifugal forces and methods of their suppression in the Soviet bloc. Bartsch considers, among other things, the cases of Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary through 1956 and discusses nationalism and trends toward national communism in East European countries. Among the compelling reasons for satellite countries to move away from Soviet domination--he calls them "motive forces of East European revolution"--is the general historical trend that makes it extremely difficult to impose the form of state of a less highly developed country on one more highly developed. As the example of India shows, the transfer of the form of state is much easier in the opposite direction.

925
Bloch, Ernst. [RESISTANCE AND PEACE; ESSAYS ON POLITICS] Widerstand und Friede; Aufsätze zur

Politik. [Erstausg. Frankfurt am Main] Suhrkamp [1968] 112 p. (Edition Suhrkamp, 257)
D415. B5

Partial contents.--Resistance and peace: Printed text. Spoken address.

Philosophical reflections on peace and war, with references to the Bible and Immanuel Kant.

926
Brecher, Michael, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein. A FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH ON FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 75-101.
JX1901. J6, v. 13

In the study of foreign policy there have been two major orientations: single-country studies and general systems theory. Each has disadvantages which a new approach must overcome. The present research design is aimed at the prediction of probable choices among foreign policy options; it derives in part from the input-output approach and in part from recent contributions of systems analysis in political science. Following a theoretical critique, the paper reports on a preliminary empirical investigation involving eight middle powers as actors and 64 foreign policy issues in four issue areas--military-security, political-diplomatic, economic-developmental, and cultural-status. The observations and hypotheses include cross-issue-area comparisons. One among several concluding hypotheses is that the maximization of power, defined as military and economic capability, is not the chief motivating factor in state behavior for powers of the middle rank. (Abstract supplied)

927
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and David P. Calleo. EUROPE AND AMERICA, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. Foreign service journal, v. 46, Jan. 15, 1969: 16-20. illus.
JX1. A53, v. 46

Panel discussion at a conference on "Foreign Affairs in the 1970s," sponsored by the American Foreign Service Association. Brzezinski presents broad analyses of six areas of East-West relations, particularly in Europe, and recommends general policy positions concerning the revitalization of American-European cooperation in joint endeavors, Soviet activities in Eastern Europe, the U.S. attitude toward East-West relations, U.S. relations with China, and arms control. Calleo examines Western Europe chiefly with regard to the consequences and future role of U.S. policy there. The ensuing questions and answers deal with nuclear weapon levels, the U.S. attitude toward China, a possible U.S. withdrawal from NATO, whether the status of communism in Rumania and Yugoslavia may motivate further Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, and the future of Anglo-American and Anglo-European relations.

928
Choucri, Nazli. THE PERCEPTUAL BASE OF NON-ALIGNMENT. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 57-74.
JX1901. J6, v. 13

Almost two-thirds of the nations in the world have chosen not to join either of the two dominant alliance systems--the Communist or the Western. The nonaligned nations are not a homogeneous group in attitude and behavior, and the degree of variation among them is largely an empirical question. This paper examines some general perceptions underlying the development of nonalignment policy for India, Egypt, and Indonesia during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It uses an interaction model linking sets of actions by a two-step mediation process, the intermediate steps being (1) the actor's perceptions of input behavior, and (2) the perceptualized intentions with respect to his own actions or verbal responses. Data in the study were speeches of national leaders on world issues, and they were examined by means of automated content analysis. A number of specific conclusions are discussed; in general, the degree of variation among Indian, Egyptian, and Indonesian attitudes is not significant; positive assessments of the Afro-Asian group appear to be a more significant component of the perceptual base of nonalignment than are negative evaluations of the major powers. (Abstract supplied)

929
Cousins, Norman. MORE ABOUT THE SHAPE OF THE TABLE [editorial] Saturday review, v. 52, Jan. 25, 1969: 20.
Z1219. S25, v. 52

The haggle over the shape of the table at the Paris peace talks emphasizes the conflict between national interests and human interests, the incompatibility of absolute national sovereignty and world peace, and the need to establish an authority over nations. Since nations cannot deal sensibly with assaults, an authoritative third party must be empowered to intervene. The United Nations has been ineffective because national sovereignties have deprived it of adequate means for handling crises; nations have reserved the right of ultimate decision and have been unwilling for the United Nations to dictate a settlement. Men must reach each other across national barriers and make human interest their prime concern; they can work "with the sovereignties if possible and against them if necessary."

930
Csizmas, Michael, comp. PRAGUE 1968; DOCUMENTS [Prag 1968; Dokumente] Bern, Verlag S[chweizerisches] O[st-] I[institut, 1968] 294 p. (Tatsachen und Meinungen, 5)
DB215. 6. C7

Original documents, mostly from East European sources, dealing with the development of the concept of "democratic socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia. The period covered is from 1967 to August 1968, when the attempt to put this kind of socialism into operation was frustrated by the Soviet invasion. Another volume, Prag 1968; Analyse, will discuss the interconnections and the world significance of the Czechoslovak crisis.

931
Davies, James C. POLITICAL STABILITY AND INSTABILITY: SOME MANIFESTATIONS AND CAUSES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 1-17.
JX1901. J6, v. 13

The study of value consensus and dissensus is a potentially fruitful area for the development of new and deeper hypotheses about political behavior, particularly in unstable times. This paper reports on a survey study of popular political and social values in the United States and Brazil, with an eye to helping explain the relative political stability of the US. Two major causes emerge from the data and from socioeconomic reality: the vastly greater hiatus between the rich and the poor in Brazil, and the enormous difference between

the two countries in their social and political heritage. The values of equality in politics and in at least economic opportunity appear to have made a difference in the current end-product of American political life. Poor respondents in the US lack the intense hostility toward the rich that is shown by poor Brazilians; and Brazilians generally lack the degree of involvement and trust in political processes that showed up in the American interviews. This research approach should be extended and refined. (Abstract supplied)

932
Djilas, Milovan. DJILAS REVISITS ORWELL: THERE'LL BE MANY DIFFERENT COMMUNISMS IN 1984. New York times magazine, Mar. 23, 1969: 28, 134-137, 140. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1969

The world in 1984 will be very different from what George Orwell imagined when he wrote his famous fictional reflections on the meaning of Stalinist totalitarianism shortly after World War II. At that time Stalin was at the height of his powers, but he had already sown the seeds of a harvest of failure for the "new class" he had created to govern Russia and for the dogma that furnished that class with its ideological justification. Today, Stalinism is entangled in a profound and probably fatal internal crisis, which, moreover, has become a crisis of Marxism itself. In the Soviet Union the most likely heir of the defunct party apparatus is the officer corps. Pressured by China, which has outstanding territorial claims against the Soviet empire, and checked by the superior power of the United States, a military regime will find it advantageous to cultivate more amiable relations with the West. Furthermore, the military lacks any principle to legitimize its rule, which suggests that military despotism may be a prelude to "decisive democratic transformations." In China the ideological crisis will strengthen provincial and traditional forces and cause the party apparatus to be replaced by the military and the state bureaucracy. Cuba and Albania on the other hand, may succeed in isolating their domestic politics from the ideological storms abroad. In all three countries utopian regimes, whose leaders will have ceased to believe in the utopian myths, will still be in power in 1984. This situation already exists in Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia may play a unique role in the developments of the next few years because of the convergence by 1984 of Western "capitalism" and Eastern "socialism" in the Yugoslav economy. The creation of this new form of society is of incalculable significance. The most hopeful trend, however, is the worldwide decline of ideologies, which have served only to "stifle human ideals and obscure vital human problems."

933
EAST EUROPE. Current history, v. 56, Apr. 1969: 193-229, 242-244. D410.C82, v. 56

Partial contents.--The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist commonwealth, by Kurt L. London. --East Europe and the United States, by Andrzej Korbonski.--Czechoslovakia in transition, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein.--Yugoslavia: the diplomacy of balance, by Stephen S. Anderson.--Poland: myth versus reality, by Richard F. Staar.--Two Germanies: a nation without a state, by Hans A. Schmitt.

Collection of articles on the foreign relations and international developments of the East European countries. After reviewing the relationship of these states to the Soviet Union, London sees little hope for their full sovereignty, while Korbonski notes opportunities for the United States to improve its East European relations by using fresh approaches to the area.

934
[EAST-WEST RELATIONS] Relations Est-Ouest [by] X. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Jan. 1969: 24-37. D410.R45, v. 25

Presents a balance sheet of East-West relations with an emphasis on how they were affected by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The author cites the nuclear nonproliferation, outer space, and test ban treaties as indicies of the preinvasion stability of these relations, which were becoming more harmonious through an intensification of bilateral rapport (Glassboro Conference, 1967) and increased economic and social contacts between the two blocs. He concludes, however, that the invasion, although it has brought cohesion among the Warsaw Pact members, may have had an adverse effect on détente. The action confirmed that Soviet policy is above all determined to safeguard socialism; i.e., to maintain the position it acquired in Europe after World War II and the unconditional alinement of the "democratic republics" according to the Soviet plan.

935
Eitner, Hans-Jürgen. [MAO TSE-TUNG OR THE END OF AN EPOCH] Mao Tse-tung oder das Ende einer Epoche. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Dec. 1968: 728-736. D839.A885, v. 19

Explains that for China's future development, the solving of its immense and growing economic and social problems, and especially its world-power aspirations "Mao's myth of a guerrilla period will prove as irrelevant as Marx' myth of the proletariat [is] for the Soviet Union of today."

936
Fedder, Edwin H. ON THE USE OF MODELS IN SIMULATIONS AND GAMES. International studies quarterly, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 111-116. D839.B2, v. 13

Comments on three simulation models--the political-military exercise; the technological, economic, military, political evaluation routine; and the internation simulation (INS)--suggests that several basic errors impair the utility of simulation, and appends "one possible method for programming war into the INS model . . . as a procedure that might be of value to" simulators.

937
Gilula, Marshall F., and David N. Daniels. VIOLENCE AND MAN'S STRUGGLE TO ADAPT. Science, v. 164, Apr. 25, 1969: 396-405. Q1.S35, v. 164

Contends that violence is no longer an effective means of adaptation to stress situations. Gilula and Daniels find that the biological-instinctual, functional, and social-learning theories of aggression provide complementary ways of understanding the nature of violence. They explore the relationship between violence and the mass media, mental illness, and firearms control and analyze collective and sanctioned violence. Because the conditions in which men live have changed and are changing so rapidly, violent means of adaptation now threaten man's survival.

938
Hassner, Pierre. CHANGE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968. 24 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 45)
U162.A3, no. 45, etc.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--pt. 1. The background.

Analysis of the factors working for and against changing the status quo in Europe. Hassner asserts that the quest to alter present-day security arrangements arises not from a search for increased security but from a desire to achieve new political objectives. Now that both East and West seem to agree that the military situation has stabilized, they can pursue the long-range goal of a political settlement in Europe. This pursuit must be cautious, however, in order not to jeopardize the military security inherent in the status quo. An appraisal of the motives of various powers to change or conserve the status quo indicates that the construction of a peaceful order in Europe is possible but will evolve slowly and by stages.

939
Isaacs, Harold R. COLOR IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Jan. 1969: 235-250.
D410.F6, v. 47

Race and color have become significant factors in the post-World War II world, which has seen the end of Western white domination and the emergence of some 70 new nonwhite states. All of the have nations of the world are white except Japan, and all of the have-not nations are nonwhite. Both angry nonwhite radicals and frightened white conservatives have predicted a universal race war because racial issues, including ethnic and tribal differences, are almost universally present as one of several determining factors in other issues that dominate hemispheric confrontations. Internationally the most important racial conflict is that between Chinese and Russians or between Chinese and Americans. The Chinese have used the issue of race effectively in an attempt to establish themselves as leaders of the Third World. Race and color have become matters of vital concern to the United States both domestically and internationally since the hopes awakened during the late 1950's and early 1960's have been cruelly dashed in the last five years as a result of the Vietnam War. Race is now an even more critical problem than those of poverty and the cities. The certain impact of American power on the world will differ according to whether the United States moves towards an open, humane society or one marked by separatism and the garrison state.

940
Krag, Jens O. EUROPE AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Review of international affairs, v. 20, Jan. 5, 1969: 11-12.
D839.R4, v. 20

Since the Cuban crisis, détente has become a prevailing tendency in international relations; both the United States and the Soviet Union favored it and began to contact each other to solve "issues of common interest." This led to some achievements in the field of disarmament but did not produce a ban on antiballistic missiles. In 1968 hope was raised by the events in Czechoslovakia that the liberation of the East European countries could be achieved through changes in the countries themselves rather than through a clash or agreement between the great powers. There must have been a strong reason--such as the situation in East Germany, where "the Soviet system would not be able to hold water when weighed on democratic principles"--behind the Soviet Union's decision to invade Czechoslovakia and thus impair the international tendency toward détente. The occupation did not shift the balance of power, which depends on a balance of nuclear weapons, nor is advancement to the German border important for the Soviet Union in the jet age. However, the occupation meant a loss for Russia, which in a critical situation can no longer count on the loyalty and cooperation of the East European military forces. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union is still interested in détente. Therefore, if the West acts wisely, does not continue the arms race or resume the cold war, and shows that it has enough strength and confidence to pursue a détente, it might become more attractive as a free world, fertile in ideas, free of social upheavals, and technologically and economically advanced. A joint decision to nullify the Munich Agreement and the recognition of the Polish borders, as well as closer contacts with Eastern Europe, might not only help Czechoslovakia but also contribute greatly to détente.

941
Leonhard, Wolfgang. [DIFFERENTIATION OF THE EASTERN BLOC--EXTENT AND LIMITS] Differenzierung des Ostblocks--Ausmass und Grenzen. Osteuropa, v. 18, Dec. 1968: 851-870.
DR1.O8, v. 18
Modified version of the paper delivered on Sept. 21, 1968, in Berlin at the annual meeting of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde, a German society for the study of Eastern Europe.

Examines trends toward independence among Eastern-bloc countries, particularly Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Communist China, Albania, Rumania, North Korea, and Czechoslovakia. Leonhard discusses neo-Stalinism and "reform communism" and points out that any détente policy toward the Eastern bloc must start with a differentiation of existing trends in world communism.

942
Millar, T. B. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FAR EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA FOLLOWING THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. In Royal United Service Institution, London, Journal, v. 114, Mar. 1969: 11-18
U1.R8, v. 114
"A lecture given at the R. U. S. I. on 9th October 1968." Discussion included.

Discusses such matters as the effects of European acceptance of the status quo on the unstable situation in Asia, the possibilities of forming an effective regional alliance to counter the Communist threat, the consequences of American withdrawal from Vietnam, the growing Chinese nuclear menace, and the probable reemergence of Japan as a military power in Asia.

943
THE NEW ASIAN POWER BALANCE. International journal, v. 24, winter 1968-69: 1-186.
D839.I5, v. 24

Contents.--Security in Asia: reappraisals after Vietnam, by Coral Bell.--The prospective politics of insecurity and strategic asymmetry in Asia, by Wayne Wilcox.--Substitutes for SEATO?, by Peter Lyon.--The Russians and Vietnam: strategies of indirection, by Charles B. McLane.--Peking and Hanoi: anatomy

of a revolutionary partnership, by Alexander Woodside. --The new Chinese polity, by R. G. Boyd. --Beyond charisma: princely politics and the problem of political succession in Cambodia, by Milton E. Osborne. --Extraparliamentary activities and political unrest in Japan, by Harry K. Nishio. --India and world politics in the post-Nehru era, by M. S. Rajan. --Review articles: Malaysia as a nation-state, by Dennis J. Duncanson. The Chinese perception of world order, by J. L. Cranmer-Byng. Rewriting Burmese history, by James Barrington. Some recent literature on Pakistan, by Charles J. Adams.

Essays exploring the prospects for stability and progress in Asia. The chief problems facing important individual countries and the impact of the Vietnam War, great-power rivalries, Chinese Communist influence, and local nationalisms are investigated. Conclusions are drawn concerning the part that the United States and other Western countries can be expected to play in the future of this region.

944
PARTNERSHIP AND FEDERAL WAYS TO BALANCE FAIRLY U.S. AND NATO ALLIES DISCUSSED BY PANEL. Freedom & union, v. 24, Mar. 1969: 5-16. illus. JX1901.F6, v. 24

"Full transcript of the tape recording of a panel discussion chaired by former Ambassador Theodore Achilles, Federal Union Vice President. Panelists were: Paul Martin, Government Leader, Canadian Senate; Paul-Henri Spaak, former NATO Secretary General; Woodruff Wallner, U.S. Minister to Paris and Clarence Streit, President, Federal Union, Inc., publisher of this magazine."

945
Pearson, Lester B. TRADE, AID, AND PEACE. Saturday review, v. 52, Feb. 22, 1969: 23-26. Z1219.S25, v. 52

Comments on the economic relations between industrially developed nations and between developed and developing countries and notes the effect of these relations on international cooperation and world peace. Pearson contends that the multinational firm is a factor in eroding national sovereignty, and, if European countries would relinquish "certain sovereign rights in the interests of a larger economic and political community," their relations with other states would be strengthened. He states that economic development offers the greatest opportunity for constructive international cooperation because "there is the greatest body of immediate agreement about objectives and methods" in this field.

946
Pruitt, Dean G. STABILITY AND SUDDEN CHANGE IN INTERPERSONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 18-38. JX1901.J6, v. 13

Change in the behavior of one member of a dyad is often reciprocated by the other member. Hence change in interpersonal and international relations often takes the form of vicious or benevolent circles. Stable relations are usually characterized by oscillations around an equilibrium point, i.e., mutually-canceling benevolent and vicious circles. Sudden change in the location of an equilibrium point typically results from one party's moving "too far" along a critical dimension, which initiates a runaway vicious or benevolent circle. A geometric interpretation of these phenomena is proposed, based on a reaction system that consists of two S-shaped curves. This system has two stable and one unstable equilibrium point. Sudden change is represented by a movement from one stable equilibrium point to the other. The likelihood of sudden change, and hence the instability of the system, is a function of the closeness of certain boundaries to the equilibrium point currently occupied. This closeness, in turn, is a function of such real-life factors as the availability of resources for retaliation, hostility, third-party pressures, etc. The analysis is related to the writings of Ashby, Boulding, and Richardson. (Abstract supplied)

947
Rejai, Mostafa. PERIODIZATION OF NATIONALISM: A POSTSCRIPT. Social science, v. 44, Jan. 1969: 20-26. H1.S55, v. 44

Edward Hallett Carr's periodization of nationalism (1945) is extended to cover postwar developments in both Western and non-Western areas. Although Carr's discussion of nationalism is found incomplete, his central conclusion--the need for international cooperation--is sustained with far greater urgency today. (Abstract supplied)

948
Scalapino, Robert A. COMMUNISM IN ASIA. Australian outlook, v. 22, Dec. 1968: 270-286. DU80.A947, v. 22

This is a transitional period for the leadership and organization of most Asian Communist parties, and the direction of developments remains indeterminate. On the other hand, the situation is much clearer with respect to the strategy and tactics of revolution. With rare exceptions Asian Communist parties take the view that violent revolution is the only possible road to power and agree that once power is achieved the immediate goals are rapid industrialization and the creation of a military force adequate to pursue broad political objectives abroad. However, despite widespread agreement on these fundamental issues, Communist unity in this part of the world, as elsewhere, is a myth. This is an era of national communism, not of Communist internationalism. The current upheavals in Communist China are in many respects a reflection of the above trends. From a slightly different point of view, they appear as consequences of the present regime's failure to solve the massive organizational and policy problems involved in modernizing China. The appeal of communism in Asia rests upon its claim to be a science of revolution and modernization. In both respects its record is mixed. Western scholars today are much less ready than before to concede that communism is a necessary stage in the forced modernization of backward societies. If a balance of forces can be found to check external aggressions in whatever form, the future of Asia will be one of political and economic diversity for Communist and non-Communist states alike.

949
Schwarz, Urs. [FEAR IN POLITICS] Die Angst in der Politik. Düsseldorf, Econ-Verlag [1967] 243 p. JA74.S36

Partial contents. --What is fear and where does it appear?--Motive powers of politics. --A fear-producing occurrence. --Irresistible instrument of

governing. --Even in a constitutional state there is fear. --The influence of fear in the international domain. --To overcome political fear.

Considers fear to be a force engendering or influencing political decisions. Schwarz inquires into the normal and fear-conditioned motives of political behavior and discusses indirect terror strategy, psychological warfare, and deterrence strategy in modern times.

950
Shepherd, George W. PRAGMATIC VERSUS RADICAL NONALIGNMENT SYSTEMS. Africa today, v. 15, Dec./Jan. 1969: 5-7. DTL.A22, v. 15

Analyzes the different patterns of nonalinement in Africa that have arisen from varying conditions of development and outlooks of national leaders. While no two African countries follow an identical nonalinement policy, the ideological orientation of these policies falls generally into two categories--radical and pragmatic. The radicals tend to be drawn toward the Marxist camp and are inclined to interpret Western activities on the African Continent as neocolonialism. The pragmatists draw more on the Socialist practices of the Western democracies and recognize the importance to the future development of their countries of their economic ties with the West. Eventually the ideological differences on the African Continent may erode away, but nonalinement in some form is likely to prevail because of the "anti-imperialism spirit and race conscious psychology" inherited by African states from their colonialist background.

951
Stevenson, Adlai E. AN ETHIC FOR SURVIVAL; ADLAI STEVENSON SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1936-1965. Edited, with introd. and commentary, by Michael H. Prosser. Assisted by Lawrence H. Sherlick. New York, Morrow, 1969. 571 p. port. E744.S849
Bibliography and bibliographical footnotes.

Fifty selected speeches on such topics as the nature and consequences of war, the United Nations, the problems of disarmament, and various aspects of American foreign policy. A "Chronological List of Stevenson's Addresses and Statements on International Affairs, 1936-1965" is appended.

952
Tsurutani, Taketsugu. STABILITY AND INSTABILITY; A NOTE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS. Journal of politics, v. 30, Nov. 1968: 910-933. illus. JA1.J6, v. 30

Attempts to identify political stability and to delineate two broad categories of political instability with the hope "that such an effort will elicit meaningful hypotheses concerning a theory of political development." Tsurutani offers observations based upon his research concerning the political behavior of developing nations.

953
VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. Current history, v. 56, Feb. 1969: 65-105, 110-116. D410.C82, v. 56

Partial contents. --The political-strategic significance of Vietnam, by William C. Johnstone. --The many-sided politics of South Vietnam, by Richard Butwell. --North Vietnam today and tomorrow, by Kenneth P. Landon. --The National Liberation Front, by Peter Arnett. --Rebellion or subversion in Cambodia?, by Michael Leifer. --Thailand's role in Southeast Asia, by Kenneth Young. --The Malaysian political game, by Robert O. Tilman.

Essays on Southeast Asian problems, including the Vietnam War, insurgency in Cambodia, Thailand's regional role, and the relationship of Malaysia to the superpowers. Johnstone emphasizes that South Vietnam's political-strategic significance for the United States has been reduced; according to Arnett, the war is just a necessary diversion from the Vietcong's main struggle to dominate the people.

954
Weinstein, Franklin B. THE CONCEPT OF A COMMITMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 39-56. JX1901.J6, v. 13

Suggests that one of the principal problems relating to current alliance commitments is that nations do not share the same understanding of what it means to be committed. Two conflicting concepts of commitment, "situational" and "nonsituational," are delineated, illustrated, and discussed. Then, by examining in some detail France's situational view of commitments and the United States' nonsituational view, the essay suggests how some of the major disagreements dividing Paris and Washington are related to their differing perspectives on the meaning of a commitment. Finally, the implications of both concepts of commitment for the future of international relations are briefly considered. (Abstract supplied)

955
Zoll, Donald A. VIOLENCE IN THE CIVILIZED SOCIETY. Intercollegiate review, v. 5, fall 1968: 3-12. illus. AP2.I64, v. 5

"Violence is an inherent characteristic of all human societies." Civilized societies acknowledge its inevitability and seek to institutionalize it in socially acceptable and beneficial forms such as sports and dancing. Since the decline of war as an acceptable expression of violence, Western societies have drifted toward regarding security as the highest value and in so doing have disparaged the value of violence. This attempt to "tranquilize youth" by offering it pallid substitutes for earlier expressions of violence only bred "a far more sinister variety . . . violence without rules and without purpose." Violence is a useful educational experience only if the individual accepts the risks it involves personally, not as part of a mob. It is therefore essential to restore a spirit of competition in a world with diminished possibilities of expressing violence. Those who oppose this on altruistic grounds are in fact contributing to the trend toward illegitimate and antisocial forms of violence.

B. FOREIGN POLICIES

956
Anderson, Stephen S. UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE PATH TO ACCOMMODATION. Current history, v. 55, Nov. 1968: 281-287, 304. D410.C82, v. 55

The existence of a détente between two powers does not indicate that fundamental problems in their rela-

tions have been solved or that they have reached formal or even informal agreements. However, during the U.S.-Soviet détente that has existed since 1962, a number of factors have forced the superpowers toward accommodation: anxiety caused by fear of a nuclear confrontation, the high cost of tension in economic terms, the erosion of bloc arrangements, and the domestic situation in each country. The events in Czechoslovakia and the Vietnam conflict have not negated these factors. Evidence of this accommodation has been exhibited in various ways: the 1962-1963 high-level bilateral talks between Soviet and American diplomats, which resulted in the hotline between Moscow and Washington and the multilateral limited test ban treaty; the sale of American wheat to the Soviet Union; the Glassboro Conference; the inauguration of commercial jet service between New York and Moscow; the signing of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; and the agreement to discuss offensive and defensive nuclear missile systems limitation. Changes in the domestic political situation of either superpower or external friction might halt this process of accommodation. Moreover, this process might not necessarily be in the best interests of the world community.

957
Apalin, G. "NEW PERIOD" IN PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY? International affairs (Moscow) no. 2, Feb. 1969: 7-13. D839.I465, 1969

Although Communist China's foreign policy toward the United States is giving way to "moderation" and "prudence," China has no intention of abandoning the main objectives of its hegemonic foreign policy--to split the Socialist world and maliciously attack and provoke the Soviet Union. China's foreign policy has become more moderate because Peking does not want to worsen relations with America, which could take advantage of China's deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and its internal political struggle. Instead of fighting imperialism, with the rest of the Socialist community, China has substituted phrasemongering for the real anti-imperialist struggle and is supporting the actions of imperialism against socialism and the Soviet Union.

958
Badeau, John. NIXON FACES THE MIDDLE EAST. Interplay, v. 2, Feb. 1969: 4-7. illus. P&GP RR

The Nixon administration will have difficulty in solving the Middle East situation because of the growing internal problems in both the Arab States and Israel and the Soviet Union's increasing influence in the Arab world. Since the Arab-Israeli War, Egypt's and Jordan's maneuverability have been restricted by the belligerence of the growing and popularly-supported Arab guerrillas, who advocate Israel's destruction. At the same time, the military establishments of these countries "are more restless and less easily controlled by the central government than in the past." Israel, too, is being confronted with many domestic and foreign problems, which have steadily narrowed its maneuverability with respect to a peace settlement. The failure of the Eshkol government to contain Arab guerrillas and the continued dislocation of the Israeli economy have made the government vulnerable to popular discontent. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been able to demonstrate its friendship to the Arab world by refurnishing arms to Egypt in the wake of a disastrous Arab defeat. Russia's aid and dependability have helped it penetrate the country as never before. Against this background, the Nixon administration could aline itself more closely with Israel and guarantee its defense through a military commitment, but after the Vietnam experience this is unlikely. Furthermore, a total American commitment to Israel would polarize the Soviet-American position in the Middle East. Russia's proposal of an imposed peace, which would force the Arabs and Israelis to agree to concessions, would be difficult for the United States to support since such a solution would raise serious questions about present and future American commitments in the Middle East, especially in the northern tier states. President Nixon could be stronger in pressing for Israeli flexibility, but there is no indication that he will do so. Instead, his "policies will probably end up by being not very different from those of the past."

959
Bender, Peter. [DÉTENTE OR SECURITY?] Entspannung oder Sicherheit? Monat, v. 20, Nov. 1968: 5-8. AP30.M56, v. 20

Considers Bonn's Eastern policy still valid despite the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Bender maintains that a West German retreat to its former rigid attitude toward the Soviet bloc would have adverse consequences for the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe, whose accommodation must be brought about in cooperation with Moscow. The Soviet intervention has narrowed for the time being chances for a complete normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and those countries but has not permanently blocked strong tendencies toward settlement, which are present on both sides and will eventually predominate.

960
Borm, William. [SOLUTION TO THE GERMAN PROBLEM THROUGH SECURITY CONFERENCE] Deutschlandlösung durch Sicherheitskonferenz. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 4, 1968: 428-432. D839.M58, v. 9

Considers Bonn's policies on German reunification and toward Eastern Europe over the last 20 years a futile attempt to solve the German question. The basis for solving the problem is now much worse than it was initially at the end of World War II. As long as there is no East-West settlement on European security, no viable solution to the German question--viz, no peace treaty--is in sight. Therefore, a prime objective of the German Federal Republic's foreign policy should be a European security conference.

961
Brezarić, Dr. RELATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Dec. 20, 1968: 8-10. D839.R4, v. 19

Since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the United States and the Soviet Union never abandoned the effort to preserve their monopolistic position in solving world problems. This parallel effort inevitably led to a growing mutual understanding on spheres of interest, bloc orientation, and "recognition of certain 'rights' in the opponent's so-called vital zone." This development was to their advantage, and their influence in world affairs grew. The Vietnam War and the Middle East crisis have put this orientation to difficult tests. In the Czechoslovak crisis the U.S. Government acted in two directions: It tried to increase the cohesion within NATO and at the same time continue the dialog

with the Soviet Union. Since then diplomatic contact between the two superpowers has been resumed, and their attitudes often coincide in the United Nations. The United States is pleased with Russia's behavior in the attempt to solve the Vietnam problem. In the Middle East both superpowers pursue a policy of avoiding war, and the differences in their policies do not seem great. The pursuit of their special interests in the Mediterranean is not likely to have more than "local" significance and will probably not lead to a world war. In Europe the bloc policy has been stepped up. The Czechoslovak crisis did not cause any serious changes in Washington-Moscow relations. Both powers made a desperate effort to "forget" it as soon as possible and showed an inclination to hasten their dialog and make it more effective. China might, however, change the dialog into an agreement. No great changes in U.S. foreign policy can be expected under the Nixon administration. Priority will probably be given to negotiations on the problems closely linked with security; i.e., antimissile systems and offensive and defensive missiles.

962
Brosio, Manlio. SOVIET POLICY: WEAKNESS, YES, BUT DANGER, TOO. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, winter 1968-69: 493-500.
D839.A85, v. 6

Address presented by the Secretary General of NATO at the Fourteenth General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Lisbon, Portugal.

The Czech crisis has highlighted both the weakness and dangers of Soviet policies. By resorting to force to quell the growing liberality of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin leaders displayed their inability to find a political solution to the situation. Despite protestations to the contrary, the Soviet Union is fearful of permitting a member of its empire to seek an independent path to communism. However, while the Czech episode represents a crisis in the Communist world, it does not mean that the Soviet Union will follow a less dangerous role in world affairs. In fact, it has prompted an increase in Soviet military power and is being exploited to further the Soviet goal of "driving a wedge between the United States and Europe, and between Germany and the other Allies." The NATO allies can best respond to the renewed Soviet threat by following the complementary goals of defense and détente as embodied in the Harmel Report. Although the Czech occupation revealed that the Soviet Union is not yet ready to accept détente, which "implies free and full development of multilateral and bilateral relations between the Communist World" and the West, the NATO partners should not abandon their efforts in this direction. They should continue to take advantage of every opportunity to improve East-West relations while at the same time bolstering their security framework in consideration of the Kremlin's "great respect for strength."

963
Bruderer, Georg. [IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE INVASION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC] Ideologische Begründung der Invasion der CSSR. Der klare Blick, v. 9, Oct. 16, 1969: 2-3. illus.
P&GP RR

Underlines the distinction made by Pravda between abstract and class-conscious concepts of national independence and between abstract and class-conscious sovereignty. Each Communist Party, Moscow asserts, "is responsible not only to its own nation but to all Socialist countries and the entire Communist movement" as well. In the case of Czechoslovakia, a leading role of the Communist Party was seriously undermined before the intervention.

964
Campeanu, Alexandru. EASTERN, WESTERN EUROPE RAPPROCHEMENT SEEN. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Eastern Europe; political, sociological, and military affairs. no. 29; Sept. 18, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,445) p. 129-139.
AS36.U57, no. 46,445

Translation of an article in the Rumanian-language periodical Lupta de Clasa, June 1968, p. 52-62.
HX8.L8, 1968

Considers Western efforts to revitalize NATO a main obstacle to the abolition of military blocs in Europe, whose very existence impedes progress toward East-West détente and the creation of a viable peace and security system for the entire Continent. Such a system depends largely on the development of multilateral collaboration between European states based on mutual respect for independence and sovereignty. Because of the NATO policy and West German tendencies toward changing the territorial status quo in Europe, Rumania does its best to strengthen the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It pursues a policy of friendship and alliance with Socialist countries and of growing and expanding cooperation with all nations in the world, regardless of their social systems.

965
Canstein, Raban, Freiherr von. [ARE WE BECOMING ENDANGERED?] Werden wir bedroht? Wehrkunde, v. 17, Sept. 1968: 437-442.
U3.W396, v. 17

Explains the Soviet Union's conduct of its foreign policy by reference to Moscow's striving to secure the status quo within its bloc and in central Europe, its holding on to the goal of world revolution, and its efforts toward predominance in all parts of Europe. Canstein thinks that the long-range development of the European situation will not endanger West Germany to the point where Bonn will have to face Soviet hegemony or Soviet-American condominium in Europe. He points to America's interest in maintaining West European security and to West Germany's in maintaining NATO.

966
Cho, M. Y. [PEKING BETWEEN HANOI AND PYONGYANG] Peking zwischen Hanoi und Pyongyang. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Dec. 1968: 737-750.
D839.885, v. 19

Finds in North Vietnam's and North Korea's different geopolitical situations, past histories, and relations to the Soviet Union an explanation for Communist China's different policies toward those two countries. Cho traces North Vietnamese and North Korean relations with the United States in the past few years. He considers the Vietnam War principally a conflict between the United States and Communist China. It is possible that after its conclusion Peking will seek an accommodation with Washington "to bring about Moscow's isolation."

967
CHOOSING, OR NOT CHOOSING, BETWEEN COMMUNISTS [editorial] Life, v. 66, Apr. 11, 1969: 36.
AP2.L547, v. 66

The Sino-Soviet clash on the Ussuri River has presented the United States with the options of either pur-

suing negotiations with the Russians and letting "the Chinese sink further into isolation" or attempting "to improve . . . relations simultaneously with Moscow and, to whatever extent possible, with Peking." The former approach could ruin any hope of coaxing China out of its dangerous isolation; the latter offers an opportunity to edge China closer to "entering the world community as a responsible Asian power" and would best serve U.S. interests. Unfortunately, President Nixon "has publicly shown little sign of adopting this [latter] approach"; the administration's stance toward China does not balance its initiatives toward Russia. The United States should welcome allied contacts with Peking and refuse to appear as China's chief antagonist.

968
Clark, Joseph S. CHINA AND THE VIETNAM WAR--WILL HISTORY REPEAT? Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 4 p.
P&GP RR

At head of title: 90th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Brief survey of developments in Communist China with special emphasis upon its Government's policy toward the Vietnam War. Clark warns that China is capable of turning Vietnam into another Korea and that the United States should be cautious in gambling on what might trigger Chinese intervention.

969
Cleveland, Harlan. THE IRRELEVANCE OF ANTI-COMMITMENT. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, winter 1968-69: 520-530.
D839.A85, v. 6

Address presented at the 1968 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2, 1968.

Although the mood of noncommitment that is evident in America today may be "pleasantly righteous," it is irrelevant in view of the present world situation. If America completely turns its back on world problems, it runs the risk of eventually becoming overinvolved. In many instances it must choose between helping to arm a country or later assuming complete responsibility for its defense. In order to avoid the consequences of living in wealth "in the midst of a global slum," it must participate in international development programs. Moreover, it can conserve its resources by cooperating with other nations in certain technical areas such as weather forecasting and communications. Today there "is a range of dangers and opportunities which is neither the Cold War of our old fears nor the warm détente of our recent dreams." The uncertainty surrounding the predictability of Soviet behavior makes it imperative that the NATO allies maintain a strong defensive capability. However, at the same time the West should take advantage of the new opportunities for easing world tension in this post-cold war era. In order to obtain the support of its citizens for carrying its share of the world's burdens, the United States should channel its efforts whenever feasible through multilateral organizations. Overseas activities that involve multilateral sponsorship have always received more popular support in the United States than unilateral operations. Regardless of America's course of action overseas, it will always have an impact abroad through its accomplishments at home. If America can eliminate poverty at home, the expectations of poor people in other countries will rise, and they will look to the United States for aid. Similarly, other nations will want to share any successful U.S. innovations for treating urban problems and may eventually look to the United States as a model for the creation of a "raceless society." Therefore, in fulfilling its domestic commitments, the United States enlarges its commitments abroad.

970
Cleveland, Harlan. VIEWPOINT; THE ROAD BACK TO INTERNATIONALISM. Atlantic monthly, v. 223, May 1969: 57-59.
AP2.A8, v. 223

America's response to the tensions of the 1970's cannot be withdrawal and anticommitment. It is hoped that the "No More Vietnams" slogan will be interpreted not as "No More Foreign Policy, or even No More Resistance to Indirect Aggression" but as "sharing with as many partners as possible the responsibility for international peacekeeping and development." Unfortunately, the United States has learned the hard way that the more power a nation possesses, the more difficult it becomes to use that power without partners. During the past 20 years U.S. international commitments fared better in domestic politics if they were multilateral rather than unilateral; it is hoped that the United States will recognize that "the cure for [the] feeling of overcommitment is multilateral commitment."

971
Conference on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Princeton, N.J., 1965. DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York, Free Press [1967] xiv, 304 p. illus.
E744.C7 1965

"Sponsored jointly by the Foreign Policy Association and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University."
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Foreign policy as an issue-area, by James N. Rosenau.--Personality and attitude correlates of foreign policy orientation, by Herbert McClosky.--Attitude change and foreign policy in the cold war era, by Milton J. Rosenberg.--Social position, party identification and foreign policy orientation: a Norwegian case study, by Johan Galtung.--Mass communication and foreign policy, by Bernard C. Cohen.--Voting and foreign policy by Lester W. Milbrath.--Urbanization, parochialism, and foreign policy, by Scott Greer.--Electoral punishment and foreign policy crises, by Kenneth N. Waltz.--Making democracy safe for the world: national politics and foreign policy, by Theodore J. Lowi.

Collection of essays illustrating "that domestic sources of foreign policy are no less crucial to its content and conduct than are the international situations toward which it is directed." A wide range of domestic variables is considered; the process of interrelation among the many sources is clarified.

972
Cox, David. FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE ELECTION: PLUS ÇA CHANGE . . . ? Queen's quarterly, v. 75, winter 1968: 737-740.
AP5.Q3, v. 75

Despite Prime Minister Trudeau's aspirations to chart bold new paths in Canada's foreign policies, the prospects are slight for any immediate changes. The Government's extensive review of current policies,

which is now underway, will probably confirm "alliancemanship" rather than stress reform. Considering the present situation in central Europe, it is difficult to imagine Canada's discontinuing its membership in NATO; moreover, the Government cannot easily sever Canada's membership in the North American Air Defense Command even though the manned-bomber threat is very remote. As a small state that is highly dependent upon its powerful southern neighbor, Canada has extremely limited opportunities for diplomatic innovation. Trudeau's desire to deemphasize multilateral organizations and improve Canada's bilateral relations with other states instead may have a significant long-term effect on Canadian foreign policy, but, in the short term, "it will take more than a reform-minded government" to drastically revise its basic postures.

973
DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION; INDIA SHEDS HER LAST ILLUSION. Round table, the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 233, Jan. 1969: 85-89.
AP4.R6, 1969

Although prudent and calculating in small matters, the Indians are naive on the issues of national interest and international power politics. They cannot understand how the United States can reconcile its commitment to democracy with its hegemony over the newly independent Asian states and how Communist China can support the military regime in Pakistan while giving assistance to the relatively progressive Government of India. Thus the recent Soviet decision to supply arms to Pakistan was a great disappointment for the Indians, who believed that Russia shared India's foreign policy outlook on the country's nonalinement, its position on Kashmir, and the limiting of the growth of China's power in Asia. Now India is worried that the Russian policy is shifting to the support of Pakistan. Pakistan nuturally enjoys receiving military support from both the United States and the Soviet Union, whereas Russia welcomes this opportunity to extend its influence into Pakistan. If India's apprehension is correct, it will have two major implications: a significant restriction of India's military power and a growth of Communist activities designed to undermine the Indian Government. However, this shift in Soviet policy is not probable because of India's role in the containment of China's expansion. On the other hand, if Russia feels that the assurances of the Indian Communist Party "that India is gradually passing under the control of reactionary forces" are correct and that the time is ripe for revolutionary action by the Communists, it surely will support the Communist Party's struggle against the Government; and, if the Communists emerge as protectors of the Indian Muslims, the Muslims might well support the Communist Party. Such a danger, while still remote, cannot be ruled out.

974
Duckwitz, Georg F. [THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION] Gewaltverzicht und Interventionsrecht. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Sept. 1968: 519-536. D839.A885, v. 19

On March 25, 1966, the German Federal Republic proposed to the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization an exchange of formal declarations "whereby each side would renounce the use of force for settling international issues between itself and the other nation." Soviet-German diplomatic talks on the proposal had already lasted for over a year and a half when in July 1968 Moscow, in violation of their agreed secrecy, published documents about them. This prompted the German Federal Republic to instantly publish pertinent documents as well. What then became a public record of those talks gave a clear picture of Moscow's German and central European policy and of Bonn's new Eastern policy. The Soviet Union insists, among other things, that prerequisites of its renunciation of force vis-a-vis the German Federal Republic be Bonn's recognition under international law of the German Democratic Republic and acceptance of the European status quo, including the Oder-Neisse Line, as final and indefeasible. Pointing to the alleged militarism and revanchism of the Federal Republic and to the allegedly growing neonazism there, the Soviet Union claims to have the right under articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter to intervene directly in the Federal Republic's internal affairs to suppress an aggressive German policy. The German Federal Republic turned down Soviet requests, claims, and allegations as lacking a legal, rational, or factual basis. For the Federal Republic to decide vis-a-vis the Soviet Union on Polish-German or on Czechoslovak-German boundaries would encroach on Poland's or on Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and independence, no matter how precarious these are in view of the Soviet power position there. The Soviet Union's right under the U.N. Charter to intervene in the internal affairs of a former enemy state was naturally limited in time, for it certainly would undermine world order if an individual nation's "outlawry" were institutionalized forever.

975
Fainsod, Merle. SOME REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. American political science review, v. 62, Dec. 1968: 1093-1103.
JA1.A6, v. 62

Must the United States and the Soviet Union continue to live like two scorpions in a bottle, "each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life," or can they learn to live together in peace? In searching for an answer to this question, it is pertinent to note the very different characteristics of the two competing political systems. Decisionmaking power in the U.S.S.R. is monopolized by ruling party elites to a degree quite alien to U.S. political experience. However, it is also true that Soviet foreign policymakers find their freedom of choice substantially restricted by such factors as the rigidity of the Soviet bureaucracy, the demands of Soviet citizens for higher living standards, and the corrosive effect of nationalism on Communist bloc politics. The Soviet leadership is also plagued by difficulties shared with all foreign policymakers: They must pursue their policy objectives in a political environment that they can influence but not control. In the United States, some observers continue to warn against "wishful thinking" and "surface accommodations," but others argue that U.S. commitments abroad can be reduced and new steps taken toward improved relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist States. Certainly, the shared U.S.-Soviet interests in avoiding total war and countering Communist Chinese ambitions offer some hope that détente can be strengthened, and moves in this direction have already been made through the negotiation of arms control agreements and cultural exchanges. Common interests of the Soviet Union and the United States point to a moratorium on deploying antiballistic missile systems and some form of limitation on offensive weapons. Beyond this, steps ought to be taken to reduce political tensions and encourage more positive kinds of cooperation. A word of caution is in order, however. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union

remain "entangled in a complex web of rival ambitions and shared concerns." There are no simple and certain formulas for solving the fatal problems of war and peace, and demands for clear-cut solutions can be dangerous.

976
Fejto, François. MOSCOW AND ITS ALLIES. Problems of communism, v. 17, Nov./Dec. 1968: 29-37.
HX1. P75, v. 17

Compares the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising with the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. While different in many aspects, both situations demonstrated the real nature of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its essential weakness as a partnership of states. Fejto cites the letter to Prague of July 15, in which the Soviet Union and four of its allies, freely admit that any real concession to statehood or sovereignty might undermine the authority of the Socialist countries' ruling elites. The author outlines the history of the Warsaw Pact and Poland's, Rumania's, and East Germany's attitudes toward the Pact. Further, he evaluates the role of East German chief Walter Ulbricht and his associates, whose secret memorandum on the possibility, advisability, and feasibility of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces was circulated among the East German Party leaders as early as the spring of 1968. A summary of the memorandum was published in Literární listy, a Prague magazine, on May 30, 1968.

977
Fitzgerald, C. P. SINO-RUSSIAN FACE-OFF; THE RIVER IS NOT THE ISSUE. Nation, v. 208, Apr. 14, 1969: 465-466. AP2. N2, v. 208

There are several possible explanations for the Sino-Soviet confrontation over the Ussuri River: Both sides are exploiting an accidental clash "to provide further ammunition for the polemical war in which they have long traded insults"; Russia and China hope to distract attention from mistakes close to home--i. e., Czechoslovakia and the cultural revolution--and unify public opinion; China is seeking to formulate a new foreign policy to explore "the chances for a change of attitude in the United States to which China could make a cautious response." Probably no single theory provides a sufficient explanation; "an adequate hypothesis must cover all the facts." A war would probably be undersirable for both countries: It would divide the Communist world and give the anarchists control of the far Left. This quarrel might represent a transformation in Chinese policy--the subordination of ideology to national interests.

978
FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, Mar. 20, 1969: pt. 1, [item] 1, 1-3.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Mar. 20, 1969.
Slav Rm

All realistically minded people in Western Europe share the opinions of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which were expressed in a message to all European countries issued in Budapest on March 17, 1969. The message calls for the protection of Europe against the danger of new military conflicts and the development of cooperation among all European countries on ths basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence. The intricate problems must be solved by peaceful means because this is the only alternative to a dangerous confrontation, arms race, or discord fomented by the imperialists. Common principles, above all the inviolability of existing frontiers, must lay the foundation for European cooperation. The Soviet Union is ready to join with the European Socialist countries to ensure the success of a general European conference and make Europe a factor of stability, peace, and mutual understanding in the world.

979
Freed, Jeffrey P. THE GROWING RIFT WITH JAPAN. Progressive, v. 33, Mar. 1969: 31-34.
AP2. P8655, v. 33

Discusses the social tensions and the deterioration of U. S.-Japanese relations caused by the presence of American bases. The Japanese resent the low moral standards at the bases, fear crashes of American military aircraft, and believe that the bases create a number of inconveniences for Japanese citizens. The main thrust of the anti-American movement in Japan is coming from the Left, particularly the Zengakuren, which wants to force the Sato government to terminate the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1970. Freed concludes that the Nixon administration, by not revising or abolishing the treaty, will fail to ameliorate the principal points of U. S.-Japanese tensions, and that this failure will lead to a broadening of anti-Americanism in Japan and an increase in anti-Government activities in the 1970's.

980
Galitz, Bernard E. ON THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Monthly review, an independent socialist magazine, v. 20, Mar. 1969: 54-56.
HX1. M66, v. 20

Several months after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, five forces stand out in the country: the official Warsaw Pact forces; the remnants of the earlier "legitimate" Novotny regime; the "vital local Reds," who advocate a brand new type of socialism; students and intellectuals, whose desire for revolutionary democratic socialism was diverted by the "social democrats" into counterrevolutionary nationalism; and a group of economists who opposed socialism and wished to turn Czechoslovakia into a social democracy. The Soviet Union took the right path and fought for Socialist ideology instead of surrendering totally and opportunistically to social democracy and imperialism. This healthy policy, if applied from the beginning, would have spared Russia the embarrassment of invading a sister country but will do no good if Moscow does not solve its own problems in a revolutionary and democratic manner without using Maoism as a scapegoat to divert attention. If the Russian leaders do not act promptly, the people themselves may try to accomplish the necessary reforms without them. Had the Czechoslovak people taken power in their own hands when Novotny was overthrown by the trade unions, they could have excluded the social democratic neocapitalist intriguers peacefully and without violating Socialist legality.

981
Gittings, John. THE GIANTS CLASH. Far Eastern economic review, v. 63, Mar. 13, 1969: 446-449. illus. HC411. F18, v. 63

Examines the Sino-Soviet border dispute over the Ussuri River and maintains that the recent frontier

incident reflected "the Soviet Union's consistent policy of needling the Chinese along their vulnerable frontiers." Gittings concludes that, according to Russian realists, such a policy, which distracts China from solving its domestic problems and from refurbishing its image abroad, is in Russia's best interests.

982
Gittings, John. THE $700 MILLION QUESTION. Far Eastern economic review, v. 63, Mar. 20, 1969: 541-542. HC411. F18, v. 63

Reviews Sino-Japanese relations, finds that Japan and Communist China lack clear-cut intentions toward one another, and concludes that an attempt should be made to remove the obstacles to a Sino-Japanese rapprochement.

983
Grant, Bruce. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POLICY. Quadrant, v. 14, Jan./Feb. 1969: 37-41. AP7.Q8, v. 14

Paper from "a recent Australian Association for Cultural Freedom Seminar in Melbourne."

The basis of Australia's foreign policy in the past--"protection and loyalty to the protector"--must be reexamined in view of the anticipated withdrawal of Britain and the United States from Southeast Asia. Several of the available options--withdrawal from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and strengthening of ANZUS, rearrangement of SEATO, and conversion of Australia and New Zealand into American outposts--favor a continuation of the present policy in a revised form, but the most promising possibility is one that provides for a more active role in regional security arrangements. The nature of Australia's role must be commensurate with its power relative to other Asian countries, which means that even smaller nations must be treated as equals and a policy of neutrality substituted for the traditional anti-communist posture. The purpose of a regional policy should be to promote stability by encouraging the development of indigenous forces and institutions rather than attempting to impose an alien way of life.

984
Greene, Fred. U.S. POLICY AND THE SECURITY OF ASIA. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill [1968] xvi, 429 p. map. (The United States and China in World Affairs) DS33.4.U6G7

Partial contents.--pt. 1. U.S. security interests in Asia: The scope of security considerations. Perspectives of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The vital interest; a balance of power in Asia. Problems of implementing a balance of power in Asia.--pt. 2. The American treaty system: The chronology of treaty-making. The Western Pacific allies. The SEATO area. The Indian subcontinent. Problems of the American presence. Fear of American changes and withdrawal.--pt. 3. The Communist threat in Asia: Asian and Western views. Force in Chinese diplomacy. Threat from Hanoi; a study in confrontation and escalation.--pt. 4. The nuclear factor: China as a nuclear power. Proliferation, arms control, and the future balance in Asia.--pt. 5. Patterns and problems for American security policy in Asia: Allies, neutrals, and American security policy. United States policy and China.

A historical survey and "balance of power analysis" of U.S. security interests in Asia. Greene suggests that the United States has a major interest in seeing stability and concord maintained in this region of the globe, and for this reason he assigns first place among America's Asian problems to the emergence of Communist China as a powerful new source of regional disequilibrium and conflict. He is convinced that only a lack of means prevents Mao from carrying out his ambition to destroy the American system and concludes that the United States must adopt a policy toward China that combines forceful containment of Chinese ideological and territorial expansionism with demonstrations of U.S. willingness to enter into more cordial relations based on mutual good will. Arms control agreements and other negotiated settlements between the two countries must await success "in restraining Chinese power, blunting its ideological offensive, strengthening its neighbors, demonstrating good will, and rallying some international pressure against Peking."

985
Guttenberg, Karl T., Freiherr von. THE THREAT TO EUROPE. Central Europe journal, v. 17, Jan. 1969: 3-5. DB200.7.S74, v. 17

The author names the key points in Bonn's peace policy [toward Eastern Europe] while stressing that there can be no thought of recognizing the non-legitimate system of Walter Ulbricht. At the same time there is to be no doubt of West German readiness to promote the human, economic and intellectual relationship between the two parts of Germany. Even if the offers to reject force, thus far made by the Federal Government to the Soviet Union and several other socialist states, have been met with negative or even hostile reactions, the Bonn administration will adhere unswervingly to its policy of non-violence and peace. (Abstract supplied, modified)

986
Hartmann, Frederick H. MEANING OF THE CRISIS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Naval War College review, v. 21, Feb. 1969: 43-48. P&GP RR

Lecture delivered at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy on Oct. 25, 1968.

Viewed from the perspective of history, the crisis in Czechoslovakia cannot be interpreted as a Soviet victory, for no large power has ever been able to permanently subjugate an unwilling people. Even during the era of so-called monolithic communism under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet Union was unable to completely dominate the Communist world. Tito in Yugoslavia and Mao in China both defied Stalin's authority. Sporadic incidents of unrest in Eastern Europe indicate it wants to be free of Soviet control. Fearing that the emerging West German policy of bridgebuilding with the East might help the East Europeans realize this goal, the Kremlin leaders moved Soviet troops into Prague. However, the occupation does not signal the end of possible freedom in the East. Russia's position as a world power is seriously threatened by the animosity of "a revived and restless Germany," an increasingly strong China, and the United States and its allies. Coupled with continuing dissension within the Eastern block, Russia's precarious world position appears to indicate that "the Soviet 'victory' will, in the fullness of time, turn to ashes."

987
Hatfield, Mark. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS: A GREATER UNDERSTANDING. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Mar. 15, 1969: 322-326.
PN6121.V52, v. 35

Argues that the United States should adopt a more rational and positive policy toward Communist China but maintains that such a policy must be accompanied by a change in public attitudes toward the Communist Chinese and a fundamental change in foreign-policy formulation to be effective. Hatfield asserts that U.S. policymakers should devote more attention to Chinese cultural traditions and historical patterns in formulating a China policy and not necessarily view China's future in terms of Russia's past.

988
Hoffmann, Stanley. AMERICA AND FRANCE: MINIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING. New republic, v. 160, Apr. 5, 1969: 17-21; Apr. 12: 20-23.
AP2.N624, v. 160

Franco-American difficulties stem from procedural differences, incompatibilities due to the general stance of the two diplomacies, and specific clashes of policy. The coming Franco-American rapprochement owes much to both powers' domestic turbulence and external failures of the past year. France's new warmth toward the United States, which is mostly a result of De Gaulle's displeasure with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, does not correspond to any drastic changes in his conception of international relations, "but a revision of the time perspective suffices to make a partial rapprochement with the United States possible." The revision goes much further on the American side: President Nixon is moving closer to De Gaulle's view of a world in which the superpowers' responsibilities take into consideration the concerns of other states. Franco-American rapprochement will require cooperation between France and NATO forces and American willingness to provide military assistance to France's force de frappe. The United States should support De Gaulle's concept of West European unity, which implies the complete overhaul of NATO and a negation of supranational government in Western Europe, by not protesting too loudly either commercial agreements between Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries or the Common Market and by not putting on West Germany and England "the kind of pressure that leads their defense establishements to rely primarily on American armaments for their forces." Further, the United States should encourage Great Britain to engage in serious talks with France over nuclear cooperation and initiate the gradual transformation of NATO to promote rapprochement between France, West Germany, and England.

989
Hoffmann, Stanley. POLICY FOR THE 70S. Life, v. 66, Mar. 21, 1969: 68-70, 73-75, 77-78.
AP2.L547, v. 66

Argues that the United States needs a foreign policy based upon a new approach to world affairs, outlines the objectives of such a policy, and offers guidelines for achieving them.

990
Hornung, Otto. IS RUMANIA NEXT? Socialist commentary, Dec. 1968: 16-18.
HX3.S74, 1968

Maintains that Russia can no longer tolerate dissidents and that it will be only a matter of time until Rumania is invaded. Hornung contends that Rumaninan attempts to forge a defensive alliance are futile; the Rumanians would profit more by not provoking the Soviet Union. He concludes that, if the Russians did invade, they would not have as much difficulty in finding quislings in Rumania as in Czechoslovakia.

991
Houghton, Nealie D., ed. STRUGGLE AGAINST HISTORY: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION [by] Neal Doyle Houghton. New York, Washington Square Press [1968] 375 p.
E744.S946

Contents.--Foreword: foreign policy and social blindness in the United States, by Neal D. Houghton. --Introduction: colonialism and the United States, by Arnold J. Toynbee.--Rise of an American world power complex, by William Appleman Williams.--The cold war in Europe: 1945-1967, by Fred Warner Neal.--The military-industrial alliance, by John M. Swomley. --Cold-war-mindedness and the mass media, by D. W. Smythe and H. H. Wilson.--Dynamics of cold war psychology, by Jerome D. Frank.--The moral climate of the United States, by George B. Vetter.--The revolution of rising expectations: rhetoric and reality, by Robert L. Heilbroner.--Contrasts in economic development: China and India, by Joan Robinson.--Underdevelopment and U.S. foreign policy, by N. B. Miller. --The impact of the Cuban revolution, by Ramon Eduardo Ruiz.--The United States and revolution in Latin America, by John Gerassi.--The United States in Asia: a century of manipulation, by C. S. Burchill. --Toward a rational view of China: the Vietnam War, by Young Hum Kim.--Containing communism in Asia: theory and practice, by Roy Bennett.--The use and abuse of international law, by Clifton E. Wilson.--Can Pax Americana succeed?, by D. F. Fleming.--Coming to terms with a revolutionary world, by Michael Edwardes.--Afterword: the challenge facing American statesmen, by Neal D. Houghton.--About the authors. --Index.

Essays on the plight of U.S. foreign policy and the social revolution in America today. The authors generally agree that America has made a big mistake in Vietnam--one in a series of mistakes since the turn of the century that has weakened the American social fabric.

992
Hruska, Izak. WHY DID THE RUSSIANS MARCH? Dissent, v. 15, Nov./Dec. 1968: 478-480.
HX1.D58, v. 15

The Russians halted "democratization" in Czechoslovakia and maneuvered the country back into a dependent position within the Warsaw Pact economic system, but they paid heavily. Relations with the West European Communist parties have been strained, and the prospect of a world Communist conference under Soviet hegemony are dim; domestic repercussions within Russia can only lead to further repression. From the Russian point of view, however, the price may have been worth paying; no workable alternative may have presented itself. The invasion demonstrated that a détente between the superpowers and the autonomy of small nations conflict somewhat because détente includes the "posibility of a tacit agreement that each [superpower] 'may play rogue elephant unopposed within its own sphere.' "

993
Huizinga, J. H. AMERICA'S LOST INNOCENCE. New York times magazine, Jan. 26, 1969: 30-31, 81-83, 86. illus. AP2. N6575, 1969

Europeans, haunted by the specter of resurgent American isolationism, are wondering what has become of the United States that as late as President Kennedy's administration still relished its role as the world's strongest power. The America of today is divided and uncertain of itself, and the trend of its thinking reminds one of the course taken by Great Britain in the middle 1930's. This change from cheerful self-confidence to morbid self-doubt has come about because it is no longer possible for America to disguise its realpolitik as idealpolitik. With the breakup of the Communist empire and ideology and the advent of the ballistic missile, American foreign policy stands revealed for what it is--a struggle for power and influence in a world ruled by the law of the jungle. The question now is whether America is willing to accept the jungle world as it is, and, disabused of the consoling illusion that it fights always on the side of right, continue its essential task of maintaining the balance of power in a spirit of cool and calculating realism. There seems to be little reason to fear an American relapse into old-fashioned isolationism. The chances are good that, in the current struggle between the present and the past and the head and the heart, reality and reason will prevail. If maturation is a matter of losing one's illusions, recognizing one's limitations, moderating one's ambitions, and learning to see the world as it is, then it is clear that only now is America coming of age. One only hopes that the cost of mature wisdom will not be the loss of that audacity, generosity, and resolution that America possessed in such abundance in its age of innocence.

994
Hunter, R. E. AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. In Royal Central Asian Society, London. Journal, v. 55, Oct. 1968: 265-275. DS1. R6, v. 55

The United States has three principal objectives in the Middle East: to deny control of the area to any hostile power, which in the present circumstances means the Soviet Union; to establish and maintain friendly relations with the Arab regimes in the region; and to continue its support for Israel. These objectives are in conflict more often than not with the result that policy can be discouragingly nonproductive. The U. S. attempt to be "even handed" in the Arab-Israeli dispute has succeeded only in alienating both parties. U. S. economic aid has provoked more hostility than gratitude among the Arabs. The policy of maintaining a balance of armaments among the various contending parties in the region was a major cause of the June 1967 war. The war revealed that the United States has yet another objective in the Middle East--a mutual interest with the Soviet Union in avoiding a nuclear confrontation. It also raised some serious new problems for the United States in the form of increased Soviet penetration of the Arab States and the Mediterranean, a general deterioration in relations with both sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and new complications in the effort to maintain a military balance in the region. The planned British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf promises new worries for U. S. policymakers, and, finally, there is a new wrinkle in the problem of nuclear proliferation. The 1967 war taught the Israelis to depend on no one but themselves for their security; therefore the acquisition of nuclear weapons appears to them to be a much more attractive alternative than before. For this reason it is likely that the Middle East, not India, will provide the real test of the nonproliferation treaty. Faced with multiple dilemmas in this region, the United States now seems to have adopted a "wait-and-see" policy, which in the circumstances is probably the most practicable approach.

995
International Conference on World Politics, 6th, Berlin, 1967. THE SOVIET UNION, A HALF-CENTURY OF COMMUNISM; [papers] Edited by Kurt London. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1968] xiv, 493 p. DK266. A3I5 1967aa

"Published in co-operation with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, the George Washington University."

Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Heresy enshrined: idea and reality of the Red Army, by Roman Kolkowicz. --Soviet military policy at the fifty-year mark, by Thomas W. Wolfe. --Soviet foreign policy: fifty years of dualism, by Kurt London. --Soviet-East European relations since World War II: theoretical perceptions and political realities, by Andrew Gyorgy. --The Soviet Union and the Germans, by Klaus Mehnert. --Soviet policy in the Middle East, by by John A. Armstrong. --A half-century of Soviet policy in Asia, by Harish Kapur.

Selection of the papers presented at the Sixth International Conference on World Politics held in West Berlin, September 4-8, 1967, which review and evaluate the most important aspects of 50 years of Soviet rule.

996
Jackson, D. Bruce. CASTRO, THE KREMLIN, AND COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1969] 163 p. (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. Studies in international affairs, no. 9) F1776. 3. R9J3

Selected bibliography: p. 163.

Partial contents.--The historical setting: Impact of the Cuban revolution. The missile crisis and its reverberations.--Moscow changes tactics and rulers, 1964: The 1964 Havana Conference.--Year of the Soviet-Cuban truce; 1965: The Cuban-Chinese split. The Dominican crisis and the seeds of division. Popular fronts.--The Tricontinent Conference; Castro unchained: The Tricontinent preparatory meetings. Blowup at Havana. Venezuela and the question of material aid. Repercussions of the Tricontinent. --The competing Soviet and Cuban revolutionary doctrines: Castro and the Fidelista guerrillas. The Debray book. Debray and Muscovite communism. Motivations of the divergent doctrines. Toward the future.

Examines the effect of the growing heterogeneity of communism in the Third World on the Soviet Union's efforts to harmonize its position as a great power with the local interests of independent Communist States. As an example, Jackson provides an insight into the differences between Cuban and Russian interests and policies in Latin America and shows a cross section of international communism in a phase of international politics vastly different from the familiar image of the cold war.

997
Johnson, John J. UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS: THE ROOTS OF MISUNDERSTANDING. Current history, v. 56, Jan. 1969: 1-6, 53-54.
D410.C82, v. 56

Mutual disrespect between the Latin American Republics and the United States is greater today than perhaps in all previous history. Latin Americans can be held partially responsible for the following reasons: They have simultaneously solicited aid from and heaped abuse upon the United States; they have sought U.S. aid and have increased military expenditures at the same time; and most universities have failed to inform their students adequately about the United States and its institutions, have failed to produce social scientists who "might make reasonably efficient use of the financial resources and technological skills available through external sources," have encouraged an economic interpretation of hemispheric relations, and have ignored the fact that U.S. "interest in the Latin American republics . . . has sprung first of all from its search for national security and not to protect United States business interests"; moreover, university politics "have led to the neglect of rigorous training for future leadership and to an excess of training in agitational politics." The United States is partially responsible for this lack of hemispheric understanding because its relations with Latin America have been based upon two premises: U.S. citizens are ethnoculturally superior to those of the Latin American republics, and U.S. institutions reflect this superiority; U.S. security is the major hemispheric problem, and only the United States can determine how to ensure it. U.S. policy toward Latin America, based on highhanded attitudes and various degrees of coercion, has had plausible success, but this situation will not continue indefinitely. Nationalism has taught Latin Americans that they should free themselves from U.S. hegemony, that problems can best be resolved in a global framework, and that the U.S. claim to speak unilaterally for the entire hemisphere must be rejected. The U.S. grip on the hemisphere will loosen; the question remains how and when.

998
Joyaux, François. [THE DISTURBING SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST] Situation inquiétante en Extrême-Orient. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Apr. 1969: 603-609. D410.R45, v. 25

Discusses the possibilities of a Sino-American rapprochement against the backdrop of the cultural revolution and the Sino-Soviet conflict. An amelioration of Sino-American relations would allow Peking to devote all its forces to the struggle against Soviet revisionism. Joyaux believes that in this situation the United States would have greater leverage in any negotiations with the Soviet Union and concludes that, despite their refusal to begin meetings in Warsaw last February, the Chinese are looking for a way to start another round of conversations with the Americans.

999
Kiesinger, Kurt G. ". . . WE SHALL CONTINUE OUR POLICY FOR PEACE NOTHWITHSTANDING ALL DISAPPOINTMENT." In Germany. (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 16, Oct. 22, 1968: suppl. 1-4. DD259.A35, v. 16

Foreign policy declaration of October 16, 1968, by the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic to the Bundestag translated into English by the West German Foreign Office. Kiesinger rejects Soviet accusations that the German Federal Republic "demanded a change in the status quo in Europe" and undermined "agreements between the Allies." By its intervention in Czechoslovakia and the formulation of its new doctrine to justify that move, the Soviet Union "desires to perpetuate the temporary division of Germany" and obstructs East-West rapprochement in Europe despite its endorsement of the idea of rapprochement in the Karlovy Vary Declaration of the Communist Parties of Europe of April 1967. The Federal Republic seeks to safeguard "peace in Europe by means of an eventual understanding" between nations renouncing the use of force. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union's military posture call for NATO's consolidation, which is supported by the Federal Government. However, the Government would much prefer "step-by-step, controlled, simultaneous and equal disarmament on both sides" and will continue to pursue this goal "by launching initiatives of its own." Further, Kiesinger also considers Franco-German cooperation within the framework of West European unity.

1000
Kiesinger, Kurt G. WORKING TOWARDS "LASTING PEACE FOR THE WHOLE OF EUROPE." In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 16, Oct. 1, 1968: suppl. 1-8.
DD259.A35, v. 16

Official English translation of the Chancellor's September 25, 1968, address before the Bundestag. Kiesinger considers the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia "a flagrant breach of international law," which caused "a grave political crisis." The Federal Republic's policy has long pursued a goal of East-West accommodation in Europe. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has exposed West Germany and Western Europe to the danger of a Soviet attack. "Should Warsaw Pact forces remain permanently stationed in Czechoslovakia . . . a reappraisal of the strength of NATO forces in Europe would be unavoidable." Despite policy setbacks, the Federal Republic is determined to pursue its goal of the relaxation of East-West tensions in Europe "and to seek a negotiated solution of all open or contentious questions exclusively by peaceful means." The Federal Republic will do its best to strengthen "the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance . . . [the] pillars on which German, European and allied policy rest." Progress toward peace and security for all of Europe depends on the unification of Western Europe.

1001
Klimov, V. UNITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES' INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TASKS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1968: 10-15, 21.
D839.I465, 1968

Formulated by Lenin, proletarian internationalism regulates the relations of the Socialist states with other countries and with one another. Examples of joint effort among these states are the Council for Economic Mutual Aid (COMECON) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, at whose Warsaw Conference, July 14 and 15, 1968, the common concerns of the Socialist community, its unity, and its cohesion were found endangered by developments in Czechoslovakia. The principal role in the Socialist community is played, of course, by the Soviet Union, whose leading position

is particularly important because the Socialist system includes countries with diverse Socialist structures, economic levels, and cultural and historic traditions. This diversity must not be allowed to affect the "common socio-economic and political basis of socialism"--the social ownership of the means of production and the leading role of the Communist Party. In the present situation it is especially important to define the relationship between the national and international interests and tasks of the Socialist states. Although national interests influence the countries' foreign policy and must be respected, it is a fundamental duty of the Communist parties to combine and reconcile them with the common interests of the Socialist community. If a Socialist country's Communist Party does not fullfill its obligation, all other Socialist countries and parties have a duty to safeguard socialism in that country. In the case of Czechoslovakia the action program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party is in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism, but the situation in Czechoslovakia causes serious alarm. The West, of course, supports the attempts to wrest Czechoslovakia from the Socialist community, but it soon will realize that all such attempts will be abortive because the fraternal alliance with the other Socialist countries meets the basic Czechoslovak national interests.

1002
Krakau, Knud. [THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE. THE CHALLENGE OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY] Die kubanische Revolution und die Monroe Doktrin. Eine Herausforderung der Aussenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten. Frankfurt a. M., Metzner, 1968. 220 p. (Untersuchungen zur auswärtigen Politik, Bd. 5)
E183.8.C9K7

Bibliography: p. 207-220.

Partial contents.--Preface: the Monroe Doctrine and its present interest.--The Cuban revolution; its development and significance for the Monroe Doctrine.--Development of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States apropos events in and about Cuba since the year 1959.--Main object: removal of the Castro government in Cuba.--Prevention of the "export" of the Cuban revolution.--Military infiltration by Communist States into the Western Hemisphere.--The United States, the Monroe Doctrine and Cuba after the crisis of October 1962.

Considers the Monroe Doctrine demaging to U.S. political influence in Latin America and to American security interests. Although the doctrine has changed greatly since the time of President Monroe, its practical emphasis on Washington's right to unilateral intervention in Latin America and on the exclusive U.S. prerogative to interpret that right authoritatively has remained constant despite the fact that for some time the United States has expounded within the Organization of American States a multilateral "Monroe Doctrine" to be collectively applied by its members.

1003
Kreisky, Bruno. [OBSERVATIONS ON POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST STATES] Betrachtungen über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Beziehungen zu kommunistischen Staaten. Osteuropa, v. 18, Dec. 1968: 839-850.
DR1.O8, v. 18

Authorized notes taken from the former Austrian Foreign Minister's speech on Sept. 20, in Berlin, at the annual meeting of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde, a German society for the study of Eastern Europe.

Underlines the importance of political factors in appraising the development of East-West relations. Kreisky criticizes the authors of the convergence theory for underestimating these factors and overestimating the economic ones in their projections of the future. He probes into the causes of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia--the Soviet fear of West German inroads into the Soviet bloc--and stresses that the relationship of East European states to the West can really change only after a truly endogenous liberalization process in the Soviet Union, which for the time being is not in sight. Therefore East-West relations will continuously oscillate between antagonism and approach.

1004
Laqueur, Walter Z. RUSSIA ENTERS THE MIDDLE EAST. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Jan. 1969: 296-308.
D410.F6, v. 47

Discusses the extension of Soviet power and influence into the Middle East. Laqueur observes that the Soviet Union has extended its power by virtue of its geographical nearness and its military and economic strength, "not by coercion or infiltration but by invitation." The Middle Eastern countries have turned to the Soviet Union for help because of their economic backwardness and political instability.

1005
McGhee, George C. TOWARD A NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPE. Saturday review, v. 52, Mar. 8, 1969: 16-18. Z1219.S25, v. 52

How great a role Europe will play in future international politics will depend on U.S. policy toward European unification and Europe's willingness to share the burden of defense in the Atlantic alliance. To allow Europe to grow and take its rightful place in the international community, the United States will have to play a less dominating role--European unity under U.S. leadership may be appealing to Americans, but it is not likely to please Europeans. Although European political unity has been slow--its progress has disillusioned many Americans--there are strong unifying forces that make the outlook promising. Unification could be accelerated if the United States made a greater effort to arrive at a closer common assessment of world problems with European leaders. This implies a greater degree of European participation in NATO since it is clear that the United States cannot bear indefinitely its present disproportionate share of free world defense.

1006
Magnus, Ralph H. US POLITICAL-STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Mar. 1969: 47-55. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

"Condensed from a chapter entitled 'Political-Strategic Interests' in the study, UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, prepared by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., in October 1968."

While America's cold war interests still dictate support for the goals of the Central Treaty Organization, its interests regarding the Arab cold war and the Arab-Israeli dispute need clarification. To date the

U.S. Government has tended to side with the more moderate Arab States even though it theoretically considers all Arab governments preferable to Soviet domination. Officially the United States has no special commitment to Israel, but in practice the latter receives favored treatment. American policies are further complicated by the growing Soviet influence with the radical Arab States, the "resurgence of particularistic and regional concerns" among all Middle Eastern countries, the decline of British power in the Middle East, and the increasing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. The United States could attempt to improve its position by wooing the governments of the more radical countries; however, critics of this approach claim "the Soviet Union could always outbid the United States for Arab support by adopting a more anti-Israeli line." If the United States openly allied itself with Israel, it would completely alienate the Arab world and jeopardize America's strategic position throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. Another alternative, cooperation with the Soviet Union to enforce peace in the Middle East, would be difficult to achieve and would probably be opposed by both the Arabs and the Israelis, who would also object to the adoption of a neutral U.S. policy. Thus, despite its failures, America's Middle East policy will probably remain essentially the same for the foreseeable future.

1007
Mendel, Douglas. CHINA POLICY; A PUBLIC-EYE VIEW. Far Eastern economic review, v. 63, Mar. 20, 1969: 542-543. illus. HC411.F18, v. 63

Brief survey of Japanese attitudes toward China and Japan's China policy that found the average Japanese voter disagrees with his government's China policy; he "would prefer to recognise Peking but retain relations with Taiwan."

1008
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [DÉTENTE AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW] La détente vue de Moscou. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Mar. 1969: 466-477.
D410.R45, v. 25

Despite the warming trend in Soviet-American relations, Russia's penetration into the Middle East and its invasion of Czechoslovakia indicate that the Soviet Union has not lost sight of its primary objective, the creation of a Communist-dominated world. Furthermore, the Russians penetrated the Middle East without firing a shot--a feat that would have been impossible 25 or 50 years ago. Détente has little value for a free Europe that lacks the collective will and power to counteract these Communist politicomilitary goals.

1009
Muller, Steven. ANXIETY IN BONN: GERMAN FEARS AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Mar. 1969: 13-15.
TK9145.A84, v. 25

West Germany views the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as "a major negative shift in the European balance of power--a shift that produced immediate disadvantages for West Germany and threatens worse." West Germany's growing sense of isolation is the primary reason for its anxiety over the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Bonn's concern over the Soviet invasion also stems from its being singled out by the Soviet Union as the source of all evil in Europe; the counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia were linked to the immediate dangers of rabid West German revanchism. Another reason for Bonn's anxiety is West Berlin. Although the city has become an economic liability and political anachronism, it remains a symbol of supreme importance, and its surrender would nullify not only every promise made by the West to Bonn but would leave West Germany "truly alone, faced with the terrifying need to accommodate itself to Soviet power without dependable assistance." The American presidential election has brought some measure of reassurance not because of the difference between Johnson and Nixon but because many Germans believe a new administration will move rapidly toward ending the Vietnam War, which has given the Soviet Union an opportunity to take additional risks in Europe while American power is committed in Asia.

1010
Mushkaterov, I. ONLY COINCIDENCES? Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, March 21, 1969: pt. 2, [item] 2, 1-3.
Slav Rm

Slightly abridged translation from Sovietskaia Rossiia, March 13, 1969.
Slav Rm

The bloody provocation on the Ussuri River was no coincidence but was brought about by Maoism, which replaces the dictatorship of the proletariat with personal dictatorship and betrays the cause of socialism. It is a bitter irony that Peking's anti-Soviet policy fits perfectly into imperialist foreign policy practices. While there is no direct analogy between the strategic views of Mao and the imperialists, some connections, such as the Chinese attitude to the Czechoslovak crisis and the coincidence of the Ussuri provocation with the presidential elections in West Berlin, are worth noticing. The encirclement of Russia might become really serious if West Germany concludes that it shares territorial and other claims on the Soviet Union with Communist China. To avoid this encirclement the Soviet Union might then look for better relations with Western Europe by paying concessions to West Germany. According to West German Minister Franz J. Strauss, "Mao is interested in having a strong power [West Germany] near the Soviet western borders," while West Germans are interested "in the Soviets being tied up strongly on their East border in Asia."

1011
Osgood, Robert E., George R. Packard, and John H. Badgley. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University [c1968] 65 p. (Studies in international affairs, no. 8)
DS845.076

Contents.--Japan and the United States in Asia, by Robert E. Osgood.--Living with the real Japan, by George R. Packard III.--Japan's nonmilitary road to power, by John H. Badgley.

Studies Japan's new role in Asia and its relationship with the United States. Osgood discusses the implications for U.S. interests of Japan's reemergence as a military power, while Packard suggests reasons for the lack of communication between the United States and Japan. Badgley concludes that Japan's quest for influence in Asia in the coming decade will be based on its efforts to serve as both a model and an agent for Asian development.

1012

Paige, Glenn D. THE KOREAN DECISION, JUNE 24-30, 1950. New York, Free Press [1968] xxv, 394 p. DS919. P33
Bibliography: p. 377-386

Partial contents. --Introduction, by Richard C. Snyder. --pt. 1. Approach: Decision-making analysis in the single case. --pt. 2. Background, 1945-50. --pt. 3. Narrative. --pt. 4. Empirical analysis. --pt. 5. Normative analysis. --pt. 6. Action implications.

Applies the decisionmaking framework proposed by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin in Foreign Policy Decision Making to the process by means of which the United States decided to intervene in the Korean War. After presenting a brief historical background and a detailed narrative of the events leading to the decision to intervene, Paige offers a number of empirical propositions that "link the variables of the decision-making frame of reference" and several normative propositions that provide a basis for evaluating the decisions taken--both of which are intended to apply in future case studies of foreign policy. He concludes by attempting "to extract . . . some operational guidelines for coping with crisis situations in international politics."

1013

Patijn, C. L. THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, winter 1968-69: 512-519. D839. A85, v. 6
Report prepared for the Atlantic Treaty Association Assembly held in Lisbon, Portugal, Oct. 14-17, 1968.

"In view of the dramatic events in Eastern Europe, the continuing crisis in the Middle East and the impasse in Vietnam it may be that time has come to re-establish unity of purpose in the foreign policy of the members of the [Atlantic] Alliance." Once the furor over the Czech crisis subsides, the NATO members should formulate a common policy toward Eastern Europe. As long as the confrontation continues between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the West must not directly interfere in the internal affairs of the Warsaw Pact nations, but it can show sympathy for their struggles for freedom, encourage East-West trade and cultural exchanges, and attempt to establish a system of security guarantees between the two alliances. NATO nations should also attempt to harmonize their foreign relations outside the Atlantic area. While the alliance cannot assume the role of world policeman without risking dangerous countermeasures on the part of the Soviet Union, it can support the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and other organizations. Furthermore, it can serve as a forum for the development of cohesive Western policies aimed at promoting social and economic progress, strengthening the rule of law and justice, and containing overt Soviet aggression in the Third World. Although NATO "itself can never be the nucleus of a new international system" since a worldwide arrangement would require the support of the Soviet Union, it could greatly influence progress toward world order if its members coordinated their foreign policies. In order to develop a viable Atlantic political system, however, the Europeans will have to strive for greater unity among themselves, and the United States must consult its allies more closely in major policy decisions.

1014

Pavićević, Mišo. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO RELAXATION OF TENSION [interview] Review of international affairs, v. 20, Jan. 5, 1969: 3-4. D839. R4, v. 20

The only alternative to relaxation of tension in Europe is the cold war, but in the present situation the relaxation policy cannot make any progress anyway. European cooperation can exist only if all European countries join their efforts, no matter what their sociopolitical systems. This cooperation must be based on respect for independence, sovereignty, and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, and the policy of relaxation cannot be partial--it cannot include only a few and bring pressure to others. In this respect, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia might be a lesson for both Europe and the superpowers. In general the positive attitude of the European countries toward relaxation is encouraging, and Yugoslavia is ready to cooperate. The situation in the Balkans, on the other hand, is very complex, and if those countries that do not support the aforementioned principles draw a lesson from the occupation of Czechoslovakia, they might finally realize that relaxation is in their interest. Then they might join Yugoslavia's effort to promote cooperation in line with Marshal Tito's principle of the "extended hand" and on the basis of peaceful coexistence and respect of U. N. principles.

1015

Pearson, Drew. KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND CUBA. Saturday review, v. 52, Mar. 29, 1969: 12-15. illus. Z1219. S25, v. 52

Notes the opportunities to improve Soviet-American relations that were available to President Kennedy early in his administration and argues that failure to take advantage of these opportunities coupled with a series of diplomatic mistakes led to the Cuban missile crisis. Pearson includes among these diplomatic errors the President's failure to respond to Khrushchev's early friendly overtures, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the failure to remove American missiles from Turkey. He hopes that "the lesson to be learned from these mistakes is herewith spread out for Mr. Nixon," who faces the same opportunities as did Kennedy.

1016

Pickard, Sir Cyril. BRITAIN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD. Pakistan horizon, v. 21, fourth quarter, 1968: [317]-322. DS376. P32, v. 21
Address delivered at a meeting of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in Karachi, Pakistan, on Nov. 15, 1968.

Since Britain gave up its imperial role, its principal world interests have been the maintenance of peace and balanced trade arrangements. Now that Britain is no longer in a position to pursue material goals forcibly and is not capable of defending itself against a nuclear war, it is more concerned than ever with the avoidance of situations that may escalate into international conflict. As an island country Britain has long been dependent upon international trade. To develop satisfactory trading relations it has concerned itself with the economic growth of its trading partners and has attempted to cultivate mutual understanding with them. Britain recognizes the yearning of modern man to be free of foreign restraints and tries to base its relationships, particularly with members of the Commonwealth like Pakistan, on common objectives and interests.

1017
PREMIER KOSYGIN REPLIES TO A JAPANESE NEWSPAPER. New times, no. 2, Jan. 13, 1969: 2-4.
D839.N483, 1969

Interview by a correspondent of the Japanese daily Mainichi.

The Soviet Union's friendly policy toward Japan is firm and consistent. Moscow considers Soviet-Japanese relations to be a major factor of peace and stability in the Far East and in Asia. The Soviet Union does not conceal its negative attitute toward Japan's Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States and cannot remain indifferent to the fact that U.S. troops and military bases still exist in Japan. The necessary prerequisite to the end of the Vietnam War is the withdrawal of foreign troops from Asia and the immediate cessation of the interference of foreign powers in the domestic affairs of the Asian states. Moreover, the stabilization cannot be separated from the solution of other vital international problems in Asia. Because the complications in Sino-Soviet relations were created artificially and not through any fault of the Soviet Union, they can be viewed optimistically. The Soviet Union is convinced that the Sino-Soviet friendship will finally triumph. The Soviets believe the end of the Vietnam War will facilitate the relaxation of tensions. The consequences of the Israeli aggression in the Middle East must be eliminated, and the crisis must be settled on the basis of the U.N. Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. Finally, the solution of European security problems should be sought not by undermining the Socialist countries but by establishing a European collective security system, in which European countries with different political systems could cooperate as equal partners. Further progress of the negotiations of general and complete disarmament would remove the threat of war and promote international détente.

1018
Puchala, Donald J. THREE IMAGES OF COLD WAR INFLUENCE: A REVIEW. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 133-138.
JX1901.J6, v. 13

A review of The Revolution in Statecraft by Andrew M. Scott [abstracted as item 958 in v. 2, no. 3, of this bibliography], How Nations Negotiate by Fred Charles Iklé, and The Intermediaries by Oran R. Young. Puchala compares these three approaches to the question of "political influence in contemporary superpower relations." Scott, who focuses on the indirect competition of the superpowers for control of the Third World, proposes a theoretical framework for analyzing the phenomenon of informal penetration and its implications for American foreign policy. Iklé examines the processes of negotiation between superpowers in order to determine the necessary preconditions for successful negotiations. Young contends that the stalemate between superpowers compels them to channel their influence through impartial third parties, especially in crisis situations, although he acknowledges the difficulties that must be overcome to find mutually acceptable and effective intermediaries.

1019
Rana, A. P. THE INTELLECTUAL DIMENSIONS OF INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT. Journal of Asian studies, v. 28, Feb. 1969: 299-312.
DS501.F274, v. 28

Probes the rationale behind Nehru's use of nonalinement as a security policy and attempts to determine the peculiar characteristics of that nonalinement. Rana states that Nehru's policy was manipulated in the spirit of peace to maintain the structure of international society.

1020
REVIEWING A REVIEW. Canadian forum, v. 48, Mar. 1969: 270-272. AP5.C125, v. 48

Contrary to popular assumptions, the current review of Canada's foreign and defense policies is not a uniquely Canadian affair directed at finding new approaches to world problems. It was triggered by a 1968 meeting of representatives from NATO nations at the John F. Kennedy Institute in Tilburg, Netherlands, which emphasized the need to convince the postwar generation of the continued importance and utility of the Atlantic alliance. However, "putting the same old product in a new box" is not going to win the support of a new generation that is all too aware of the failures of past policies. The new Prime Minister should recognize the validity of this discontent and seek completely new initiatives in international relations. A realistic China policy should be adopted and the reality of the two Germanys should be officially recognized. Canada should help "tone down the mutual exacerbation between the French and other NATO governments, which tends to increase domestic tension between [its] two dominant cultural groups." While there is no reason for Canada to withdraw from North America Air Defense, it should closely reevaluate the implications of the proposed American ABM defense system. The published Soviet opinions on the Middle East appear quite realistic and deserve serious attention. A new design in foreign policy should also take into account the implications of the projected revolutionary advances in international communications.

1021
Scalapino, Robert A. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST ASIA. Australian outlook, v. 22, Dec. 1968: 253-270. DU80.A947, v. 22

Although isolationist sentiment has increased in the United States in recent years, a truer perception of the national interest will prevail, and America will continue to play an important role in the politics of East Asia with changes, however, in the way that role is performed. Most probably the United States will put greater emphasis on multilateralism in dealing with the problems of this region and insist more on reciprocal responsibility in its engagements with other states. Suggestions that the United States limit its commitments to the most advanced states or withdraw to the offshore island chain will be rejected, but future commitments to underdeveloped continental states will emphasize political and economic support and leave these countries the responsibility for their initial military defense. The U.S. military presence will take the form of a "broad umbrella, the ultimate deterrent" and be projected by mobile forces operating from island bases. U.S. policy toward Communist China will aim at encouraging the moderate tendencies of the regime while discouraging its extremism. The overall goal of the United States in Asia is to make peaceful coexistence a reality and establish "the type of political equilibrium in Asia which at present offers the only practical alternative to chaos and war."

1022
Schickling, Willi. [THE GLAMOUR AND MISFORTUNE OF THE DÉTENTE POLICY] Glanz und Elend der

Entspannungspolitik. Politische Meinung, v. 13, no. 4, 1968: 29-40. H5. P75, v. 13

Considers President Kennedy's and President Johnson's efforts toward East-West accommodation a failure because they were based on false premises. Schickling argues that the Federal German Republic must give priority to its own security before embarking on a gradual rapprochement policy with the Soviet bloc, for its foreign policy can be successful only if based on a solid foundation.

1023
Schlesinger, Arthur M. VIETNAM AND THE END OF THE AGE OF SUPERPOWERS. Harper's magazine, v. 238, Mar. 1969: 41-49.
AP2. H3, v. 238

President Johnson's announcement on March 31, 1968, implied a collapse of America's messianic foreign policy and an end to the age of superpowers. Nationalism is responsible for frustrating American efforts in Vietnam specifically, and both American and Russian efforts to manage global affairs generally. Last-ditch champions of America's Vietnam policy argue that the only alternative to universalism is isolationism, but this is false. The United States cannot withdraw from building a rational world order; in the future, such an order will probably be based upon "regional groupings within the United Nations, thereby merging universalist and sphere-of-influence conceptions, strengthening the 'middle powers' and discharging the great powers from the supposed obligation to rush about putting down every presumed threat to world peace." Moreover, considering the Vietnam tragedy, a new American foreign policy should be based upon recognition that all areas of the globe are not equally important to the United States, that America has limited power and cannot be the permanent guarantor of world stability, that all international problems cannot be solved militarily, and that America's future influence in international affairs will depend upon its example rather than its military power.

1024
Schmidt-Häuer, Christian, and Adolf Müller, pseud. [VIVA DUBČEK; REFORM AND OCCUPATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. With an introduction by Heinrich Böll] Viva Dubček; Reform und Okkupation in der ČSSR. Mit einem einführenden Bericht von Heinrich Böll. Köln, Kiepenheuer u. Witsch [1968] 190 p.
DB215. 6. S3

An authentic report containing some previously unknown information on the events in Czechoslovakia from June 1967 to the Soviet occupation by an eyewitness, who, as a correspondent for several West German newspapers, had access to the leaders of the Communist Party and Government of Czechoslovakia. Müller, a Czech political scientist, gives an evaluation of the situation prior to the invasion, an analysis of the reformers' program, and an outline of the prospects that were left for them and for Europe.

1025
Schütze, Walter. [FOREIGN POLICY WITH QUESTION MARKS] Aussenpolitik mit Fragezeichen. Dokumente. Zeitschrift für übernationale Zusammenarbeit, v. 25, Feb. 1969: 25-31. H5. D65, v. 25

The long-lasting economic effects of the May 1968 student turmoil in France have dramatized the lack of a material basis for French power politics in Europe. French armaments and foreign-aid programs have proved too ambitious for the nation's material resources, and, instead of concentrating on one certain type of weapon at a time, it was building full arsenals of nuclear and conventional arms simultaneously. Because of France's weak economic structure it cannot keep step with other members of the European Economic Community. De Gaulle expected Moscow to repay France for its undermining of the Atlantic alliance, its withdrawal from NATO's military structure, and its opposition to West European economic integration by loosening the Soviet grip on East European nations, but that never happened. By his outspoken partiality for the Arab cause he deprived himself of any genuine mediating role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. It would be premature to expect France's prompt return to the NATO integrated military command, but its foreign policy is now becoming supranational at the time "when thinking in terms of national interest is being revived in the German Federal Republic."

1026
Sharma, J. M. NON-ALIGNMENT--INDIA'S DEATH TRAP? Eastern world, v. 22, Dec. 1968: 10-11.
DS501. E45, v. 22

For some Indians the nonalinement policy has become "an inflexible imperative to which India must adhere at any cost." This attitude is indicative of a failure to comprehend the significance of two critical factors in India's current situation. The first is Chinese Communist hostility and expansionism, which, based as it is on Chinese imperialist traditions, Communist ideology, and militant nationalism, is not to be appeased by high idealism or the principles of coexistence. The second is India's inability to match Communist China in military might. A democratic state like India simply cannot compete effectively for military power with an authoritarian and fanatical regime such as exists in China. Chinese behavior in Sinkiang, Korea, Tibet, and Southeast Asia should have been sufficient evidence to convince the Indian Government of the urgent need to make up for India's military deficiencies with a policy aimed at creating a buffer zone between the two countries, but because of the infatuation with nonalinement the opportunity was allowed to pass. The Chinese threat cannot be contained, however, without outside assistance, which can be had only if India is willing to abandon its antiquated nonalinement policy and embark on a new and more realistic diplomacy.

1027
Shepherd, George W. NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN POLICY. Christian century, v. 86, Apr. 16, 1969: 504-507.
BR1. C45, v. 86

Foreign policy decisionmaking has not yet been effectively integrated into America's democratic system; it is rationally and institutionally unresponsive to the people's will, even though "foreign policy has moved increasingly into the domestic political process." This is demonstrated by James Rosenau's issue-area concept, which points out the interactions between domestic and foreign policy processes. Two rival "issue-areas in the debate over national priorities in the '60s and beyond"--the cold war and the poverty war--are present in the United States today; the clash between them "is becoming explosive because [the political] system offers no adequate democratic means for recognizing and rationalizing differences." The

failure to establish national priorities in accordance with the changing needs and demands of the people was demonstrated in last year's presidential election. Some means must be developed for debating important issues and solving problems in terms of the majority interest on a continuing basis. The electoral process has some value, but other possibilities need exploration. The political parties might develop "groups of 'attentive elites' who could be a focus of the debate between issue-areas and through Congress could exert increasing influence on the decisionmakers." Today people must act as wisely on foreign policy issues as on domestic issues, or democracy will prove unworkable.

1028
Shub, Anatole. LESSONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Jan. 1969: 266-280.
D410. F6, v. 47

The failure of most Western observers to anticipate the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia called into question the belief in Soviet predictability by demonstrating that the new collective leadership is not "intrinsically" more cautious than its predecessors and the belief in the inevitable erosion and mellowing of the Soviet regime. There are at least three reasons for the current regression: the presence of hostile powers on two fronts (China and the West), fear of the disintegration of the multinational Soviet empire, and an atrophy of the political sense among the Soviet masses. Finally, the invasion undermined the "popular belief that liberalization in Eastern Europe could precede and compel change in the Soviet Union itself." The Western response to the invasion was determined by its basic policy to maintain the status quo while awaiting liberalization and to respect Eastern Europe as a legitimate sphere of Soviet influence. This policy is questionable since it leaves at least four border nations--Finland, Austria, Albania, and Yugoslavia--in an anomalous position, renders internal change in Eastern Europe difficult, and perpetuates the unnatural division of the Continent; moreover, respect for spheres of influence has been one sided. The time has therefore come for the West to reappraise its "thoughtless and inconsistent passivity toward the future development of Central and Eastern Europe" and to prepare itself to act quickly and decisively to deter any future Soviet reprisal against East European nations that seek greater independence. To counter Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the United States should move toward closer relations with China, the largest independent Communist state. If the Czechoslovak tragedy promotes this development, it will not have been in vain.

1029
Sorensen, Theodore C. WHO ARE THE ISOLATIONISTS? [editorial] Saturday review, v. 52, Jan. 11, 1969: 72.
Z1219. S25, v. 52

The real isolationists are the supporters of America's Vietnam policy, not its critics. The past policy of escalation in Vietnam has diminished America's international prestige, forced a reduction in American assistance "to the Atlantic alliance, to the Alliance for Progress, and to other key spots around the globe," helped build economic barriers between the United States and other nations, handicapped prospective disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union, hindered the development of a new approach to China, and obstructed "steps toward a world of law instead of despair." Those advocates of a policy of "no more Vietnams" should not be viewed as isolationists, but as "responsible realists who recognize the practical limitations of [America's] military and diplomatic power." Many of these critics oppose a return to isolationism and realize that America cannot abandon those world obligations that national power, wealth, conscience, and interest have imposed upon it. If the new administration insists upon a hard line in the Paris negotiations or decides upon a renewal of the bombing of the north, "America will truly be isolated in the worst possible way."

1030
Stone, Ronald H. AN INTERVIEW WITH REINHOLD NIEBUHR. Christianity and crisis, v. 29, Mar. 17, 1969: 48-52. BRl. C6417, v. 29

Presents the eminent theologian's views on a variety of topics, especially U. S. foreign policy. Niebuhr contends that world peace depends upon U. S. -Soviet cooperation, which is jeopardized by the war in Vietnam, the troubled situation in the Middle East, and the threatened arms race in missile defense. However, in his opinion, the Nixon administration should be given an adequate grace period to cope successfully with these enormous problems.

1031
Sviták, Ivan. THE MEANING OF INTERVENTION BY FORCE. East West digest, Jan. 1969: 8-11.
P&GP RR

Translation of an article published in the Czech magazine Student at the beginning of August 1968.

The 1956 Hungarian revolution proves that Soviet leaders believe in intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign allied state as their justified fraternal duty. Now they assert that even ideological differences justify a military intervention while military, political, and power factors may be decisive for the intervention itself. The Soviet leaders are willing to tolerate any benevolent dictatorship in Eastern Europe but not a Socialist democracy with a respect for civil rights, which might contaminate other Socialist states. Discipline in the Communist parties and the Communist movement is the most important factor and must remain intact. Therefore, the Soviet leaders regard the attempt of the Czechoslovak Communist Party "to subordinate the power elite of technocrats, ideologists, bureaucrats, and manipulators to some mechanism on which they themselves would depend" as an attack against the "uncontrollable filling in of the elite by the elite," which is the basic principle of totalitarian states. As the Czechoslovak example is already stimulating and will stimulate inner conflict in the U. S. S. R. and the disintegration of Russian rule in Eastern Europe, the bureaucrats are bitterly afraid of a future crisis in the Stalinist imperium. They do not want to lose power and will try to destroy this nightmarish danger by intervention.

1032
Szamuely, Tibor. TOWARDS A NEW BALANCE OF POWER. Spectator, v. 222, Feb. 14, 1969: 202-204.
AP4. S7, v. 222

Now that the Czech crisis has dealt the final blow to America's rather tenuous policies of détente and containment, the Nixon administration should seek a more viable U. S. foreign policy. In view of the collapse of America's hopes for a legalistic and moralistic world order, the new administration would be wise to adopt the principles of power politics. The restoration of a new balance of power in the world would prove

far more stabilizing and flexible than the present balance of terror. Fortunately the Sino-Soviet dispute now offers the West the opportunity to establish a favorable balance of power. By seeking a rapprochement with enemy number two, China, it could effectively counter the threat posed by enemy number one, Russia. Thus the United States must discard its phobia of Chinese expansionism and seek an accommodation with China. Although many difficult hurdles will have to be overcome before such an accommodation can be achieved, the outlook is favorable because the two countries share "an overriding common interest: to make the world, the West as well as the East, safe from Russian imperialist expansion."

1033
Thomson, James C. NIXON AND CHINA: TIME TO TALK. Atlantic monthly, v. 223, Feb. 1969: 71-73.
AP2. A8, v. 223

The Nixon administration has an opportunity to improve Sino-American relations and possibly bring Communist China into the international order. Those factors responsible for American inaction toward China since 1960 have disappeared or diminished in importance: The issue of Vietnam is being negotiated; the Soviet-American détente has been shaken; and the Democratic Presidents who "were acutely gun-shy on China policy" and the Secretary of State who was obsessed with Asian communism are gone. The President has the chance to transcend Vietnam by moving "to fold the Vietnam War's resolution into a larger act of statesmanship: reengagement with China through a series of initiatives toward Peking." Moreover, domestic circumstances favor the pursuit of a new China strategy; the President does not need to prove his anticommunism and can probably receive congressional and public support. The Russians will be displeased, but America must serve its national interests; Soviet-American relations cannot be definitively important in developing a new East Asian relationship. The Chinese request for ambassadorial talks at Warsaw on February 20, 1969, must be understood and accepted as either an attempt to disrupt Soviet-American relations or an effort to avert further isolation. Peking's initiative can be the beginning of a multiple relationship--"Moscow, Washington, and Peking, each pursuing independent policies vis-à-vis the others, rather than a ganging up of any two against the third"--and may allow "some movement toward China's re-emergence as a participant power with a stake in the international order." Nixon must consult Japan and Formosa if a new policy is pursued; the U. S. commitment to Formosa must be reaffirmed, but America should not support a Nationalist return to the mainland.

1034
Varma, Ravindra. INDIA'S DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. United Asia, v. 20, July/Aug. 1968: 194-201. DS1. U55, v. 20

India's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia is affected by geography as well as by "the fluid facts of power relationships." The subcontinent, wedged between the two great cultural centers of Asia, has over the centuries greatly influenced Southeast Asian thought and culture and has maintained a special feeling for Southeast Asian countries, which are located in a " 'low pressure area' . . . to which currents of various types are invariably directed." Because of this influence and Southeast Asia's strategic importance--it provides the best air and sea routes from Europe and Asia to Australia and North America --India has taken more than a passing interest in ideological rivalries and foreign encroachments. Great Britain's withdrawal East of Suez and the possibility of a power vacuum in Southeast Asia have upgraded India's role in the creation of a regional collective security system to meet the Chinese Communist threat. However, India must shed "its seemingly isolationist posture and take active interest in the security, political stability and economic development of the smaller Southeast Asian nations" if it is to help.

1035
Weber, Bernd. [BERLIN--A MEETING PLACE AND A BRIDGE TO THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] Berlin--Treffpunkt und Brücke zur DDR. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Dec. 1968: 720-727.
D839. A885, v. 19

Underlines the importance of West Berlin for the German Federal Republic's security and as a focus of West German policy toward German reunification.

1036
Wehner, Herbert. GERMAN POLITICS AND "HEGEMONIC CO-EXISTENCE." Central Europe journal, v. 17, Feb. 1969: 43-45.
DB200. 7. S74, v. 17

A special aspect of the German situation resides in the fact that a balance of interests between the pluralistic West and the Communist East is necessary to the Federal Republic as part of Central Europe. Contrary to the provisions of the Four Power status of Berlin, the eastern part of that city is being claimed as the "capital of the GDR." For a quarter of a century the Soviet Union has been bending every effort to consolidate into its own empire those parts of Germany under her control. The present status can best be characterized as a state of "hegemonic co-existence." The exigencies of Soviet hegemonic power in the tussle with its competitor in Peking determine the sharpness of cleavage between the "GDR" and the Federal Republic. Soviet Russia's policy with respect to Germany consists solely in exploiting the German issue as a means of producing tensions for the purpose of keeping its own empire intact. The Federal Republic of Germany must try to prevent the isolation of free West Berlin. Speaking by proxy for the Germans in the "GDR" who have been denied democratic rights, the German Federal Republic pursues a policy of peace and conciliation with respect to the German question and toward Eastern Europe. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1037
Wettig, Gerhard. [SOVIET GERMAN-POLICY AFTER PRAGUE] Sowjetische Deutschland-Politik nach Prag. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 4, 1968: 432-435.
D839. M58, v. 9

Moscow's "European security policy" has long aimed at the liquidation of NATO and the American presence in Europe. The greatest obstacle to the realization of these aims, Bonn's support for its Atlantic commitments, led to Soviet efforts to isolate and pressure the German Federal Republic by such means as transportation restrictions to West Berlin and Moscow's claim of the right of intervention in West Germany. By its military occupation of Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union has discredited its European security policy in the eyes of many who had attached to it some hope for a European peace and security settlement. To tone

down such an impression Moscow accused West Germany of having stirred political unrest aimed at counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia and intensified its allegations of growing neonazism in the German Federal Republic, against which it reasserted its claim to the right of intervention. But at the same time Moscow contradicted itself by emphatically assuring other Western governments that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was merely an internal affair of the Soviet bloc, that it was not in any way directed against the West, and that the Soviet policy of détente toward the West remained unaffected by Czechoslovak developments. Despite such assurances the intervention sharply reduced Moscow's chances to organize international pressure against Bonn. With the decrease in the action potential of Russia's German policy, the chances for Moscow's "European security policy" to attain its double goal are also reduced for at least some time.

1038
Wilson, Richard G. ANATOMY OF CHINA; AN INTRODUCTION TO ONE QUARTER OF MANKIND. Rev. and up-dated ed. New York, Weybright and Talley [1968] 327 p. DS777.55.W46 1968

First published in 1966 under the title A Quarter of Mankind.

Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 277-317).

Bibliography: p. 319-320.

Partial contents.--Introduction: the past.--pt. 1. Society.--pt. 2. Economy.--pt. 3. Diplomacy: Taiwan and the West; island irritant. Hongkong; window on the West. Southeast Asia; what kind of expansionism? India; whose Himalayas? Africa and beyond; champion of the oppressed. Russia; uncle no longer. The world; lamb into lion.--Conclusion: the future.

General view of social and economic life in China, which focuses on the factors that determine the Chinese view of the world. Wilson discusses the principal geographic concerns of Chinese foreign policy and the prospects for peaceful resolution of China's conflicts with its neighbors and the rest of the world. He concludes that "Communist China is not an impossible country, a nation condemned to perpetual mistrust and isolation. There are forces at work there which will hasten her eventual reconciliation with the world by the same token that they will render her a more modern and more rational society."

1039
Wilson, Richard G., ed. CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Feb. 1969: [1]-88. illus.
TK9145.A84, v. 25

Contents.--Where China stands now: an introduction, by Dick Wilson.--pt. 1. The political struggle in China: China's "second liberation" in perspective, by W. A. C. Adie. The prospects of the cultural revolution in 1969, by John Gittings. Revolution within a revolution?, by Ray Wylie.--pt. 2. The economy: Economic realities and China's political economics, by Robert F. Dernberger. The economics of Maoism, by Jack Gray.--pt. 3. Foreign policy: Foreign policy; a revolutionary hiatus, by C. P. Fitzgerald. One-man diplomacy, by Richard Harris. An isolationist science policy, by John Lindbeck. China's nuclear option, by Michael B. Yahuda. The five principles--a new approach, by Merry Selk. --pt. 4. Science and technology: Science travels the Mao road, by C. H. G. Oldham.--pt. 5. Books and periodicals: A reader's guide to publications from and on China.

Articles on the origin, dynamics, and impact of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Wilson believes that, once China has regained its political poise, "the caution which in the past typified Chinese foreign policy, in acts if not in words, is likely to return," and Yahuda argues that, as soon as China acquires a credible nuclear deterrent, it will be drawn out of its isolation and into communication with other nations. Selk thinks that China's offer to the United States to discuss the "Five Principles of Coexistence" represents a new departure in Chinese foreign policy and concludes that this is an opportune moment for the Nixon administration to take the initiative in improving relations with China. On the other hand, Harris suggests that, since China conducts its foreign policy on an ad hoc basis, its course in world affairs is largely unpredictable, while Fitzgerald warns that the outlook for détente between the United States and China is not very bright.

1040
THE WORTH OF THE NEUTRALIZERS [editorial] East West digest, Jan. 1969: 1-4.
P&GP RR

Many influential policymakers in Britain today have assumed a neutralist position in the ideological clash between East and West. Not only are they reluctant to carry out anti-Communist activities, but they sustain a deliberate policy of misinformation and want to preserve the status quo to the detriment of the human rights of millions of people. They recommend a dreamlike policy of conciliation and détente, which is completely wasted because the Marxists have no real interest in a lasting settlement with the West. The belief in détente is an error, just as it is an error to build bridges over unbridgeable gaps, play down frictions and forget offenses, or describe the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as a "traffic accident" on the road to détente. The politicians' views are reflected in the press and BBC, which are spreading illusions such as the disappearance of a threat by the Soviet Union, the desirability of what is in fact unilateral disarmament, and the possibility of peace through "understandings." Nobody warns the British public of subversive Soviet activities. The judgment of the Western politicians has proved consistently wrong because it is based on a false appreciation of the past, present, and future intentions of the enemy. In this situation the East European countries lose hope in liberalization, and the West believes that they do not feel deprived of liberty because they already have it.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

1041
Barnett, Correlli. GUERRILLA WARFARE. Horizon, v. 11, winter 1969: 4-11. illus.
AP2.H788, v. 11

Explains the origin and doctrine of guerrilla warfare and draws comparisons between revolutionary war and conventional war. After noting that guerrilla warfare has been successful in the past in Indochina, China, Algeria, and Cyprus, Barnett states that the United States is failing in Vietnam at present because "the indiscriminate destruction and remote nature of technological war make nonsense of the simultaneous attempts to win the hearts of the people by social reform." There is no purely military solution to guerrilla warfare because victory lies in political and social action and in remedying the grievances the Communists exploit. Barnett concludes that there is a possibility of guerrilla war in the United States even though the Negro masses have neither the organization and self-discipline necessary for revolutionary war nor leaders comparable to Mao and Castro.

1042
Beaufre, André. [HOW CAN WE HUMANIZE WAR CONDUCT? 20TH CENTURY TENDENCIES AND THE ROLE OF THE RED CROSS] Wie lässt sich die Kriegführung humanisieren? Die Tendenzen des 20. Jahrhunderts und die Rolle des Roten Kreuzes. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 48, Dec. 1968: 861-868.
AP32.S47, v. 48

International rules for the partial humanization of war were inadequate to prevent the senseless atrocities of World War II. A great deal of human suffering could have been avoided had there been more concern on the part of airmen, but such restraint runs counter to the theory that the bombardment of a civilian population breaks the enemy's warring morale at its very roots. Despite the fact that entire countries were subjected to destruction, this theory has proved ineffective. To prevent such a return to barbarism a special ethical code on the conduct of air war is clearly needed. The advent of nuclear weapons has enormously complicated the problem of humanizing war. The dangers contained in nuclear weapons make them the most irrational means of war conduct and at the same time deterrents against such war. The fundamental paradox of the nuclear deterrent lies in the nuclear powers' keeping their mutual threat of genocide real lest the effectiveness of deterrence be impaired. So far, the existence of nuclear weapons has proved to be a powerful political stabilizer and peace promoter in the world, but the continuation of such a situation requires a change in their control. The best solution would be the establishment of an international nuclear force under the United Nations. Besides nuclear war, civil resistance and guerrilla warfare badly need to be humanized. Rules of the Geneva Red Cross conventions [of 1949] are useless in guerrilla warfare because that type of war blurs the distinction between combatants and the civilian population and puts regular forces in a most disadvantageous position. Since guerrilla war evolves into a vicious circle of terrorism and repression, which only hardens civil resistance, the civilian population suffers the most from it. A new legal frame of reference is needed to allow a clear distinction between the crime and the act of war, to limit repressive measures to terrorists, to stop punishing civilian resisters as spies but to recognize them as combatants, and to protect the civilian population. The establishment of neutral hospital or refuge zones under the exclusive control of the International Red Cross or the United Nations would greatly lessen the suffering of civilian populations, especially children. The problem of humanizing war is essentially ethical and calls for the creation of a pertinent nonutopian chivalry code. As for nuclear war, fundamental contradictions in nuclear deterrence prevent the formulation of a logically consistent code of that kind.

1043
Beaumont, Roger A. GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERNS OF CONFLICT. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Feb. 1969: 73-76. map.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Lewis F. Richardson, in his Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, discovered some interesting patterns in the recurrence of war. He found that the desire for revenge is the most important single cause of war--not economic factors as so many had supposed; that the frequency of a nation's involvement in war is directly related to the number of its immediate neighbors; that the scale of conflict is proportional to the number of belligerents engaged; that seapowers are less belligerent than landpowers; and that most wars remain localized. His statistics showed that in the period 1820-1949 populations had increased much more rapidly than wars. His most general conclusion was that geography is the major factor determining the pattern of conflict. Despite this, he neglected to project his data geographically. Had he done so he would have made another interesting discovery: Wars in the tropics occur more frequently but are much smaller than wars in the temperate zones. Major conflicts seem to be restricted to a rather narrow range of topographical and climatic conditions. The conclusion is that there are "natural environments in which major conflict is more likely to appear." These are found in northern and Western Europe, northern India, the Eastern United States, eastern Argentina, southern Africa, and eastern China. Information of this kind should be of great value for the design and use of national and international peacekeeping forces or any other measures to prevent the outbreak of violence or suppress it once it has begun.

1044
Glick, Edward B. ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA: SOME LATIN AMERICAN EXAMPLES. Orbis, v. 12, fall 1968: 873-886. D839.O68, v. 12

Because Latin America has been the scene of many guerrilla wars, those planning counterinsurgency oper-

ations in other parts of the world can learn valuable lessons from Latin America's past and present insurgencies. One example of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare occurred during the French intervention in Mexico at the time of the American Civil War. Although the French instituted several successful counterrevolutionary measures, U.S. aid, the charisma of Juarez, and Mexico's geography proved too great a challenge for Napoleon III. In Colombia the insurgency has been a mixture of "political civil war and nonpolitical banditry, mostly the latter." Colombia's geography, like that of Mexico, is conducive to guerrilla warfare. Counterinsurgency in Colombia is based on military civic action--i.e., use of noncombatant troops in social and economic projects--which has turned the tide of the war in favor of the army and "may well be one of the most important guerrilla isolation instruments available in underdeveloped areas like Latin America." During the Cuban insurgency (1956-1959) the Batista government failed to defeat the insurgents because many professional soldiers, offended by the Government's atrocities, were reluctant to participate in an antiguerrilla campaign and because the army's counterinsurgency tactics and morale were poor.

1045

Hahlweg, Werner. [GUERRILLA WAR WITHOUT THE FRONTS] Guerilla Krieg ohne Fronten. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer [1968] 297 p.
U240.H22
Bibliography: p. 225-248.

Partial contents.--The guerrilla in our time.--From the beginnings till into the 18th century: foundations and refinements of guerrilla war as a craft and an art.--The age of the American War of Independence, of the French Revolution and of Napoleon I: guerrilla war and people's war.--Guerrilla war in the 19th century as a part of operations by regular armies and as a means of national uprisings.--Marx, Engels, the Paris Commune, Lenin: partisans' war as a revolutionary form of struggle and as a means of the revolutionary formation of a state.--Guerrilla war and World War I.--World War II: the guerrilla, total conduct of war and resistance movements. The "fourth part of the Armed Forces."--The guerrilla as a form of struggle favored for the emancipation of colored and underdeveloped peoples and as a means of revolutionary world policy.--"Paper tiger"? American conduct of guerrilla war.--Aspects of the guerrilla in Western Europe: Major von Dachs' "total resistance."--Consequences and prospects.--List of acts and documents.

Traces the development of guerrilla warfare to its present forms and discusses their impact on the outcome of major open military confrontations, wars, and political struggles of mass character.

1046

Pomeroy, William J., comp. GUERRILLA WARFARE AND MARXISM; A COLLECTION OF WRITINGS FROM KARL MARX TO THE PRESENT ON ARMED STRUGGLES FOR LIBERATION AND FOR SOCIALISM. New York, International Publishers [1968] 336 p.
U240.P62
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Historical background: The art of insurrection, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Guerrilla warfare in Spain, by Karl Marx. The revolutionary army and the revolutionary government, by V. I. Lenin. National wars against imperialism, by V. I. Lenin.--pt. 2. Contemporary theory and practice: The Soviet Union--Guerrillas in the civil war, by I. Minz. Europe--Specific features of the Yugoslav liberation struggle, by Josip Broz Tito. The Greek resistance against Nazi occupation, by E. Joannides. China--The military problem, by Mao Tse-tung. Characteristics of China's revolutionary war, by Mao Tse-tung. Southeast Asia--Instruction to establish the Vietnam propaganda unit for national liberation, by Ho Chi Minh. The resistance war against French imperialism, by Vo Nguyen Giap. Africa--Lessons of the Algerian liberation struggle, by Bashir Hadj Ali. A political-military strategy for African liberation, by Kwame Nkrumah. Latin America--Lessons of the Cuban revolution, by Ernesto Che Guevara. Criteria of revolutionary armed struggle in Colombia, by Alberto Gomez. The United States--Revolutionary struggle for Afro-American freedom, by Henry Winston.--Index.

Aims to clarify Marxist-Leninist principles in regard to armed struggle and show how they have emerged in varied circumstances over the past century and how "they may be used to define the issues of controversy that have arisen out of contemporary armed struggles."

1047

Schieder, Theodor. [PEACE SECURITY AND PLURALISM OF STATES] Friedenssicherung und Staatenpluralismus. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Dec. 25, 1968: 881-896.
D839.E86, v. 23

Clausewitz' theory of war as a means of carrying out the state's will cannot be applied to nuclear wars, which by their disastrous effect on warring states would be out of proportion to political goals. The existing "balance of terror comprises not absolute constants but variable factors, which are being determined by technological development." The very fear of the weapons that would be employed in nuclear war has prevented the outbreak of such a war. The situation may continue, but it may also be replaced by another possibility: Because the human imagination boggles at the thought of such a conflict, nuclear war will no longer be perceived as a real threat; the incidence of conventional wars and the chances of their escalation into nuclear war can then easily increase. For the foreseeable future, a chasm between the rich and the poor nations symbolized by the Vietnam War, which thus created a universal ideological resonance, will pose the greatest danger to world peace. But even wars engendered by local particularisms, such as the Cyprus and Near East conflicts, can easily grow to major proportions if they occur at points where the great powers' interests crisscross. A purely local solution to the conflict is then impossible. The traditional code for the humane conduct of war, including the Hague convention on land warfare, is mostly irrelevant today because of the growing importance of unconventional warfare, to which guerrilla warfare belongs. Peking places a great premium on this form of war, which is evidenced by its un-Marxist doctrine of a rising against the cities by the world's rural population. The Vietnam War is an example of this Maoist struggle. Since the consolidation of peace depends on a timely and adequate removal of the causes of war, an effort to ascertain those causes is most important for finding proper remedies. Herein rational effort must go hand in hand with moral commitment. Perpetual peace, like a perfect legal constitution, may never be attainable, but both are worth the pursuit.

1048
Sokolov, P. WAR AND MANPOWER. Soviet military review, Dec. 1968: 10-13.
P&GP RR

Manpower is one of the essential factors to determine the combat effectiveness of an army. The number of men needed for modern armies has steadily risen, but a much greater proportion is now devoted to noncombat functions than previously. The increasing complexity and technical nature of war has led to greater specialization and a consequent need for more education and skills among the reserves, the civilian labor force, and especially the officers. Although advanced technology makes possible the production of weapons and equipment with a proportionately smaller economic investment, the vulnerability of the strategic rear necessitates a higher proportion of the labor force to maintain it.

1049
Wells, Donald A. THE WAR MYTH. New York, Pegasus [1967] 288 p. U21.2.W4
Bibliography: p. [267]-279.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. The meaning and matter of war: The definition of war. The just war. The inevitability of war. Patriotism and the military spirit. --pt. 2. The critique of war: The attack on the war system. Conscientious objection and pacifism. Humane and inhumane war practices.--pt. 3. War and religion: Religion and war. War is unchristian. Can Christians be soldiers?--pt. 4. The causes of war: Psychological causes of war. Military causes of war. Economic causes of war.--pt. 5. The cures for war: Disarmament and the arms race. World political federation.

Examines the justifications for warmaking in Western thought, offers "insights as to who must assume the responsibility" for war, and concludes that "the alternative to anarchic chaos has always been organization, and the wider the scope of that organization, the better the chances that it will serve as an effective alternative to Armageddon."

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1050
APG OPERATING NEW WEAPONS SPECTRUM GENERATOR. Army research and development, v. 9, Sept. 1968: 1, 3.
U393.A8, v. 9

Reports the operation of a new weapons spectrum generator (WSG) at the U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. Designed to simulate the effects of a nuclear explosion, the WSG provides a safer and more economical means of testing weapons than an actual detonation.

1051
[AIRPLANES AND GUIDED MISSILES OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Flugzeuge und Lenkwaffen der Bundeswehr. Soldat und Technik, v. 11, Dec. 1968: 672-677; suppl. illus. U3.S58, v. 11

Outlines the strength of the German Air Force in terms of weapons systems at its disposal for air defense, attack, reconnaissance, and transport. Several dozen types of aircraft and missiles are listed and their general technical characteristics given.

1052
Anderson, William R. PENTAGON IGNORES SABMIS, THE SEA-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. Navy, v. 12, Apr. 1969: 25-27. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 12

Argues that the sea-based antiballistic missile intercept system (SABMIS) would be a valuable adjunct to any land-based ABM system the United States might adopt. SABMIS could be deployed at sea near enemy launch points to make early interceptions of incoming missiles or sent to protect allies from attack or blackmail. No technological breakthroughs are necessary to deploy this system whose major components are "the Poseidon missile and tracking and acquisition radars of a type already deployed at sea on a more limited basis."

1053
Bielau, Hermann. [THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY ROCKET ARSENAL] Das militärische Raketenarsenal der Sowjetunion. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Sept.-Oct. 1968: 478-482, 532-534. U3.W396, v. 17

Discusses Soviet surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, air-to-air, and orbited missiles and their technical characteristics and performance.

1054
Brenner, Hans. [MODERN RECONNAISSANCE WEAPONS SYSTEMS: AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT MIRAGE IIIR] Moderne Aufklärungs-Waffensysteme: AMD Mirage IIIR. Flug Revue, no. 12, Dec. 1968: 26-30. illus. TL503.C524, 1968

Discusses the reconnaissance version of one of the most successful European military aircraft, the Avions Marcel Dassault Mirage IIIR, a direct derivation of the Mirage C. The author describes the development of the aircraft and turns to the technical description. The armament of the IIIR is consequently covered (it conforms essentially [to] the air-to-ground armament of the IIIE). The self-contained navigation system and the air-to-surface armament are the [same] as in the Mirage IIIC. The report closes with the newest reconnaissance version of the Mirage III, the Mirage IIIRD, which is similar to the Mirage IIIR, but [with] an improved navigation systems (Marconi Doppler radar) and automatic cameras (OMERA AP-33). (Abstract supplied, modified)

1055
Breyer, Siegfried. [HELICOPTER CRUISER MOSKVA. NEWEST DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY] Hubschrauber-Kreuzer Moskva. Die neueste Entwicklung der Sowjetmarine. Soldat und Technik, v. 11, Dec. 1968: 660-663. illus.
U3.S58, v. 11

Sees in the newest accession of the Soviet Navy, the helicopter carrier Moskva, evidence that the Soviet Union has drawn proper conclusions, in terms of defensive naval weapons systems, from its experience in the 1962 Cuban crisis. Breyer gives data on the construction, equipment, and performance of the "cruiser."

1056
Butz, J. S. HIT 'EM WHERE THEY IS! Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Mar. 1969: 64, 66-68. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Previews the new airborne detection and delivery systems that are expected to revolutionize close air support operations within the next few years. Laser-ranging and computer-driven guns promise to enhance the accuracy of firepower from the air, and moving target radar, infrared instrumentation, and low-light-level television equipment should vastly improve the capability for detecting ground targets.

1057
Butz, J. S. THERE'S NO SUBSTITUTE FOR FLIGHT-TESTING. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Feb. 1969: 36-43. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Traces the history of supersonic fighter aircraft design and outlines the future requirements in this field. Although many problems in supersonic aerodynamics can now be solved through theoretical analysis, most experts in aircraft development still recommend the construction of a prototype before going into the production of a major new aircraft system. They contend that, if the new administration agrees to revitalize experimental flying in the United States, there is every reason to believe that the next generation of supersonic fighters will completely outclass those of today. Tested improvements in aerodynamic design could give future fighters unprecedented maneuverability at supersonic speeds.

1058
Chesarek, F. J. TRENDS IN THE ARMY; WEAPON SYSTEMS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Feb. 15, 1969: 287-288. PN6121.V52, v. 35

Lists trends in weaponry that will serve as benchmarks for the Army's calculation of future needs and application of weapons trade-offs, and discusses possible improvements in defense procurement. Chesarek advocates streamlining manpower costs, since they are the dominant factor in weapons system cost-effectiveness analyses, and urges the Army to improve its ability to tap industry's resourcefulness "along the path of product improvement" and "develop cooperative measures to capitalize on industry's innovative capability."

1059
Geisenheyner, Stefan. JAGUAR: A COOPERATIVE PROJECT PAYS OFF. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Feb. 1969: 44-48. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Notes the tremendous success of the Anglo-French Jaguar fighter-trainer program. Initiated in 1965 the program is an outstanding example of international management and technical cooperation. In administering the project the joint industrial-level and governmental-level committees took much care "to divide equally between the two nations the expenditures, workload, and accruing knowledge." Although the Jaguar is not revolutionary in design or performance, it is a highly efficient aircraft with superior short takeoff and landing capabilities and can be easily adapted "to meet the diverse demands of future users." With the manufacture of two prototypes of Jaguar variants already underway, the French and British Air Forces expect to receive their first shipment of Jaguars by 1972.

1060
HARDWARE TO CLOSE THE SECURITY GAP: NICE WORDS FOR PROBLEM PROGRAMS. Armed Forces journal, v. 106, Jan. 25, 1969: 12-13.
Ul.A66, v. 106

Enumerates some of the new weapons programs mentioned in the Secretary of Defense's budget statement for the next fiscal year and surveys the status of existing programs as set forth in the statement. Included among the new weapons systems are Navy and Army fighter aircraft, improved ICBM warheads, close-support aircraft, transport helicopters, and antisubmarine warfare, carrier-based aircraft. The Secretary suggested cutbacks in the F-111 bomber and main battle tank programs because of unforeseen difficulties and requested additional funds for major ship systems.

1061
A HEALTHY BOOST FOR RDT&E PROGRAMS: BUT LESS FUNDS FOR OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT. Armed Forces journal, v. 106, Jan. 25, 1969: 18-19. Ul.A66, v. 106

Examines the $8.174 billion budget requested by the Defense Department for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs for the coming fiscal year and compares it to the $8 billion budget requested in fiscal year 1969. The breakdown is given of the funds earmarked for the various program activities, which include military sciences, aircraft, missiles, military astronautics, ships and small craft, and ordnance and combat vehicles. The amounts allocated to the various stages of the RDT&E cycle are also presented.

1062
Heiman, Leo. ISRAEL'S "SECRET" WEAPON. Ordnance, v. 53, Jan./Feb. 1969: 408-411. illus.
UF1.O67, v. 53

Describes the Israeli ability to refit, repower, and rearm the supposedly "obsolete" Sherman M50 tank to defeat easily the newest Soviet T-55 and American M48 Patton tanks. Heiman presents a brief history of "the Jewish Army's strange love affair with Sherman tanks" and describes Israeli solutions to problems encountered in renovating the Sherman M50's.

1063
Hull, E. W. Seabrook. NEW DIMENSION IN ASW. Ordnance, v. 53, Jan./Feb. 1969: 404-407. illus.
UF1.O67, v. 53

Significant factors that limit the effectiveness of airborne antisubmarine warfare (ASW)--data acquisition and interpretation--have been eliminated with the Navy's development of an advanced avionics systems, A-NEW, and its acquisition of an aircraft to carry it, Lockheed's P-3C Orion. The Navy has shown its faith in the A-NEW-Orion combination by the programing over the next decade of a $600 to $700 million procurement for 100 P-3C's equipped with the new system; production is already at a rate of from two to three aircraft per month. A-NEW's objective is to optimize contemporary ASW techniques and equipment by employing a general-purpose digital computer and an integrated tactical display installed in the aircraft. Navigation, a burden completely removed from the

human crew in the P3-C, and the capacity to obtain and calculate such data as bearings and distances to sonobuoys and suspected targets are some of the most important capabilities of the A-NEW system. In the future, the Navy hopes to reduce A-NEW's size and weight "to fit it into the VSX--the carrier-based, fixed-wing ASW patrol plane now under development--and make it capable of being operated by only two people, compared with the five . . . now needed."

1064
Kozlowski, Joseph P. R&D IN THE U.S.S.R. Science and technology, Mar. 1969: 8-19. illus.
Q1.I587, 1969

Ever since Soviet officials announced their intention to overtake the West in industry as well as in space their goal has been impeded by a plethora of problems. Ironically, the three-year study by the [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] anent science policy in Soviet Russia is just a jumping off point. For the Russians fully realize their drawbacks in certain areas of R&D, and they are doing something tangible to improve conditions, to turn current weakness into future strength. The author clearly delineates problems besetting Soviet R&D [and] points to future solutions and rather ominous implications for the free world. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1065
Küng, Paul. [INTRODUCTION OF THE MIRAGE III INTO THE SWISS AIR FORCE] Ausrüstung der schweizerischen Flugwaffe mit Mirage III. Flug Revue, no. 12, Dec. 1968: 20-25. illus.
TL503.C524, 1968

[Discusses] the French weapons system Avions Marcel Dassault Mirage III being supplied to the Swiss Air Force, which is equipped with the two-seater trainer version Mirage IIIBS (Bi-place Suisse), the reconnaissance version Mirage IIIRS (Reconnaissance Suisse), and the single seater fighter version Mirage IIIS. A description follows of the individual versions. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1066
Lowe, George E. THE POLARIS REVOLUTION CHANGES COURSE OF HISTORY. Navy, v. 12, Jan. 1969: 10-15. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 12

The past has witnessed two great revolutions in marine technology in the West--the birth of the age of sail in the period from 1440 to 1490 and the advent of "steam and iron ships" from 1840 to 1890. Each of these revolutions was to have a profound impact on the course of world history--the first by furnishing the instruments of naval might with which the West united the world under its hegemony, the second by providing the means to consolidate this global empire. It now appears that from 1938 to 1968 the West passed through a third great period of naval innovation with profound implications for the future of mankind--the nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered submarine is certain to bring about far-reaching changes in world politics. Because it is the first truly invulnerable deterrent to total war, its practical effects are not too different from those of disarmament; it makes total war unthinkable as an instrument of policy and forces nations to turn to less destructive forms of competition. This does not mean that all conflict and violence will cease; however, the ultimate catastrophe has been postponed. Man must now take advantage of this respite to construct a more stable balance of power and to effect a more equitable distribution of the earth's resources. He has the opportunity now to realize a new golden age if he will just make the effort.

1067
Mason, John F. AIR-DEFENSE DISPLAY DOES MORE. Electronic design, v. 17, Mar. 1, 1969: 36-38. illus.
TK7800.E437, v. 17

Praises the versatility and performance of the display system developed for the Air Force's backup interceptor control (Buic III) system, a network of 15 sites that will be responsible for air defense should the firstline Sage network become inoperative. The Buic III display can depict aircraft movements in its area of responsibility, geographic data, the airbases that are prepared to service manned interceptors, ground-air missile site locations and their effective ranges, and radar sites and their range areas. In addition, a switch on the Buic III console controls a ground-to-air radio transmitter, which links the Buic commander with the radio station closest to the aircraft to be contacted. Improvements in computer programming and additional hardware enable the Buic III to generate twice as much information as its predecessor, the Buic II.

1068
NEW MUSCLE FOR NAVY'S AIR ARM. Business week, Feb. 1, 1969: 58, 60-61. illus.
HF5001.B89, 1969

Assesses the Navy's newest high-speed tactical fighter, the F-14 and cites such innovations for the aircraft as the development of boron fibers by Grumman. The Navy will come under close scrutiny by Congress when it presents its plans for the F-14--Congress will want to know how the F-14 will stand up against the Air Force's faster and cheaper F-15.

1069
NEW SCHEMES FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. Business week, no. 2063, Mar. 15, 1969: 36-38. illus.
HF5001.B89, 1969

Surveys various proposals for a more effective missile defense system currently under study by "Project Defender," which aims to improve conventional systems that use interceptor missiles to destroy incoming warheads and to develop unconventional methods of missile interception known as "non-nuclear kill mechanisms."

1070
Norris, John G. THE NAVY'S HOT NEW FIGHTER PLANE. Navy, v. 12, Mar. 1969: 9-12. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 12

Reviews the development and evaluates the expected performance characteristics of the Grumman F-14. This aircraft is to be delivered to the Navy in the F-14A version in May 1973. It is designed for air superiority missions and as a counter to the Soviet Navy's surface-to-surface missile threat. The overall cost of the new aircraft will be about $5 billion for 469 planes.

1071
Orphan, Richard C., and Robert P. Gard. NUCLEAR DEMOLITIONS. Ordnance, v. 53, Mar./Apr. 1969: 490-493. illus. UF1.O67, v. 53

Although the use of explosives in such military operations as the destruction of fortifications, the creation

of barriers, and mining is not new, the use of nuclear explosives with their small size, economy of manpower, and speed and safety in emplacement could herald a new era in military effectiveness. Nuclear demolitions could delay and drain the momentum of an armored attack. During this delay the defense could plan a strategy to restore a favorable situation and determine whether the attack is "a large-scale effort, a foray, or an in-between tactic." Despite such a serious limitation on the use of nuclear detonations in the field of battle as radioactive fallout, "it would seem that there is much incentive for the development of rapid techniques for charge burial that will be suitable for use under combat conditions."

1072
Palii, Aleksandr I. [TECHNIQUE AND METHODS OF RADIO ELECTRONIC WAR] Technik und Methoden des funkelektronischen Krieges [by] Alexander Ignatijewitsch Pali. Berlin, Deutscher Militärverlag, 1968. 340 p. illus. UG610.P3315

"Soviet manuscipt translated by Gernot Padur and adapted by a collective of the [East German] Ministry of National Defense."

Partial contents.--Technique of radio electronic war.--Technique of radio electronic reconnaissance.--Counteraction by wireless.--Action against wireless counteraction.--Methods of radio electronic war.--Conduct of radio electronic war.--Radio espionage.

Discusses the technology, techniques, and political effects of radio warfare, including espionage, reconnaissance activities, and humming produced by electronic equipment mounted on the ground, ships, submarines, aircraft, and satellites. Palii considers radio warfare important not only in war but in peace as well, because it is a never-ending business; any technological or other improvement made by one side instantly causes competition by another.

1073
Petras, Ehrenfried. DETAILS ON BONN'S BUG-WARFARE PLANS. Democratic German report, v. 17, Dec. 23, 1968: 185-187. DD261.D3, v. 17

Commentary on the statement is abstracted as item 1076 in this bibliography.

Excerpts from a statement to the international press in East Berlin made on December 6, 1968, by the former director of the Laboratory for Microbiology of the Institute of Aerobiology in Grafschaft, West Germany, on the German Federal Republic's research activities in the area of "highly pathogenic micro-organisms and virus aerosols, V substances, G gases, toxins, psychoactive war agents, algogens and phytotoxic war agents." Petras observes that the intensity and dimensions of such research in the Federal Republic far surpass the country's scientific and defense needs for the development of antidotes against these substances.

1074
POWER REACTORS 1969--INDEX. Nuclear engineering, v. 14, Feb. 1969: 109, 111-126. TK9001.N75, v. 14

General information and detailed technical data and progress schedules for all the world's nuclear power reactors--planned, under construction, and operational.

1075
POWER REACTORS OF THE WORLD. In International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, v. 11, no. 1, 1969: 28-35. QC770.I4955, v. 11

Lists nuclear power reactors operating or under construction in states belonging to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Name, location, type, net output, and criticality date are given for each reactor. The list was prepared from data available in December 1968 and will be amended in later issues of the Bulletin.

1076
PREPARATIONS FOR BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WARFARE IN WEST GERMANY; REVELATION BY WEST GERMAN SCIENTISTS. Socialist congressman, v. 8, Jan. 5, 1969: 9. JQ298.S6A35, v. 8

"From Arif Naqvi."

Text of Dr. Petras' statement appears as item 1073 in this bibliography.

Information concerning the preparation of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons in West Germany. Dr. Ehrenfried Petras, former director of the Laboratory for Microbiology of the Institute for Aerobiology in Grafschaft, West Germany, has disclosed the areas of extensive research on such weapons and noted research priorities.

1077
REPORTS FROM WORLD NUCLEAR POWER STATION SITES. Nuclear engineering, v. 14, Feb. 1969: 103-108; Mar.: 216-224. illus. TK9001.N75, v. 14

Reports on the status of nuclear power stations recently commissioned or under construction. Part 1 covers sites in Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, India, Japan, Pakistan, and Spain. Part 2 covers Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

1078
Seaborg, Glenn T. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOM--A NEW APPRAISAL. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 60, Mar. 3, 1969: 173-184; Mar. 10: 199-211. JX232.A33, v. 60

Contents.--pt. 1. The past and the promise.--pt. 2. On keeping the peaceful atom.

Examines the role of nuclear science and technology in international relations. In part 1, Seaborg enumerates the major peaceful uses of the atom and describes how the United States and agencies like Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency have helped to promote wider sharing of nuclear technology. In part 2, he discusses the baneful impact of nuclear energy on the security of nations and evaluates briefly the several efforts that have been made to deal with this problem--the Baruch plan, safeguards systems, and the nonproliferation treaty.

1079
STRATEGIC WARFARE. Space/aeronautics, v. 51, Jan. 1969: 84-95. illus. TL501.A786, v. 51

Outlines the various advanced strategic weapons systems that are being considered to ensure the continued survivability of America's second-strike forces.

New spaceborne and airborne reconnaissance systems promise to improve the U.S. warning and intelligence network greatly. Intensive work is underway on the development of efficient antiaircraft, antisatellite, and antimissile defense systems. Efforts are being made to improve the delivery systems of the next generation of offensive missiles, and extensive studies are being conducted on the feasibility of an advanced manned strategic aircraft.

1080
TACTICAL WARFARE. Space/aeronautics, v. 51, Jan. 1969: 96-105. illus.
TL501.A786, v. 51

Surveys the programs for upgrading U.S. tactical fighting capabilities needed to meet the requirements of the coming decade. Advanced close-support aircraft, air superiority fighters, and tactical missiles are being developed to fight in battlefield situations similar to those of the Vietnam experience. Moreover, defense researchers are pursuing greater sophistication in airlift, communications, and command capabilities.

1081
Thomer, Egbert. [THE NAVIES' DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOR THE FUTURE] Flottenbauprogramme für die Zukunft. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Sept. 1968: 474-478. illus. U3.W396, v. 17

Describes development projects of the American, British, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, Norwegian, Danish, and West German Navies and outlines certain technical characteristics of some of their planned warships and weapons systems.

1082
Thomer, Egbert. [NO COMMUNITIES IN SHIPBUILDING] Keine Gemeinschaften im Kriegsschiffbau. Atlantische Welt, v. 8, Oct. 1968: 2, 4-5. illus.
V3.A8, v. 8

Points to the need for and the possibilities of cooperative shipbuilding among NATO members and to the lack of any bilateral or multilateral plans in that respect. The defense tasks and structures of areas of military operations of the West German, Danish, Norwegian, Belgian, and Dutch forces should dispose such nations to cooperative projects for construction of their naval vessels weapons systems.

1083
Ulsamer, Edgar E. SUCH A NIMBLE GIANT. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Apr. 1969: 79-80. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Praises the performance of the Air Force's supertransport, the C-5 Galaxy, during a test flight on February 25. Most of the design flaws appear to have been corrected, and the first aircraft is scheduled for delivery by the end of this year. Despite congressional criticism of escalating costs of this project, the actual cost of the 120 aircraft ordered is projected at $3.966 billion, only 10 percent above the original estimate. Among the other uses for the C-5 currently under examination are its potentials as an aerial tanker, missile launcher, and test-bed for a nuclear propulsion system.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

1084
Achminow, Herman F. [OUR CONTINENT'S FUTURE (PT. 2)] Die Zukunft unseres Kontinents (II). Politische Studien, v. 19, Nov./Dec. 1968: 679-688.
H35.P66, v. 19

Pt. 1 was abstracted as item 1 in v. 5, no. 1, of this bibliography.

Considers the strategy of the Soviet-Communist expansion, including the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and Western reactions to it. Achminow discusses the relationship between American and Soviet nuclear power and points out that in World War II there were already enough chemical mass-annihilation weapons, to destroy mankind. Political military situations in France, Italy, and the German Federal Republic are also discussed.

1085
Armfield, Hugh. JUST A MIRAGE? Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Dec. 5, 1968: 530, 567-568. illus.
HC411.F18, v. 62

Australian Prime Minister John Gorton's statement that his Government had decided "in principle" to maintain defense forces in Malaysia and Singapore until 1971 has resulted in confusion concerning Australia's real intentions. Sources in both External Affairs and Defence maintain that the statement affirms Australia's commitment until 1971 and believe that it will be extended beyond that date. Gorton's closest advisers, however, maintain that there is no firm commitment to remain until 1971 and definitely none beyond then. A precise reading of the Prime Minister's statement indicates merely that he is keeping his options open. While politicians in Canberra dither, defense planners are examining possible sites in Malaysia and Singapore for basing the Australian battalion and its New Zealand attachment; a site in Singapore will probably be chosen. Australia, which has no defense treaty with Singapore and shuns the ties of a formal treaty, would prefer "a flexible arrangement with the Government of the day, able to decide when and in what circumstances the Australian force would and should be used."

1086
Barclay, C. N. [BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY 1968 (2); ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF JULY 1968 TO THE DEFENSE WHITE PAPER] Britische Verteidigungspolitik 1968 (II); Analyse des Ergänzungsberichtes vom Juli 1968 zum Verteidigungsweissbuch. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Sept. 1968: 454-457.
U3.W396, v. 17

The first part of this article was annotated as item 1512 in v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography.

Outlines planned changes in the British military posture over the coming years. By 1972 the numerical strength of the British Armed Forces will be reduced by 16 percent, from 406,000 to 340,000 troops, but their standard of military preparedness and equipment, especially in conventional weapons, will be greatly improved. The withdrawal of British forces from distant areas, especially from East of Suez, will enable Great Britain to put a greater effort into the defense of Western Europe.

1087
Beaufre, André. [ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY] Analyse du problème de la sécurité. Stratégie, no. 16, Oct./Dec. 1968: 5-16.
U162.S78, 1968

Argues that the solutions to crises resulting from security problems are better realized by political and diplomatic means than by military weapons and defenses. Beaufre notes that, because most nations do not possess a nuclear deterrent, the most efficient solution to the problem of security is moral deterrence, which is embodied in international organizations, alliances, and international opinion. He concludes that "deterrence of conventional war can be assured by moral deterrence more effectively than by a defensive military system, which requires a great amount of power, often out of proportion to the economic capacity of the nation, to be valuable."

1088
Bell, Coral. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE IN THE ASIAN CONTEXT. In Royal Central Asian Society, London, Journal, v. 55, Oct. 1968: 276-287.
DS1.R6, v. 55

The chief preoccupation of Australian diplomacy has always been how to protect the nation and preserve its Western ethnic identity in a region that may fall one day within the orbit of any one of several Asian powers. In the past the solution has been found in alliances with "great and powerful friends"--first Great Britain and then the United States. Since 1951, Australia has made the Anzus Treaty the cornerstone of its security policy and labored hard to maintain the conviction among American officials that "Australians are useful and reasonable allies." In general, the alliance has worked out well enough for both sides although it has by no means provided a solution to all of Australia's security problems. It would be a mistake, however, to take the alliance for granted. A victory at the polls for the strenuously nationalistic Australian Labor Party would subject the U.S.-Australian relationship to severe strains. A shift in U.S. security interests from the Far East and the Pacific to other areas following the Vietnam War could be equally disruptive. While it is impossible to predict the shape of postwar U.S. foreign policy, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the United States will be distracted from its Far Eastern concerns by more pressing problems elsewhere. In these circumstances the isolationist nationalism favored by the Labor Party would reassert itself and a "Fortress Australia" policy and nuclear armaments would become much more attractive. Only one thing can be said with certainty, however: Considering the way things are going in Vietnam, one can only conclude that in the future America's contribution to Australian security will be smaller and that, consequently, Australians will have to bear a greater share of the burden of their own defense.

1089
Bentley, Helen D. 'NOTHING SHORT OF MIRACULOUS.' Navy, v. 11, Dec. 1968: 24-28. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 11

Illustrates the rapid growth of the Soviet merchant marine, which performs a normal commercial role in international trade and at the same time serves as an instrument of Soviet political and military policy.

1090
Blixt, Melvin D. SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. Naval War College review, v. 21, Mar. 1969: 4-24. map.
P&GP RR

Analyzes the development of Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has attempted to gain footholds in this strategic area. However, Russian aspirations met with little success until the mid-1950's, when Western influence began to decline in the Arab world. By encouraging anti-Western sentiments among the Arabs, exploiting Arab resentment of Israel, and sponsoring massive economic and military assistance programs, the Soviet Union has succeeded in enhancing its prestige in the Middle East. Many Western observers are concerned that Russia will use its new position of power to "create a military presence that is disadvantageous to the West" and fear that it will extend its power eastward toward Gibraltar and southward "into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, to thereby be in a better position to influence 'third world' events." Despite recent Russian successes, however, Blixt asserts that the West can still act to stem the tide of Russian influence in the Mediterranean.

1091
Bonin, Bogislaw von, and Ferdinand O. Miksche. [IS THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC DEFENSIBLE? BONN AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE MUST LEARN TO THINK OVER THEIR MILITARY CONCEPTS AFRESH] Lässt sich die Bundesrepublik verteidigen? Bonn und seine atlantischen Bündnispartner müssen militärisch umdenken lernen. Christ und Welt, v. 21, Oct. 11, 1968: 3.
BR4.C37, v. 21

Bonin: The Czechoslovak crisis has weakened the Warsaw Treaty Organization's potential for conventional forces. The Czechoslovak Army is now as unreliable for the bloc's common action as the Rumanian Army has already been for some time. Still Moscow is easily able to put from 80 to 100 divisions in the field that stretches from the Baltic Sea to the Alps and, without bringing additional forces from deep inside the Soviet Union, can muster four times as many conventional forces as can NATO in the central European sector. NATO's planned "Big Lift" operation to compensate for this discrepancy is "a joke," considering the realities of war. Only American nuclear deterrence gives the German Federal Republic and its NATO allies their security. Their concepts of conducting full-fledged conventional war in the heart of Europe are sheer anachronisms. The prime function of the German Federal Army should be as a border guard, for the greatest danger of war lies in outbreaks of local border conflicts for which conventional forces are best suited.
Miksche: Moscow's loss of control over Czechoslovakia would open a gap in the strategic glacis that stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which is of crucial importance to the Soviet Union. This gap would undermine the Soviet position not only in the other satellite countries but in the Mediterranean as well. Russian control of Eastern Europe and Soviet preponderance over NATO in conventional weapons give the Soviet Union enormous possibilities for political pressure on the West. To paralyze Western resistance to this pressure, which could eventually give the Soviet Union substantial gains, it would suffice for Moscow just to declare that it would never use nuclear weapons first. It is therefore necessary for

NATO and especially for the German Federal Republic to raise their conventional defense postures, particularly their military mobilization capabilities, to the Soviet level.

1092
Brosio, Manlio. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. NATO letter, v. 16, Nov. 1968: 2-9. illus. D845.2.A44, v. 16
Text of a speech given in Stuttgart, Germany.

Argues that, despite the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the primary objectives of NATO remain valid. Brosio observes the effect of the invasion on NATO's defense and security policies and concludes that NATO has an obligation to defend the free world and a duty to pursue detente with the Soviet Union and its allies.

1093
Bulatov, A. U.S. BRIDGEHEAD IN SPAIN. Soviet military review, no. 2, Feb. 1969: 52-54. P&GP RR

Spain's strategic location with regard to Western Europe, Africa, and the Warsaw Pact countries prompted the United States--after abortive efforts to make Spain a NATO member--to conclude an agreement that allows construction of U.S. naval and air bases on Spanish soil. The agreement has now expired, and in negotiating renewal Spain "is trying to exact the maximum for its services from its overseas partners." It is probable that Spain and the United States will eventually reach an agreement, but the previous controversy in the Spanish civilian community over certain aspects of the military program has developed into a movement against U.S. base rights. The major cause for their concern is the stockpiling of nuclear weapons on Spanish ground, which is permitted by "secret clauses of the Madrid-Washington military agreement" and resulted in the Palomares incident. This protest has merged with similar movements against the Franco regime, and the Government has acted in a demonstration of military strength to repress the protests. Franco can be expected to compromise his exorbitant demands in the interest of the military aid that is involved and in view of the continuing U.S. effort to "integrate Spain into the NATO orbit."

1094
Burks, David D. SURVEY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS; INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA. A study prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 28 p. P&GP RR
At head of title: 90th Cong., 2d sess. Committee print.

Partial contents.--Castroite doctrine and Cuba's role: The Tricontinental Conference, 1966. The Latin American Solidarity Conference, 1967.--Communist insurgency movements: Venezuela. Colombia. Guatemala. Bolivia. Nicaragua. Other countries.

Examines the progress of Castroite insurgency in five Latin American countries and recommends that greater emphasis be placed on upgrading the civil security forces and intelligence agencies in Latin America. The study concludes with a survey of other Latin American countries that are currently being threatened with Communist insurgencies.

1095
Cameron, Robert A. CANADA'S MILITARY UNIFICATION--A PROGRESS REPORT. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Apr. 1969: 72-78. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52

Canada's military unification program, which was launched in 1967 by the former Minister of Defence, Paul Hellyer, has not noticeably affected the functions of the Air Defence, Transport, and Maritime Commands or of Canada's NATO forces to date. However, it has resulted in improved decisionmaking and management at Defence Headquarters, an increased number of common-support services, a consolidation of training procedures, and the establishment of a Mobile Command. Although its supporters continue to praise the unification program, it has not resulted in the expected savings in overhead and has not eliminated interservice rivalries. At the end of the unification period Canada can expect "a defense with integrated management, professional combat elements, and unified support where practical"--about the same "status every other modern defense organization should reach by the same time."

1096
Candlin, A. H. S. UNTHINKING THE THINKABLE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 114, Mar. 1969: 39-41. U1.R8, v. 114

The American practice of "farming out" responsibility for policymaking and defense research has led to the growth of a "new tribe of defence intelligentsia" that has ruthlessly usurped the proper function of the professional military. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara, whom congressional committees have charged with overriding sound military advice, was widely supported in his efforts by private organizations engaged in national security studies. Admiral Rickover has complained about "the red-tape jungle" and the endless studies that make it difficult to secure Defense Department approval of new projects. "The McNamara doctrine of 'assured destruction,' " which accepts parity as an adequate basis for deterrence, and the emphasis on cost effectiveness have enabled the Soviet Union to make substantial gains in the arms race. Exposure of the unwarranted and harmful intrusion by the "defence intellectual" will lead to a restoration of the professional military to their legitimate function with "their civilian allies supporting them in a technical capacity."

1097
THE CASE FOR A VOLUNTEER ARMY. Time, v. 93, Jan. 10, 1969: 25-26. AP2.T37, v. 93

Despite the wide appeal of the concept of a volunteer army, there are a number of reservations that must be overcome before the administration can move toward building such a force. Pentagon experts fear that manpower needs cannot be met without the draft. Furthermore, they contend that it would cost the Nation up to $17 billion a year to attract volunteers and argue that such a system would attract men with only "marginal" capabilities. Proponents argue that with the right incentives both the quantitative and qualitative needs of the military could be met without overburdening the taxpayer and dismiss the arguments that a career army would assume the stature of a paid mercenary force or "become a seedbed for future military coups." They point out that for most of its history

America has relied on citizen armies, and they maintain that there is no substantive evidence to support the claim that a volunteer army would be disproportionately black. Actually, regardless of the attitudes of its critics, a volunteer army may "eventually become the only orderly way to raise armed forces." Growing public discontent with the inequities of the draft, plus President Nixon's convictions in favor of a volunteer force, will place the proposal for a volunteer army near the top of the administration's priorities.

1098
Chang, Parris H. CHINA'S ECLIPSE OF THE MOON. Far Eastern economic review, v. 63, Jan. 16, 1969: 97-99. illus. HC411. F18, v. 63

The intensive political attacks on the national defense industry and scientific and research institutions during the cultural revolution have adversely affected both China's overall military capability and its nuclear program. Research and development in modern weaponry, particularly nuclear weapons, and the production of military hardware have been retarded. To what extent the nuclear program has been disrupted is difficult to determine, "but last month's triumphant explosion of 'another hydrogen bomb' must be set against the year-and-a-half delay since the last publicly announced . . . test." Predictions that China could deploy short- and medium-range missiles before the end of 1968 have proved false, although deployment may be achieved soon.

1099
Cho, Soon Sung. NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA: STEPPED-UP AGGRESSION AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW SECURITY. Asian survey, v. 9, Jan. 1969: 29-39. DS1. A492, v. 9

Because of America's reluctance to react in kind to North Korean border crossings into the south, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is losing confidence in the strength of America's commitment and is seeking new sources of national security that rely on its own military power rather than America's. ROK leaders want to amend article 3 of the mutual defense pact with the United States so that it will guarantee an "immediate and automatic" U.S. response in case of an enemy attack. In addition, the South Korean Government wants to acquire control over its forces, which up to now have been under U.N. command. Lack of confidence in America's commitment has caused South Korea to seek a different kind of security agreement--a multilateral defense treaty among Asian nations that would find its origin in the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). However, since the ASPAC countries did not want to change the economic and cultural character of their organization, ROK leaders are probing the possibility of an Asian Pacific treaty organization to supplement the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the mutual defense pact with the United States. North Korea, on the other hand, is becoming belligerent because of Premier Kim Il-sung's advocation of "revolutionary violence in crushing foreign imperialists and overthrowing reactionaries." He believes Korean unification will best be promoted by a revolutionary struggle and that because the possibility of war between the big powers has decreased the threat of limited war remains. As long as the South Korean people support their Government, "Kim Il-sung will reap nothing but frustration from his efforts to instigate a South Korean revolution."

1100
Chopra, Maharaj K. [SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE INDIAN VIEW] Sowjetische Strategie in indischer Sicht. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Nov. 1968: 581-584. U3. W396, v. 17

Since it is the biggest of all states in territory alone and borders "unconquerable" frozen seas on the north, the Soviet Union is the most secure nation in the world. However, because of its exposed role as an empire subjected to various disintegrating forces, the Soviet Union cannot leave its security unprotected. In its foreign relations the security of its own territory takes precedence over all other considerations; the Communist ideology is often only a facade for Russian nationalism and expanisionism. Unlike America, the Soviet Union relies as strongly on nuclear as on conventional forces, which gives it elastic military posture and the ability to concentrate its forces wherever it chooses. In terms of large territorial spans, its defense policy is oriented toward Europe, the Northwest Pacific, and, recently, the Soviet-Chinese boundary. To undermine Red Chinese and American influence on its southern flank and to establish its foothold in Pakistan, the Soviet Union recently started arms deliveries to Pakistan in complete reversal of its former policy. Moscow is well aware of the impotence of India's resentment toward this move, for India as a developing country depends on Soviet help. On the other hand, Moscow does not intend to lose its influence on India, which is strategically most important to the Soviet Union.

1101
CIVIL DEFENCE IN IRAN. International civil defence, v. 16, Jan. 1969: 1-5. UA926. I488, v. 16

Discusses the Iranian Civil Defense Organization (ICDO), whose duty it is to protect the lives and property of the population against air attacks, accidents, and natural disasters. A breakdown of Iran's civil defense program, which includes training schools and information campaigns, is given. The author concludes with a review of the ICDO's work during the 1968 earthquake.

1102
Clark, John J. THE ENCIRCLING SEA. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Mar. 1969: 26-35. V1. U8, v. 95

"Mesmerized by the vision of expanding power," U.S. policymakers in the postwar era undertook unrealistic world commitments, which overextended the United States militarily and economically. Thus, the Nation's leaders must now reassess the limits of its power and redefine its policy goals and strategy accordingly. Because of favorable geographic and ideological factors the United States has developed into a wealthy and powerful nation. However, "further accretions to American power" are inhibited by the absence of these same factors overseas. A viable national strategy must recognize the pluralistic nature of the world community. It must not strain the country's resources and should be flexible and pragmatic to adjust to changing world conditions. A maritime strategy meets these prerequisites and would facilitate U.S. security interests in containing the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would include the maintenance of air

and sea forces to deal with any threat to U.S. territories, a system of offshore bases around the Russian landmass, land bases equipped with ABM's and tactical nuclear weapons, fast deployment forces capable of rapid intervention in any threatened sector of the world, and sea-based nuclear deterrent forces. Naval supremacy would permit the United States "to intervene at a time and place of [its] choosing and to define the area of conflict in the most favorable terms."

1103
Clark, Melvin D., and Richard C. Orphan. ARMY NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: IS IT OUT OF DATE? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Mar. 1969: 3-9. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Summarizes and questions the validity of the basic concepts of the Army's nuclear doctrine, which was formulated almost 15 years ago. The authors express concern over the Army's capability to maximize the effectiveness of its nuclear forces.

1104
Cleveland, Harlan. NATO AFTER THE INVASION. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Jan. 1969: 251-265.
D410.F6, v. 47

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Five shattered the atmosphere of détente that prevailed in the first half of 1968. NATO's initial reaction was restrained--"to watch carefully but lie low." The NATO countries pledged no further reduction of forces pending a comprehensive review of policies and resources and generally agreed on the need to improve the quality if not the quantity of NATO defenses; the difficulty lay in reversing the already active budget-cutting trend. The instinctively negative reaction to the invasion soon gave way to the more serious question of long-range plans. The basic assumption of détente--that the Soviet Union would permit a gradual extension of the East European liberalization movement--was undermined by the invasion, as were the immediate chances for an effective agreement on arms control, particularly limitations on nuclear weapons. Since the need for arms control is too pressing to let an opportunity pass, however, NATO policy will probably continue to be "defense-cum-détente--the preservation of Western security as the essential basis for making peace with the East."

1105
Croker, F. P. U. THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF NATO FLANKS. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 114, Mar. 1969: 51-54. illus.
U1.R8, v. 114

Contends that, in the event of a conventional ground attack by the Soviet Union, Britain could best contribute to the defense of NATO by using its seapower to protect NATO's flanks. The probable route of a Soviet attack would be the north German plain. By maintaining a strong flank position in Denmark, NATO forces could threaten Soviet lines of communication or even launch an invasion along the Baltic coast. In addition to supplying the stronghold in Denmark, the British Navy could assist in blocking the entrances to the Baltic and Black Seas and also in defending against a Soviet attack on Norway from the north. Britain already has naval craft suitable for these purposes, but the scope of its responsibility would require far greater numbers.

1106
Czempiel, Ernst O. [HOW STRONG IS THE UNITED STATES?] Wie stark sind die Vereinigten Staaten? Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 4, 1968: 396-409.
D839.M58, v. 9

The degree and objectives of American engagement abroad surpass the U.S. capabilities. "Strength is a multidimensional category." In terms of traditional military-economic power factors the United States is the strongest country in the world. Although the Soviet Union has already caught up with the United States in the quantity of its strategic offensive weapons and is ahead of America in the development of orbital and fractional orbital weapons systems, American "assured destruction" capability will remain unimpaired as long as an effective ABM system is not built in Russia. In terms of general purpose military forces the relationship between the two countries is equal. A comparison of American and Soviet defense budgets over the past few years shows the United States lagging far behind the Soviet Union in outlays for strategic weapon systems. The United States is still strong, but it is so in technological "categories of the early sixties." The reason is the Vietnam War, which has made the American military machine "nose heavy" with the kind of conventional forces that is atypical for the superpower. Expenditure on the war, although representing only 3 percent of the national income, has had considerable inflationary impact on the national economy and adversely affected the technological improvement of armaments. Essential divergence between America's claim to leadership and its need to retain freedom of action limits American influence in the world. "The strength of the two superpowers alone does not suffice for global condominium."

1107
Dahm, Helmut. [MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION] Militärische Aspekte der chinesischen Kulturrevolution. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 6, Sept./Oct. 1968: 318-324. P&GP RR
Excerpts from his book Abschreckung oder Volkskrieg, strategische Machtplanung der Sowjetunion und Chinas im internationalen Kräfteverhältnis, 1968.

Points out that Red China's defense policy, which lacks adequate nuclear deterrence either in the nation's nuclear arsenal or in the form of a Soviet protection guarantee, for the time being relies on "people's strategy" and a doctrine of struggle between the "world village" and "world city" as substitutes for a missing deterrence. This notwithstanding, China badly wants to avoid any direct confrontation on its southern frontiers with the United States. The main objective of the Chinese cultural revolution is to destroy "the Soviet Union's fascination power." Dahm traces the development of various Chinese strategic doctrines, considers several Western and Eastern views on China's defense policy, and describes the nation's internal aims in regard to this policy.

1108
Dawalt, Kenneth F. DAWALT DISCUSSES INTERNATIONAL MILITARY R&D. Army research and development, v. 9, Sept. 1968: 2, 32-34.
U393.A8, v. 9
Excerpts from an address by the Army's Deputy Chief of Research and Development (International Programs) to a recent meeting of the American Ordnance Association at the NASA-Lewis Research Center.

Explains U.S. policy regarding cooperation with its allies in military research and development (R&D) and discusses existing international R&D programs. Believing that countries that may have to fight together should also work together in peacetime, U.S. defense policymakers support three major types of international cooperation in defense R&D. First, the United States promotes the exchange of technical data through NATO, the American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Armies Standardization Program, and the ABCA Technical Cooperation Program. It also cooperates with the allied governments in the development of specific items, such as the U.S.-German main battle-tank project. The third type of arrangement involves "industrial cooperation through licensing, subsidiaries, joint funding, and private contractor-to-contractor sales agreements." Despite the difficulties often encountered in finding a standardized item to meet the diverse defense requirements of several nations and the problems created by international industrial competition, Dawalt foresees the continuation of U.S. involvement in international defense R&D.

1109
[THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY THOUGHT IN RUSSIA] Développement de la pensée militaire en U.R.S.S. [by] XXX. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Feb. 1969: 223-238.
D410.R45, v. 25

Discusses the influence of Marshal Sokolovskii's book Soviet Military Strategy on the development of Soviet military thought and distinguishes between his theoretical and conceptual approach to strategy and the ideologically-conditioned approach advocated by political leaders, which has been replacing Sokolovskii's thought since 1965. The author concludes that "certain 'signs' are causing the superpowers to admit the futility of an arms race and study the possibility of a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic weapons."

1110
DNEPR; A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES [Dnepr; sbornik] Moskva, Voenizdat, 1967. 125 p. illus.
U255.R8D57

Reports by various military correspondents who took part in the "Dnepr" maneuvers held in 1967 in the Ukraine and Belorussia. The newest weapons and offensive techniques were employed, and operational and tactical methods were demonstrated under warlike conditions.

1111
Douglas-Home, Charles. RUSSIANS ON THE MOVE. Survival, v. 11, Feb. 1969: 63-65.
U162.S9, v. 11
Reprinted from The Times, Dec. 10, 1968.
Newsp

Russian military forces have become increasingly active throughout much of the world, both on land and at sea. The mobilization of reserves during the Czechoslovak crisis and the extensive deployment of forces in Eastern Europe have enabled the Russians to exercise a decisive influence on the course of events there. Although an invasion of Yugoslavia is unlikely at present, Soviet strength in the area could ensure that its own interests would not suffer in the event of a crisis such as Tito's death. Similarly the expansion of Soviet naval forces into areas previously regarded as Western preserves, such as the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, makes Russian influence critical in times of tension. Instead of the usual military response to these threats the West should stress political and economic measures to counter further Russianization. Any military countermeasures--e.g., the deployment of naval forces in the Black Sea--should be undertaken only where the West is adequately prepared to respond to possible Soviet retaliation.

1112
East, John P. CONTAINMENT--THE MILITARY IMPERATIVE. New guard, v. 9, Feb. 1969: 14-17, 22.
AP2.N6154, v. 9

Argues that, although communism must be contained militarily, the military aspect of America's containment policy has failed in the underdeveloped continents. East maintains that "the will to contain" is the first prerequisite of a successful military containment policy, which can be realized if certain basic approaches are followed--for example, the various steps proposed by the American military to achieve victory in Vietnam.

1113
Emmerson, John K. JAPAN: EYE ON 1970. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Jan. 1969: 348-362.
D410.F6, v. 47

Japanese-American relations are approaching a time of change as the date for continuation or termination of the mutual security treaty draws nearer. Japanese thinking is currently dominated by a "peace mood" strongly reinforced by "nuclear allergy," the psychological reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "My-home-ism"--a feeling of self-satisfaction and a corresponding indifference to the world's problems--and a new sense of nationalism reflect Japan's economic prosperity. There is little sentiment to revise the constitution to permit any basic change in the nature and role of the Self Defense Forces (SDF). Less than one per cent of the gross national product is spent on defense, but the SDF are competent and well equipped to accomplish their limited purpose. The security treaty with the United States, which comes up for review in June 1970, and which provides for protection of Japan by an American "nuclear umbrella" in return for American use of Japanese bases to defend "the peace and security of the Far East," has generated a heated controversy. Most Japanese seem to feel no immediate threat to their security but are concerned about the possibility of being drawn into the American war in Vietnam. On the sensitive issue of Okinawa's future, all parties are agreed that it belongs to Japan; the only significant question is when and under what conditions Okinawa will be returned to Japanese control. There is an urgent need to reach agreement on the status of American bases on Okinawa. Prospects for the future are that the security treaty will continue in effect, that the SDF will grown steadily but undergo no radical change, that Japan will continue to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will pursue better relations with China and the Soviet Union, but that Japan will not replace the U.S. role in Asia.

1114
Erickson, John. JOHN ERICKSON ON THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE BY THE RUSSIANS. Listener, v. 81, Feb. 20, 1969: 230-232.
AP4.L4165, v. 81

Deciphers from articles in The Armed Forces' Communist [Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil] and Red Star [Krasnaia zvezda] a controversy between the Soviet

military establishment, or a faction of it, and the Communist Party and Government leadership on Soviet defense policy and budget. In their organ, The Armed Forces' Communist, the military expound an intensification of the military space program, largely for anti-ballistic missile defense. Deviating from the official Government line, they emphasize that nuclear war is a rational means of attaining political aims and press "for new weapon systems or 'new means of waging war.'"

1115
Ermakov, Vladimir. ANOTHER DANGEROUS 'UMBRELLA.' Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Jan. 1, 1969: 14.
D839. C87, v. 20
Translated from Pravda, Dec. 14, 1968.
Slav Rm

From the NATO Council session in Brussels has come a plan to deploy a "naval strike group" of 50 warships--aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers --in North Atlantic waters. The purpose of the force has been cited by various Western news sources as "intervention, interference, invasion"; although the force will be multinational, its procedures will be comparable to those of the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. The orders of the fleet are to be in the hands of its commanders, who will not be required to report to their governments before acting. The purpose and the mode of operation of this new naval force can only be construed as a danger to European peace.

1116
Fair, Stanley D. THE GHOST OF YPRES. Cosantóir, the Irish defence journal, v. 28, Oct. 1968: 315-318.
Ul. C8, v. 28
Reprinted from Army, February 1967.
Ul. A893

The Allied propaganda campaign against the German gas attack at Ypres intensified a revulsion to gas warfare that still persists. An enlightened program of public information can reduce this antipathy and "permit Americans to understand and discuss rationally the potentialities and dangers of modern chemical agents." In such a program it should be emphasized that protection against the chlorine gas was simple and that gas warfare did not influence the outcome of World War I; further, the excellent status of the current U.S. defensive capability should be stressed. To get the facts before the public it is necessary to differentiate between general information that should be made available and detailed information that should remain classified for national security purposes. Russia possesses a modern gas-warfare capability and would use it against its enemies if hostilities erupt. NATO will feel the major impact of this Soviet capability, and, since NATO members will depend upon the United States for retaliatory measures, the Nation must possess a modern gas capability. The U.S. chemical industry is capable of developing war gases to deter or defeat the Russians, but industrial leaders first must be convinced that developing such gases is not immoral but essential to national security. Thus, to gain the support of industrial leaders should be a goal of any public information program. Public acceptance of gas warfare will ultimately depend upon Government officials. In the past "they have led the way with free and open discussion on . . . controversial matters and should do the same with gas warfare."

1117
FAR EAST FORCE WILL BECOME BRITISH ELECTION ISSUE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Oct./Nov. 1968: 10-12. UA646. F5, v. 13

Discusses the possibility that Great Britain will keep military forces in the Far East after 1971 as part of a joint defense organization composed of Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain.

1118
THE FLANKS OF NATO. European review, v. 19, winter 1968/69: 24-25.
AP4. E78, v. 19

Contents.--Watch on the Mediterranean, by A. P. Hockaday.--Build-up in the north, by Torstein Selvik.

Surveys Russia's naval buildup in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. Hockaday stresses that the Mediterranean region's economic importance and Malta's strategic significance make constant vigilance over Soviet naval operations in that area a necessity. Selvik asserts that Soviet naval activity in the North Atlantic, "together with the activities in the Mediterranean, clearly indicates the danger of the Soviets outflanking the European areas of NATO both in the North and in the South" and maintains that a clear and acceptable definition of "peaceful coexistence" is a precondition for progress toward peace.

1119
Forster, Thomas M. THE EAST GERMAN ARMY; A PATTERN OF A COMMUNIST MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. South Brunswick [N.J.] A. S. Barnes [1968, c1966] 255 p. illus., ports.
UA719.3. F6613 1968
Translation of NVA; Die Armee der Sowjetzone.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--Introduction, by Brigadier W. F. K. Thompson, C.B.E.--Preface.--pt. 1. Historical development.--pt. 2. Organization and equipment: Organization and structure of the Armed Forces. The NPA and the Warsaw Pact. The Armed Forces of the Ministry of Interior and paramilitary formations. The political organization of the NPA. Weapons and equipment. Logistics of the NPA.--pt. 3. The personnel potential: The recruitment of the Armed Forces. The personnel reserves of the NPA.--pt. 4. Training and service in the NPA: Political education, indoctrination and control in the NPA. Military training of the NPA. Training of the cadres. Barracks duties and order. --pt. 5. The NPA in action: The NPA in manoeuvres. The NPA/Frontier Troops on the demarcation line and the Berlin Wall. The psychological offensive of the NPA against the Bundeswehr.--pt. 6. Evaluation: The strong and weak points of the NPA.

Explains the disproportionally small military power of East Germany in relation to the area's potential by reference to Soviet safety precautions taken because of the political unreliability of the East Germans.

1120
Garvey, Sean. BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY. Cosantóir, the Irish defence journal, v. 28, Sept. 1968: 271-275.
Ul. C8, v. 28

"Summary of statements on defence estimates and policy" for 1968. Financial strictures in Britain have

forced a reduction in the British defense budget, but the cutback does not represent a security threat in light of Britain's realization that it no longer has a vast empire to protect and its formulation of a new relationship with Europe. In the future Britain will concentrate on integrating its policies, economic and political as well as defense, into European interests to promote a strong Atlantic alliance with Great Britain playing a major role.

1121
Gerasimov, G. REANIMATING NATO. New times, no. 5, Feb. 5, 1969: 11-12.
D839.N483, 1969

Recognizing that several NATO members may not want to renew their memberships when the NATO treaty expires later this year, the NATO Defence Committee, which met in Brussels on January 16, outlined a military buildup that would, in effect, bind the members to a 5-year commitment to increase troop levels. The difficulties that the Committee encountered in formulating the policy exposed the inherent confusion within NATO: While claiming a purely defensive function, the commanders have accepted the aggressive policies of the United States and have constructed an offensive framework. Until recently the two widely accepted theories of the nature of a future war held that Europe would be caught in a nuclear crossfire. Since in this event conventional weapons would be useless, Europe declined to concur in a buildup. However, now that the superpowers have achieved a "nuclear balance," a war on European soil would be fought conventionally. This theory was developed in 1967, but the bloc lacked credible sanctions for implementing it. The events in Czechoslovakia were seized upon as a suitable pretext, although several Western sources have concluded that the European balance was unaffected. As a result NATO is now engaged in troop augmentation, deployment of a multilateral naval force in the Mediterranean, and massive military exercises only 50 kilometers from the Czech border. The escalated military atmosphere in Europe at once reveals the true aggressive nature of the NATO bloc and deters serious efforts for a stable European peace.

1122
Glenn, William. AN ELUSIVE ALLIANCE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Dec. 26, 1968: 730-732. illus.
HC411.F18, v. 62

Northeast Asian countries have been the strongest advocators of an effective Asian military alliance against communism. Since 1949 both Formosa and South Korea have explored Asian alliance possibilities but have been relatively unsuccessful. In 1966 the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was established, but its actions have been restricted to social, cultural, and economic matters; its military potential is nil. Regardless, the ASPAC experience encouraged the South Koreans to start "sending up trial balloons on the subject of PATO--a Pacific and Asian Treaty Organization which would be to its region what NATO is to the Western European community"; Formosa immediately lent its support. With U.S. instigation and leadership such an organization could become a reality, but Nixon does not seem favorably disposed, and both the State and Defense Departments feel that bilateral treaties are a more effective method of dealing with East Asian countries. Further, since neither South Korea nor Formosa wants an alliance without American economic support and other Asian countries are not willing candidates for membership, the prospects for such an alliance appear dim but not out of the question.

1123
Görlich, Joachim G. [50 YEARS OF THE POLISH NAVY] 50 Jahre polnische Kriegsmarine. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Nov. 1968: 584-586.
U3.W396, v. 17

Traces the development of the Polish naval forces since 1918 and sets forth their present numerical strength and status.

1124
Görlich, Joachim G. [25 YEARS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S ARMY] 25 Jahre polnische Volksarmee. Politische Studien, v. 19, Nov./Dec. 1968: 666-672.
H35.P.66, v. 19

History of the Polish People's Army from 1943 and evaluation of its present state. Görlich stresses the Soviet control of the army and points out the Polish officers' mistrust of "Pops"--Russians who on Moscow's order have changed their citizenship from Soviet to Polish and have been assigned to positions in the command structure of the Polish Armed Forces.

1125
Goldwater, Barry M. WHY A "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX"?--A SENATOR'S ANSWER. U.S. news & world report, v. 66, Apr. 28, 1969: 88-90. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 66

Excerpts from a speech delivered to the Senate on April 15, 1969.

Argues that in a world threatened by totalitarian dangers there is "nothing to criticize but much to be thankful for" in the possession of a large military establishment and supporting industrial plant. Goldwater defends the reemployment of retired military officers in civilian defense firms and suggests that the mistakes being made in American security policy today are to be attributed not to some imaginary cabal of military officers and businessmen but to the miscalculations of a "civilian-computer complex" in the Pentagon, which has managed, in large measure, to exclude the advice of military professionals from defense decisionmaking.

1126
Gorton, John. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE STATEMENT. Survival, v. 11, Apr. 1969: 116-119.
U162.S9, v. 11

"Extracts from the statement made on 25 February 1969 . . . to the House of Representatives, Canberra."

In the wake of Britain's announcement that it would withdraw all its forces from Malaysia-Singapore by 1971, Australia was compelled to reevaluate its own relation to the area. Complete withdrawal, except for an expressed willingness to participate in future United Nations actions, was rejected outright since it would seriously threaten the area's stability. Complete withdrawal with the proviso that Australia would provide emergency assistance at the request of the Malaysia-Singapore Governments was also ruled out because it reduced the credibility of Australia's commitment. It was threfore decided that Australia will continue to maintain a modest military presence with the consent of the Governments concerned and on condition that it be used only to deter or repel external aggression. In addition Australia will assist in the development of an

indigenous defense capability and will make available its own forces for use against externally promoted insurgencies if the indigenous forces cannot cope with such a threat. Beyond this Australia will continue to promote the economic development of the region and will encourage a move toward regional security arrangements.

1127
Grkovic, George. SOVIET UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Apr. 1969: 54-63. illus. Vl. U8, v. 95

Examines the new Soviet universal military service law to determine why it was enacted. The law offers little to commend itself to the military, and its economic value is only marginal. Noting the trend towards disaffection among Soviet youth, on the one hand, and the special position of the Soviet military on the other, Grkovic concludes that the primary purpose of the law was to make greater use of the military as a means of controlling and indoctrinating youth.

1128
Harrigan, Anthony. NEW DIRECTION IN STRATEGY. Ordnance, v. 53, Mar./Apr. 1969: 481-482. UFl. O67, v. 53

New directions in U. S. defense strategy will require a rethinking of the present conceptual features of national security policy, which must take into consideration the changing world environment and the dynamism of many nations, including friends and enemies. The United States will have to project the significance of the evolving character of Communist China's nuclear power and the political changes in NATO to determine its vital interests in relation to these changes. Although the United States has become profoundly international in its vision, it will have to pursue a policy of greater selectivity in dealing with Communist trouble-making--if the United States is going to resist Communist aggrandizement, it "has to be sure that the point of resistance is a good or tenable place to make a stand." Vietnam has taught the United States that it cannot afford an endless war of attrition for just a piece of land and that it must move away from the strategic concepts of the cold war era to formulate new concepts for new world realities.

1129
Harrigan, Anthony. RUSSIA TIPS THE SCALE. Navy, v. 12, Jan. 1969: 23-26. illus. VA49. N28, v. 12

Summarizes the main conclusions of the House Armed Services Committee's recently issued report "The Changing Strategic Naval Balance: U. S. S. R. vs. U. S. A." The report, which was prepared by a special subcommittee of the American Security Council, concludes that Soviet naval strategists have abandoned their traditional defensive posture and are vigorously seeking to develop the offensive capabilities of Soviet maritime forces with the ultimate purpose of "gaining supremacy over the United States on the high seas."

1130
Healey, D. W. ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE. Survival, v. 11, Apr. 1969: 110-115, 119. U162. S9, v. 11

Address at the 6th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Munich, Feb. 1-2, 1969.

Because the Warsaw Pact nations have a preponderance of conventional forces--particularly in troop strength, tanks, and aircraft--plus the advantage of surprise, NATO forces have no choice but to rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter possible Soviet aggression. NATO cannot forgo reliance on nuclear retaliation by building up large conventional forces; Soviet forces are prepared for nuclear war and could respond by proportionate increases, and front-line nations such as Germany oppose such a buildup because they would suffer as much from conventional as from nuclear war. Nevertheless conventional forces continue to play a significant role in NATO, primarily by making the nuclear threat credible, by providing time for a decision on the use of nuclear weapons, and by policing the frontiers against effects of future East European uprisings. The element of surprise increases the need for integration of NATO's military forces and for prior consultation on plans to use nuclear weapons. The expansion of the Soviet Navy into the Mediterranean and North Atlantic poses an added threat to NATO, while the growth of Chinese power may deter Soviet threats in Europe. The former reluctance of European members of NATO to seek closer military cooperation must be overcome. For its part, Britain now considers its commitment to NATO as primary and has given evidence of this by several recent significant contributions to the alliance.

1131
Hough, Richard L. DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN THAILAND: LESSONS FROM OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES. Asian survey, v. 9, Mar. 1969: 178-187. DSl. H492, v. 9

Revised version of a paper delivered at a RAND Corporation conference on Thailand in Nov. 1967.

Discusses aspects of the experiences of several Asian nations with the problems of rural development and guerrilla warfare to interpret their application to comparable problems in Thailand. Hough states that the village-cluster concept facilitates local development programs, which are stifled because the separate Asian village is not a viable economic entity.

1132
Karber, Phillip A. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A SCENARIO OF THE FUTURE. In U. S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Feb. 1969: 11-21. illus. Z6723. U35, v. 49

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia--a highly complicated airborne and armored assault carried out by units of the armed forces of five countries--was an ominous demonstration of the Soviet Union's military capabilities in Europe. The operation was brilliantly planned and executed, but, what is perhaps more important, it was prepared for in total secrecy. Apparently the massive troop movements and stockpiling that preceded the invasion went unnoticed by Western intelligence, which raises doubts about the U. S. claim that satellite surveillance furnishes it with exact information about deployed Soviet missiles, but the immediate question is whether the Soviet Union will try to repeat its Czechoslovak success in other parts of Europe, most particularly in West Germany. The Soviet Government has a sufficient motive in its almost pathological fear of the Germans. Soviet strategists have been quick to point out that the U. S.-Soviet nuclear balance increases the possibility of a nonnuclear war in Europe, and in recent years the Warsaw

Pact has been putting ever greater emphasis on preparation for offensive conventional war. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has altered radically the balance of forces in Europe in favor of the East and put an end to doubts about the reliability of satellite troops. In these circumstances, a Soviet attempt to seize West Germany under the cover of an anti-Nazi propaganda barrage is not beyond the realm of possibility. The United States would then be faced with a fait accompli and the choice of either accepting a Soviet Germany or launching a nuclear war. To avoid this eventuality, NATO forces must be strengthened and a new strategy evolved to meet the changed circumstances in Europe.

1133
Kasatonov, V. THE MEDITERRANEAN IS NOT AN AMERICAN LAKE. Soviet military review, Jan. 1969: 53-55. P&GP RR

Charges the United States and its NATO allies with maintaining naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea for aggressive purposes and justifies the presence of Soviet naval forces there as necessary for the defense of the Arab countries and as a natural extension of Soviet naval power in the Black Sea. Kasatonov concludes with a warning that the Soviet Union is adequately prepared to meet any Western threat in the Mediterranean.

1134
Labin, Suzanne, and Daniel Lyons. FIFTY YEARS; THE USSR VERSUS THE USA. New York, Twin Circle Pub. Co. [1968] 236 p. E183.8.R9L252
Based on the 1962 ed. of Competition U.R.S.S.-U.S.A., by S. Labin
Bibliography: p. 235-236.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. The myth of the economic dynamism of the USSR: The jungle of Communist statistics. Soviet achievements in heavy industry. The results of fifty years of planning.--pt. 2. Soviet challenge in culture: Schools and teaching in the USSR. Culture for the elite and culture for the masses.--pt. 3. The military and scientific challenge of the USSR to the USA: A scale of values.--pt. 4. Conclusion: The real force of Soviet propaganda. Facing reality.

Uncovers many Soviet frauds and dubious claims relating to Russia's alledged military and economic superiority over the United States. The authors conclude that until 1964 the United States surpassed the Soviet Union militarily and that Americans were unduly alarmed by the Soviet space program and other "firsts" because of highly successful Soviet propaganda.

1135
Larionov, V. [THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE] Politicheskaia storona sovetskoi voennoi doktriny. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, Nov. 1968: 11-18.
U717.R9A27, 1968

Soviet military doctrine has military and political aspects, the latter of which is predominant and is being developed in the spirit of the party and Government policy and on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army, Lenin's principles of foreign policy, and the Communist Party's views on war and peace in the present era. The doctrine's fundamental principle maintains that imperialism is the sole source of the danger of war, that the world Socialist system is instrumental in the changes of international forces, and that basic new types of war were necessitated by the requirements of defense, which again brought up a new development of the armed forces. At present the imperialists threaten the lives of millions of people and might provoke the destruction of civilizations and cultures. Therefore, the Soviet Union must prepare not only a rebuff to their aggression but also an attack because, if war becomes a fact, there will be no other way to destroy the enemy completely. Therefore the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union must be strengthened, but on the other hand the Soviet Union must pursue a peaceful foreign policy and press for the realization of its disarmament proposals. Moreover, the Soviet Army must be equipped with the newest types of arms because the growth of its defense capability is the best and only means to preserve peace and the security of its peoples.

1136
Lemnitzer, Lyman L. THE MOST FORMIDABLE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN THE WORLD TODAY. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, winter 1968-69: 501-507. D839.A85, v. 6
Address presented by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the Fourteenth General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Lisbon, Portugal.

In view of the tremendous conventional military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact countries, NATO planners have called for the implementation of a strategy of flexible response. If this directive is to be fulfilled, the trend toward reductions in conventional strength by several member nations must be discontinued. To ensure the credibility of its revised deterrence strategy, NATO requires an adequate force of highly skilled and well-trained men, both "on the spot" and in reserve. Furthermore, the alliance needs sufficient money and materiel to modernize its forces and equip them for their dual responsibilities. In addition to providing the needed resources, the NATO allies must make it clear that they will back up their conventional forces with nuclear power should the need arise. Finally, the "solution of the military problems confronting NATO requires pre-arranged and coordinated plans and procedures to provide for the effective employment of [its] collective strength."

1137
Limoli, Salvatore. TWENTY YEARS OF HISTORY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (1948-1968) NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Dec. 1968/Jan. 1969: 54-55, 58-60, 62, 64. UA646.F5, v. 13

Traces the growth of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean area. Limoli concedes that the Soviet Union has made important political and military gains in the area since 1955 but asserts that the overall strategic balance still favors the West. He outlines a program of diplomatic initiatives and naval redeployments to protect the Western position from further erosion and perhaps regain some of the ground lost to the Russians.

1138
Long, J. F. L. SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE 1970s. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 9, spring 1969: 33-38. UG635.G7A1252, v. 9

Predicts the probable course of Soviet military development during the next decade. Long notes that the present Soviet leaders have so far shown greater respect for the military than did either Stalin or Khrushchev and have abandoned the latter's policy of

relying on massive retaliation. Instead emphasis is now on the development of a long-range intervention capability and the achievement of parity in both land-based and submarineborne missiles. The author foresees no immediate prospect for Soviet deployment of an ABM system.

1139
Luce, Sir William. BRITAIN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 114, Mar. 1969: 4-10. U1.R8, v. 114
"A lecture given at the R. U. S. I. on 26th November 1968." Discussion included.

Since Britain no longer has any special interests or influence in the eastern Mediterranean region, its planned withdrawal will have no significant effect there. In the gulf region, however, Britain has substantial interests--primarily oil--but its military presence has never played any part in protecting them. The principal effects of withdrawal on this area will likely be two: "Russian penetration of the area in the sense of diplomatic representation, technical assistance and probably occasional naval visits; and the unleashing of local conflicts, unless in the meantime other arrangements can be made to remove the causes of these conflicts."

1140
Macmillan, Harold, and David Ormsby-Gore Harlech, baron. HAROLD MACMILLAN AND LORD HARLECH DISCUSS WITH ROBERT MACNEIL THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962. Listener, v. 81, Jan. 30, 1969: 142-143. AP4. L4165, v. 81

Recalls President Kennedy's consultations with the British Prime Minister and the British Ambassador to the United States throughout the crisis. Macmillan points out that the American decision to have Soviet missiles in Cuba removed occurred three of four days before they would have been fully installed and operative; then the problem for America could have been insoluble. The missiles commanded by Khrushchev into Cuba represented 40 percent of the Soviet Union's offensive nuclear power. Macmillan and Harlech stress the British support of the President's decision to quarantine Cuba and emphasize his careful handling of the crisis and the fortunate circumstances that were present.

1141
Markov, Andrei. JAPANESE MILITARISM AGAIN. Soviet military review, Mar. 1969: 52-54. P&GP RR

Japanese militarism is on the upswing as both military and government officials increasingly demand military power consonant with Japan's economic potential. Japan has given direct support to the American aggressors in Vietnam, while the United States has encouraged rearmament and invited Japan to share in the leadership of an Asian military alliance. Although not yet armed with nuclear weapons, Japan is preparing the scientific and technological base essential for their production, and a massive ideological campaign is underway to convince the people of such a necessity. The Government has earmarked 2, 340, 000 million yen for its third 5-year defense plan, and private industry will produce over 1, 000, 000 million yen worth of armaments between 1967 and 1975.

1142
Marx, Werner. YUGOSLAVIA LOOKS TO ITS DEFENSES. Central Europe journal, v. 17, Mar. 1969: 79-80. DB200.7.S74, v. 17

Yugoslavs feel that the increased number of Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean is a psychological tactic, but one which should be a warning signal to General de Gaulle, as France borders in part on the Mediterranean, and Soviet instructors are numerous in not too remote Algeria. Any act of aggression, the author feels, towards West Germany or other NATO states, would trigger World War III. There seems no doubt that the Soviets will reinforce their grip on Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs are eager to avoid added tension between themselves and the Soviet Union but they also are amazed that West Germans take such a carefree attitude to matters of their own national security. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1143
Matthews, Roy A. A NEW ATLANTIC ROLE FOR CANADA. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Jan. 1969: 334-347. D410.F6, v. 47

Canada participates in the Atlantic community in two principal ways: politically and militarily through NATO and the North American Air Defense (NORAD) Agreement, and economically through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Both forms of participation are relevant to the two basic political issues in Canada: its relationship to the United States and the relationship between French- and English-speaking Canadians. Canada has never been enthused with the policy whereby the United States and Western Europe are viewed as two pillars of the Atlantic alliance, because Canada constitutes the distinctly junior partner of one of these pillars. Nevertheless Canada was forced to reexamine its role when its Commonwealth ties, which mitigated its dependence on the United States, became less important with Britain's application for entry into the Common Market. This reexamination revealed that Canada's contribution to both NATO and NORAD was largely symbolic and that protective tariffs had failed to slow the trend toward closer economic ties with the United States. Canada's position as an intermediate and essentially nonalined power enables it to perform a peacekeeping function in the Third World that the great powers cannot fulfill. On the other hand its economic ties to the United States and Western Europe have accelerated its industrial development. The implications for Canadian policy are basically two: Canada will continue to seek closer economic ties with members of the Atlantic community but will probably disengage from its military alliances in favor of a peacekeeping role in the Third World.

1144
Miska, Peter. CREEPING CONFLICT? Atlas, v. 17, Jan. 1969: 28-30. AP1.A83, v. 17
Translated from Frankfurter Rundschau, Frankfurt. Newsp

Sooner or later the Russians may invade Yugoslavia and set the stage for world war III. The Yugoslavs would resist the invaders unsuccessfully and then withdraw to the mountains to begin a partisan war. The United States would aid the Yugoslavs by blocking the Strait of Otranto and supplying the partisans with supplies and food. Such a situation is dangerous--it produces unforeseen incidents, which "may be minor in themselves, but [whose] consequences are catastrophic because they come as a complete surprise to those involved." Americans could not block the Adriatic without coming into conflict with Soviet warships; they could not supply the partisan army without air incidents. Eventually, all NATO and Warsaw Pact members would be drawn into the conflict and world war

III would be in full swing. Informed sources in the U. S. Department of Defense "believe that in this stage it would still be possible to avoid the worst"; however, the Russians would probably resort to the hydrogen bomb. According to a former German NATO officer, a third world war will probably occur within the next 10 to 15 years; he contends that "we can't wander about on the narrow ridge of deterrence for longer than that."

1145
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 114, Jan. 1969: 2-6. illus.
U2.R5, v. 114

From a speech by Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, on Oct. 15, 1968, before the North Atlantic Treaty Association.

Warns against the complacency of the U. S. Department of Defense toward NATO's defense posture, considering that the nuclear and tactical capabilities of the Warsaw Pact countries, which are constantly being improved, enable them to inflict heavy damage on the West European powers. Lemnitzer believes that the flexible response strategy, which is based on an equilibrium between appropriate nuclear and conventional responses, came about at a time when many NATO members were facing reductions in their conventional forces. The effective application of this concept requires the means to implement it.

1146
NATO AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD. INTERNATIONAL COLLOGUE [sic] MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD JANUARY 30-FEBRUARY 4, 1967, IN HAMBURG. NATO und die kommunistische Welt. Internationales Kolloquium. Protokoll einer Tagung 30. 1.--4. 2. 1967 in Hamburg. [Bad Godesberg, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1967] 97 p. (Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung. Berichte und Abhandlungen, Heft 8) D849.N3

German, English, and French text.

Contents.--Foreword, by Barthold C. Witte.--To what extent has the Soviet foreign policy changed and why?, by Richard Löwenthal (Berlin).--What are the attitudes of the Eastern European countries to East-West relations?, by William E. Griffith (Boston).--The fourth world conflict, by Michel Garder (Paris).--The past and future role of NATO in East-West relations, by Vittorio Badini Confalonieri (Torino).--The opportunities for and limits to cooperation with Communist countries, by Jo Grimond (London).--The German question, by former Federal Minister Walter Scheel (Düsseldorf).--Summary, by Richard Moore.--Index of participants.

Abbreviated version of papers delivered at an international conference staged by "liberal and democratic groups and personalities." The summary contains, among other things, the opinions of participants other than those whose lectures are listed in the contents.

1147
NATO DOCUMENTS THE SOVIET SEA THREAT. Navy, v. 11, Dec. 1968: 13-19. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 11

Text of a recently declassified briefing by the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic on the growth of Soviet maritime power. The briefing stresses that the Soviet Union has abandoned its traditional defensive and peripheral maritime strategy in favor of an offensive and global one. This shift in strategy has been accompanied by a steady and balanced buildup of all elements of Soviet maritime strength--merchant marine and fisheries fleets, scientific and technological capabilities, and naval forces. To this indigenous strength must be added that acquired through "penetration by arms delivery" in the developing countries, a technique that has already met with considerable success in north Africa and the Middle East.

1148
Nau, Ludwig. [NEW MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Neue militärische Überlegungen in der Bundesrepublik. Frankfurter Hefte; Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, v. 23, Nov. 1968: 743-746. AP30.F555, v. 23

While the Soviet Union could tolerate the somewhat independent political course of Rumania, it could not do so in regard to Czechoslovakia, which borders on NATO territory. The Czechoslovak course could have led to neutralization of the entire Balkan Communist area. Moscow decided to intervene in Czechoslovakia to assert its hegemony over all satellites, but in a broader context, its efforts were designed to make clear to the United States that the solitary actions of America's allies toward Eastern Europe can lead to direct conflict between the two superpowers. Soviet divisions now stand on the Czechoslovak-West German border face to face with the U. S. 7th Army. The intervention has not changed the balance of military power between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The premises underlying NATO's flexible response strategy are still valid in regard to a large conventional war or to tactical nuclear war. However, the placement of 17 Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia has reduced the warning time for the German Federal Republic of a possible Soviet surprise attack of a limited objective. Neither American big-lift operations nor the potential lowering of a nuclear threshold in NATO's strategy would be effective or desired answers to such a threat; only troops stationed on the border should cope with the situation. To that end the Bundeswehr should be reorganized and armed with adequate conventional weapons.

1149
Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U. S. THE TIME TO SAVE NATO. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, winter 1968-69: 479-484. D839.A85, v. 6

A radio address broadcast on Oct. 13, 1968.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has indicated the continuing need for a strong and united West. NATO must be revitalized to counter growing Russian strength on the Continent and moderate the influence of the hard-line faction within the Kremlin. Not only should the NATO nations increase the military strength of the Atlantic alliance, but they should also cooperate in "helping build those bridges that are so urgently needed between the rich and poor nations of the world." The United States can help promote such cooperation by paying more attention to the interests and assets of its European friends and by encouraging but not directing the development of European unity. With a new spirit of cooperation, the Atlantic partners can take substantive steps toward reaching accommodation with the East.

1150
Norris, John G. NEW HOUSE SEA POWER SUBCOMMITTEE WEIGHS BIG SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM.

Navy, v. 12, Feb. 1969: 17-21. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 12

Reports on recent activity in Congress with regard to naval construction programs and the general question of maintaining U.S. seapower. There is a good chance that expenditures for naval construction in fiscal year 1970 will be raised to $3.8 billion, which is three times the amount for the current fiscal year. The bloc obsolescence of U.S. naval vessels and the growing Soviet maritime threat are the principal factors behind the new attention being given to Navy needs.

1151
Norris, John G. NEW U.S. TRIDENT STRATEGY IS PRESENTED. Navy, v. 12, Apr. 1969: 8-11. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 12

Outlines a proposal that the United States concentrate at sea a major part of its striking power against land targets. This has become possible as a result of recent important advances in the design of sea-based strategic missile systems, attack carriers, heavy-lift helicopters, and amphibious ships, which will enable naval forces to project military power much farther inland than has been possible heretofore.

1152
O'Ballance, Edgar. THE MEGATONNAGE AND MISSILE GAPS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Mar. 1969: 65-70. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Although the Soviet Union probably leads the United States in total nuclear megatonnage, the United States possesses a greater number of warheads: Thus the megatonnage and missile gaps tend to counterbalance each other and perpetuate the nuclear stalemate, which was first achieved when the Soviet Union was able to stockpile enough nuclear weapons and long-range bombers to counter America's early superiority in these areas. It was temporarily disturbed in the mid-1950's with the advent of missile-delivery systems and again in 1960 when the United States fired its first submarineborne missile. However, parity was reached once again in 1962 when the Soviet Union developed its own underwater ICBM. Since that time each country has maintained a secure second-strike force. Because America continues to retain its missile advantage, its assured-destruction capability has been disrupted by neither the Soviet deployment of a limited ABM system nor the Russian development of a fractional orbital bombardment system. Yet, despite the failure of recent advances to upset the strategic balance, "the technical struggle to gain some major advantage in the nuclear arms race continues."

1153
Ovchinnikov, I. LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROPAGANDA STRESSED. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 479; Sept. 30, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,558) p. 24-26. AS36.U56, no. 46,558
Translated from Voennye znaniia, no. 8, 1968; p. 20.
Slav Rm

Discusses the civil defense propaganda program conducted by various groups in the Tarashchanskii district, which includes movies, radio reports, seminars, and lectures on the means of defense against weapons of mass destruction.

1154
Parrish, Michael. THE NEW SOVIET HIGH COMMAND. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Feb. 1969: 22-27. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Calls attention to recent personnel changes in the Soviet high command. The newly promoted officers are products of Communist society, and most of them have close party connections. Their experiences during the purges and World War II were significantly different from those of the men they replace. It is too early to tell, however, whether the gradual phaseout of older commanders will result in significant changes in Soviet strategy or party-military relations.

1155
Pemberton, R. F. GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 9, spring 1969: 17-20. UG635.G7A1252, v. 9

Armed forces are a necessary adjunct of governments in a world of independent nation-states. Since armed forces are essentially instruments of diplomacy, they are properly subject to control by the governments whose interests they serve in times of both war and peace. It is not the function of armed forces to determine policy, nor is the control exercised by governments absolute. Once the decision to wage war has been made, governments should delegate responsibility for tactical and most strategic decisions to the military since it alone is qualified to make these decisions and, in view of the Nuremberg verdicts, is ultimately responsible for its own conduct.

1156
Prina, L. E. CAN OUR FLEET WAIT 'TIL NEXT YEAR? Navy, v. 12, May 1969: 10-13. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 12

Insists that Secretary of the Navy Chafee's proposed $35 billion naval ship construction and conversion program be put into action in view of the large number of obsolete ships in today's Navy. Prina concludes that the Soviet Navy is rapidly expanding and has become a major instrument of Soviet national policy.

1157
Raoust, Capitaine de Vaisseau. [SOVIET MARITIME EXPANSION] L'expansion maritime de l'U.R.S.S. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Apr. 1969: 626-637.
D410.R45, v. 25
Report given to the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale on Dec. 3, 1968.

Discusses Soviet maritime expansion and compares tabularly the Soviet Navy to the navies of France, Great Britain, and the United States. Raoust concludes that the Soviet Navy will play a significant role in the struggle against the capitalist countries.

1158
Ratiani, Georgii. IN THE LINE OF FIRE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Dec. 11, 1968: 6-7.
D839.C87, v. 20
Translated and condensed from Pravda, Nov. 24, 1968. Slav Rm

The meetings of the Committee on Preparations for the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Budapest and of the NATO Council in Brussels present a contrast between "socialism and peace on the one hand and the forces of imperialist

reaction and aggression on the other." The committee's work proves that the international Communist movement, far from being fragmented, is constantly growing stronger. The imperialist powers, however, are forced by the crumbling of their organization to resort to "threats and blackmail" to maintain their influence. They now espouse a "new doctrine" of "gray zones" that covers those states not included in NATO or the Warsaw Pact in the contention that states such as Austria and Yugoslavia are related to NATO's security. This doctrine is the first step toward imperialist interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Although Yugoslavia claims to be nonalined, its defense and that of the other Socialist states must come from the Warsaw Pact states to prevent imperialists from running rampant in the affairs of the Socialist "fraternal alliance."

1159
Réchin, Paul. [LOGISTICS] Logistique. Revue militaire générale, no. 1, Jan. 1969: 41-57.
U2.R48, 1969
Includes summaries in English and German.

Defines logistics and its role in conventional and nuclear warfare. The logistics of a modern military system must forecast and provide weapons and force capabilities and popular support of the defense effort. Réchin believes that errors of logistics caused the failure of Napoléon's forces in Spain and France's troubles in both World Wars and concludes that logistics plays a significant role in planning a nation's defense.

1160
Rogers, Robert B. TRENDS IN SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY. Naval War College review, v. 21, Feb. 1969: 13-29. P&GP RR
Bibliographical footnotes: p. 28-29.

Examines the growth of Soviet seapower and warns that it will be used to expand Soviet influence throughout the world. Coupled with complementary increases in the merchant marine forces, the enhanced flexibility and capabilities of the Soviet Navy have led to an enormous rise in Soviet maritime power. The patterns of Soviet ship design and naval operations indicate that this burgeoning seapower will be used to enlarge the Soviet Navy's mission from strictly defensive requirements into offensive activities. While the Soviet Navy cannot yet match the U.S. mobile support capacity, the Russians are making a major effort to enhance the mobility of its seaborne forces. Soviet activities in the Mediterranean portend Russia's intentions to deploy its naval power to support the "tactic of interposition," whereby Soviet naval forces will be used to preclude the effective use of U.S. naval forces.

1161
Santamaria, B. A. A TEN-YEAR PLAN. Quadrant, v. 14, Jan./Feb. 1969: 41-46.
AP7.Q8, v. 14
Paper from "a recent Australian Association for Cultural Freedom Seminar in Melbourne."

Contends that Australia cannot rely on the promises of its allies for its security but must develop its own military force. Santamaria notes that Britain is withdrawing from Southeast Asia despite repeated assurances to the contrary and that the United States will probably soon withdraw from Vietnam "under the cloak of a meaningless agreement." Australia should therefore institute a program of military development to substantially increase its Army, Navy, and Air Forces and, "if the two major nuclear powers can do nothing about the possession of nuclear weapons by China, . . . should develop the weapons needed to prevent nuclear blackmail."

1162
Schneider, Fernand T. [THE MILITARY DEFENSE OF SWITZERLAND] La défense militaire helvétique. Revue militaire générale, no. 1, Jan. 1969: 110-124.
U2.R48, 1969
Includes summaries in English and German.

Praises the Swiss Army for its discipline and unity. Schneider believes the Soviet military potential affects such small noncommitted nations as Switzerland and suggests how the Swiss should prepare for a possible conventional or atomic attack. He concludes that France could draw inspiration from Switzerland's territorial defense organization.

1163
Schneider, Fernand T. [THE NEW BRITISH MILITARY POLICY] La nouvelle politique militaire britannique. Revue militaire suisse, v. 113, Dec. 1968: 597-607.
U2.R5, v. 113

Analyzes the changes in Great Britain's defense policy that were influenced by the cost of maintaining overseas commitments, the changing situation in Europe and East of Suez, and the reorganization of the British Armed Forces. Schneider believes Britain's new defense policy marks the beginning of the end of the British political empire.

1164
Schroeder, Gerhard. DETERRENCE, DEFENSE, AND THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Dec. 1968: 363-366.
DB200.7.S74, v. 16

Discusses the purpose and the effectiveness of deterrence, one of the prerequisites of which is that a potential enemy think along rational lines. "We view with concern the fact that Moscow's decisions seem occasionally to lack this rationality and reason." The Alliance, so thinks Minister Schröder, makes allowance for the imponderables on the side of the Soviet Government by embedding this deterrence in the concept of "flexible response." The opponent must be brought to realize that he would run an incalculable risk by launching any kind of attack. Since the conventional forces are not adequate to cope successfully with an en masse attack on European states, and as the majority of the nuclear weapons are destined for the defense of Europe under American custody, the credibility and full spectrum of deterrence measures are closely related to the willingness of the USA to fulfill its obligations according to the "Athens Guidelines" and apply nuclear weapons without delay, if required. It is in Europe's interest that the tactical use of nuclear weapons should take place in time and as far forward as possible in order to avoid the loss and devastation of NATO territory. The problems arising in this context will be discussed in the Nuclear Planning Group. The development of events in Czechoslovakia has supported the belief of the NATO partners, who since May 1967 have adopted modern strategy, that the flexible response would have made it possible to react in a manner appropriate to the situation. The Minister discusses observers' doubts as to whether the number of fighting forces as well as their weapons and equipment suffice for the forward defense.

"It is obvious that the magnitude of the defense effort should be reviewed." Furthermore, it must constantly be kept in mind that there is an unimpairable interdependence between forces with conventional armament on the one hand and what are called tactical nuclear weapons on the other. Minister Schröder noted with satisfaction that all nations suspended further withdrawal and reductions of forces within the Alliance. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1165
Schroeder, Gerhard. [HOW IS WESTERN EUROPE TO BE DEFENDED] Wie Westeuropa zu verteidigen ist. Politische Meinung, v. 13, no. 4, 1968: 11-20.
H5. P75, v. 13

Discusses the German Federal Republic's and NATO's military policies and postures, including the flexible response strategy, which increases the threat of an attack on Germany by conventional enemy forces. NATO should have adequate conventional forces at its disposal to cope with the situation. Its strategy is based on the credibility of deterrence, which in turn depends on "the American readiness to fulfill its obligations without delay. It is in the European interest that the need for tactical use of nuclear weapons comes in time and possibly in the most forward area to prevent the loss and devastation of NATO territory." The alliance's and West Germany's defense policy must be based on a careful analysis of the political and military significance of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia and on changes in the Soviet bloc. West Germany should also continue its efforts toward East-West détente.

1166
SECRET WAR OF THE BONN REVANCHISTS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Policies of Red China and West Germany assailed--USSR, Sept. 30, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,565) p. 15-25.
AS36. U57, no. 46,565
Translation of an editorial in the Russian-language periodical Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, no. 15, August 1968, p. 72-76.
U717. R9A27, 1968

Ascribes to the West German Government a policy aimed at war and based on imperialistic West German tendencies toward revanchism and territorial revisionism. The article describes the progressing militarization of the people by the Government and the Bundeswehr's preparations for psychological warfare.

1167
Self, Morris W. SURVIVAL IN CITIES--THE TUCSON TUNNEL-GRID PLAN. International civil defence, v. 15, Dec. 1968: 1-5. illus.
UA926. I488, v. 15
Reprinted from Survival, no. 3, Sept./Oct. 1968.
P&GP RR

Describes the Tucson tunnel-grid plan, which is designed to protect an urban population from the direct effects of a nuclear explosion and radioactive fallout. Self enumerates the advantages of a tunnel shelter system as compared to individual community or family shelters and notes that this system should be a prototype for other urban blast shelters.

1168
Simonian, R. DOCTRINE OF THE AMERICAN AGRESSORS. Soviet military review, Jan. 1969: 50-52.
P&GP RR

The political goal of American military doctrine--the destruction of the world Socialist system--has remained the same since World War II, but U.S. military strategy has changed several times in response to the growing strength of the Socialist bloc. The strategy of "massive retaliation" was abandoned when it became clear that the United States did not have the superiority in nuclear weapons that this strategy presupposed. To give the United States a capability for conventional as well as nuclear warfare, President Kennedy in 1961 proposed a strategy of "flexible response," to which McNamara's "counterforce" strategy added the idea of using nuclear weapons to destroy the enemy's armed forces. In 1963 the United States adopted a "forward defence" strategy, and more recently attention has centered on the doctrine of "limited war," whose real purpose is to "limit" war to areas outside U.S. territory. The imperialist bloc cannot risk a nuclear war without suffering a crushing defeat at the hands of the Socialist countries.

1169
Simpson, J. J. H. OPERATIONS OUTSIDE EUROPE IN THE 1980S. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 113, Nov. 1968: 324-327.
U1. R8, v. 113

It will become necessary for British troops to be committed to operations outside Europe in the 1980's because of a more unstable international situation. Military conflicts will occur with greater frequency in the 1980's since the aims of international communism are likely to increase along with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The addition of these factors to a continued balance of terror between the superpowers makes limited war between nations more likely and potentially more dangerous. Britain's withdrawal East of Suez can only exacerbate this trend, particularly if Europe becomes increasingly preoccupied with internal problems and if the United States returns to isolationism. To combat an insurgency and nip it in the bud, Great Britain will need a special, highly mobile strike force that can be rapidly deployed to a threatened area. This force must be trained in tactical concepts that are compatible with NATO and allied defense concepts that "offer the maximum number of options in the political and financial circumstances of the time frame." The strike group must be controlled more by directive and target dates than by orders --operational control rather than direct command. The strike-force system will require an effective logistics system and reliable communications down to the lowest level. In light of the increasing emphasis on the conventional "pause" during a Soviet attack against Western Europe, the addition of strategic reserve and amphibious forces to the NATO flanks, and a trend toward air-transportable vehicles, the strike force is compatible with Great Britain's concepts of its European operations and strategic obligations. Whatever political decisions lie ahead, there will be some sort of strategic reserve in the British Army. Whether this reserve will have a capability outside Europe will depend on the priorities of the times. However, if the significant developments cited above are realistic assumptions, a strike force will contribute to the creation of a "single army," which "must give more value for money in terms of the options it offers."

1170
Smirnov, N. SOVIET SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Dec. 11, 1968: 7-8. D839. C87, v. 20

Translated and condensed from Krasnaia zvezda, Nov. 12, 1968. Slav Rm

One of the intensified military activities that has resulted from the NATO Council meeting in Brussels is increased naval concentration on the Mediterranean--for instance, a new Mediterranean naval air command with headquarters in Naples. The justification is that the Soviet Mediterranean-based naval operations "menace" NATO's southern flank. However, the Soviet Fleet is merely a balance to the U.S. 6th Fleet stationed permanently in the Mediterranean since World War II--a fleet that is supposedly vital to the interests of the United States thousands of miles away. The real purpose of the 6th Fleet, as is evidenced not only by its actions but also by assertions from American officials, is "to control lines of communications passing through the zone of the Black Sea straits and in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as to be prepared to strike at enemy targets from sea and air with nuclear and conventional weapons." The Soviet Union, as a Black Sea and therefore a Mediterranean power, had no choice but to indefatigably strengthen its defense capability." While the Soviet vessels are prepared to defend the borders of Russia and the other Socialist countries from imperialist aggression, their presence is not a menace to the Mediterranean countries; on the contrary, their presence serves to safeguard the peace.

1171
Spaak, Paul Henri. "THOSE WHO FAVOR ATLANTIC FEDERATION ARE, BEYOND QUESTION, INDUBITABLY RIGHT." Freedom & union, v. 24, Jan. 1969: 8-13. JX1901. F6, v. 24

Second Estes Kefauver memorial lecture, delivered on Nov. 8, 1968.

Praises the early efforts of Senator Estes Kefauver in favor of an Atlantic union and urges continued progress in this direction. Spaak notes the deterioration in U.S.-European relations in recent years and expresses the hope that the new U.S. administration will follow the lead of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which has called for the convocation of a conference to explore the possibility of transforming NATO into a federal union. Since "the countries of Western Europe and the United States belong to the same civilization and . . . this civilization is now endangered by communism," Spaak stresses that they should earnestly endeavor to overcome their differences and attempt to establish a real Atlantic community.

1172
Stevens, Victor. THE ATA AND THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE. NATO letter, v. 16, Nov. 1968: 10-19. illus. D845.2.A44, v. 16

Surveys the 14th annual assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, whose unofficial theme was "the Harmel Report in the light of the invasion of Czechoslovakia." Included are extracts from speeches delivered by Manlio Brosio, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, and Franco Nogueira and the final resolution and recommendations adopted by the assembly.

1173
THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE U.S.S.R. International civil defence, v. 15, Nov. 1968: 1-2. UA926.I488, v. 15

Discusses the Voluntary Organization for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy, a "mass patriotic organization which aims at strengthening the defence capacity of the Soviet Union." The organization is supported by the Communist Party, the Komsomol, and trade unions. The author describes the functions and responsibliities of the organization and concludes that it has been very effective in popularizing measures for the citizen to take in time of enemy attack.

1174
Sudakov, A. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, SHELTERS DISCUSSED. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 501; Jan. 28, 1969. Washington. (Its JPRS 47,324) p. 1-4. AS36.U56, no. 47,324

Translated from Sovetskii patriot, Dec. 18, 1968, p. 3. Slav Rm

Maintains that the fallout shelter is the most reliable means of defense against not only chemical weapons but all weapons of mass destruction. Sudakov describes the typical shelter and recommends measures to be taken in the event of a chemical attack.

1175
TASS STATEMENT. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Dec. 11, 1968: 5-6. D839.C87, v. 20

Translated from Pravda, Nov. 24, 1968, and Izvestiia, Nov. 24, 1968. Slav Rm

The NATO Council session that was held in Brussels a month early to create the impression of an emergency meeting was staged in a forced atmosphere of crisis conducive to imperialist desires to increase NATO's military strength and scope. Contending that the balance in Europe has been altered, the United States, Britain, and West Germany capitalized on their power over the small European countries to manipulate the proceedings of the Council and obtain agreement to military intensification plans. The NATO command obviously acted in fear that, when the option of each country to remain in NATO is opened in 1969, some may withdraw to regain control of their foreign policy formulation. To preserve the alliance the command has attempted to re-create the notion of "the Soviet threat." They have also acted to extend NATO's sphere of influence to new states that have not even expressed interest in such an arrangement. The Soviet Union regards NATO's actions as a severe blow to the cause of peace.

1176
Van der Kroef, Justus M. AUSTRALIA LOOKS TO NIXON. National review, v. 21, Feb. 11, 1969: 119-121. AP2.N3545, v. 21

Perturbed by President Johnson's decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, Australian policymakers are anxiously awaiting clarification of the new administration's Asian-Pacific policies. Fears that America may be moving toward a "reactionist" Asian policy and Great Britain's decision to withdraw its Far Eastern and Persian Gulf forces by 1971 have raised doubts about the continued viability of Australia's forward defense strategy based on Anglo-American support. Thus the new Prime Minister, John Gorton, is conducting an extensive defense review, focusing upon three major alternatives. First there is the concept of "fortress Australia," which "involves disengagement from Southeast Asian military involvements and a greater concentration on home defenses" and is

supported by Australia's ruling Liberal Party, the anti-Communist Democratic Labor Party, and the Australian Communist Party. The second policy alternative is the "activist regionalism" promoted by External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck and Defense Minister Alan Fairhall, which involves regional commitments to combat Communist expansionism in Asia. The third alternative is frequently called the "sleeping partner technique," as it involves close regional economic and political cooperation in Asia but no "direct military involvement in internecine Asian strife" and seems to be favored by Prime Minister Gorton. While Gorton is not a dove, he is cautious and can be persuaded to participate in "activist regionalism" only if he is assured that America will still come to Australia's assistance should the need arise.

1177
Varlamov, A. NATO PLANS IN EUROPE. New times, no. 10, Mar. 12, 1969: 5-6.
D839.N483, 1969

The maneuvers in Western Europe from January 6 to February 4, 1969, were the biggest test of U.S. preparedness for a "quick military response" or rather intervention in any part of the world and a rehearsal of actions envisaged by NATO's new military doctrine. The deployment of a "fire brigade" equipped with tactical nuclear weapons was a test in "limited war," a concept underlying the U.S. strategy of "flexible response" adopted in 1960, which deprived the European states of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and forced them to recast their strategic doctrine to be ready to escalate the Atlantic forces flexibly from the use of "sufficient non-nuclear strength" through the employment of tactical nuclear weapons to the involvement of nuclear weaponry in a potential war against the Socialist countries. If the German generals decide to start a military conflict, the other NATO countries will automatically be involved.

1178
Wallis, Arthur J. [THE ROYAL AIR FORCE] Die Royal Air Force. Flug-Revue, no. 3, Mar. 1969: 26-29. illus.
TL503.C524, 1969

The German Air Force has always had a high regard for Britain's Royal Air Force, both as an adversary in two world wars and, in more recent years, as an ally. But many people in Germany and in other NATO countries, are gravely concerned by the run-down of the RAF. Although it remains a highly trained force and, in a few years, will be a highly modern one (if there are no more defence cuts) the RAF is but a shadow of its former self. Analysis of the decline of the air force to its perilously weak number of actual operational aircraft is given. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1179
Whetten, Lawrence L. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. World today, v. 25, Feb. 1969: 60-68.
D410.W63, v. 25

Although the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was politically motivated, the Soviet Union has gained important military advantages from the occupation. Czechoslovakia's national defense policies and liberalization, which compromised "the Pact's military potential at a time when the Pact was still confronted with a theoretically dangerous Western threat," convinced Soviet leaders that the only recourse was the use of force. A major reason for this decision was Czechoslovakia's lack of nuclear preparedness. Its nonparticipation in joint pact exercises and planning programs also contributed to the decision to invade. Czechoslovakia did not engage in the spring maneuvers held during the Dresden Conference last March, and the Soviet Union, which treats the participation in these exercises as an indication of political reliability--Rumania has engaged in pact exercises only occasionally--was not pleased with Czechoslovakia's action. Another reason for the decision to invade was to maintain the Warsaw Pact's solidarity. Without genuine collaboration between Russia and Czechoslovakia the pact's general intelligence capability and its flexibility in formulating and pursuing strategic objectives would be severely curtailed. However, if the occupation of Czechoslovakia should engender a form of Stalinist centralism within the pact, it would weaken rather than strengthen the organization. In fact, the occupation may adversely affect pact cohesion if it curtails the decisionmaking role enjoyed by the national forces within the pact. The occupation of Czechoslovakia has strengthened the Warsaw Pact's tactical posture because the Soviet Union has gained control of the vital East-West front. However, the unreliability of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces has compromised the immediate military advantages gained by the invasion; moreover, the invasion created a gap in mutual confidence.

1180
Wickbom, Jan. [THE NORDIC SECURITY POLICY] Nordische Sicherheitspolitik. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Nov. 1968: 577-581. U3.W396, v. 17

Despite NATO's considerable naval strength, its current deployment of other forces inadequately protects northern Norway against possible invasion by the Soviet Union, which in case of war would need to establish its bases in the area. This makes NATO's political protection of Norway dubious. On the other hand, an increase of NATO forces in northern Norway would certainly be answered by the reinforcement of Soviet defenses in the Murmansk area, which would only ensure instant escalation of any local conflict. Finland, for its part, has little chance of preserving its neutrality in wartime, because of its pact of friendship and mutual aid with the Soviet Union, which obligates it to seek military consultations with the latter when threatened with attack. Like the present Norwegian-Finnish security policy, this is very satisfactory in peacetime but would be highly disadvantageous during war. As for Sweden, it bases its policy of neutrality on its independent defense strength, which it tries to build up intensively. However, Sweden's political strategic environment is less advantageous than that in World War II for its traditional neutrality, which needs a broader basis in foreign policy. Considering the interests of the great powers, the security of the three Scandinavian nations could best be protected by creation of a neutral community between Norway, Sweden, and Finland, uncommitted to any bloc or military alliance, despite several reservations that might be raised against such a project from outside.

1181
Witze, Claude. MR. LAIRD TAKES OVER. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Mar. 1969: 37-39. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Examines the impact of the change of administration upon Defense Department policies. Both President

Nixon and new Defense Secretary Melvin Laird have publicly supported strong defense postures, but at the same time they have exhibited an awareness of the need for caution in dealing with a Democratic Congress. So far important decisions regarding such matters as the Sentinel ABM system, the Air Force's C-5 transport, the Navy's F-14 fighter, and the Air Force's FB-111 have been delayed pending further Pentagon review. Many top policymaking positions in the Pentagon have still not been filled, and the appointments that have been made reflect Laird's desire to retain a balanced viewpoint in the Department.

1182
Wolk, Herman S. THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN DEFENSE TEAM--TIME FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SELF-ANALYSIS. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Feb. 1969: 52-55.
UG633.A65, v. 52

If U.S. defense policymakers are to cope successfully with the complex challenges that confront them today, the entire decisionmaking process must be reappraised. The current administrative structure stifles creativity and must be streamlined to permit the proper blend of political and military considerations in the formation of national security policies. Military and civilian employees in the defense hierarchy have become "so involved in their own requirements processes, staff analyses, and internal decision-making that it becomes extremely difficult for them to open their minds to different points of view within the government." Confusing military jargon and the profusion of staff studies have hindered the smooth flow of intra-agency and interagency communications. Moreover, the Pentagon's emphasis upon special committees and advisory groups has too often resulted in "a greater concern with the collection of facts than with an interpretation of their significance." In addition to organizational reforms the defense establishment needs to overcome its parochial approach to problem solving. Area studies involving the politics, economics, history, and culture of various regions should complement formal military training programs. "Although the cultivation of generalists in the services may run against the grain of traditional military training for specialization, it is now absolutely essential that the military think deeply about the fundamental interactions of international politics." Strong decisive leadership and the development of capabilities "to articulate in a global context" would enhance the power of the military to meet its responsibilities.

1183
Woller, Rudolf. RED ARMY IN THE RHINELAND: HOW IT COULD HAPPEN. Atlas, v. 17, Jan. 1969: 30-32.
AP1.A83, v. 17
Translated from Christ und Welt, Stuttgart.
BR4.C37

If Russia marched several Warsaw Pact divisions into the German Federal Republic, NATO's conventional forces and the West German Bundeswehr would prove inadequate; only nuclear weapons could defend the country. Such an event is not fantasy, and, if the Russians can "employ a limited means for attaining a politically vital goal--the political paralysis of Europe by the severance of West Germany"--without reaching the atomic threshold, they will probably not hesitate to do so. Thus, the Bundeswehr must be reformed: It must be able to demonstrate to the enemy, "on the basis of training, equipment and combat morale, that any dirty tricks played on [West Germany] or any part of it carry the incalculable risk of sliding into atomic escalation." Responsible defense planning is needed; present defense legislation must be reviewed.

1184
Wu, Chin-yin. PEIPING'S EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE WORK IN DESERT AREAS. Chinese Communist affairs, v. 6, Feb. 1969: 17-20.
DS777.55.C4495, v. 6

Contends that Communist China is strengthening its defenses in the desert areas of the northwestern provinces "to guard against possible Russian attack." Wu enumerates several steps Peking has taken toward this end: greater administrative unification of the area, intensified economic development, greater control over ethnic groups, and increased military deployments. He concludes that Russia could easily overrun northwest and northeast China but is unlikely to engage in all-out war because of China's immense size and population. In any event, it is Russia that holds the key to war or peace, and "the Russians are not willing to see the Chinese Reds grow stronger while their own military superiority is steadily reduced."

1185
Wünsche, Wolfgang. THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE GDR; BASIC ARTICLE IN "NEUES DEUTSCHLAND." Democratic German report, v. 17, Dec. 11, 1968: 178-179. DD261.D3, v. 17

"Extended extracts" from an article in the November 23, 1968, issue of the central organ of the [East German] Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Wünsche states that any war between West Germany and East Germany would not be fratricidal, despite the sharing of a common language by both sides. Since such a war would decidedly have the characteristics of a class struggle, West German imperialists fighting East Germany must be considered as enemies. For the West German population under the imperialist yoke, the war would have the characteristics of a national liberation war. The author underlines the importance of missilery in the East German military arsenal.

1186
Yahuda, Michael B. CHINA'S NUCLEAR OPTION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Feb. 1969: 72-77. TK9145.A84, v. 25

Communist China's current nuclear war strategy is defensive in character, aiming to ensure survival under nuclear attack from the air and defeat of the enemy on the ground. The assumption is that China's revolutionary masses constitute a "spiritual atomic bomb" capable of offsetting the U.S. advantage in nuclear weapons. The regime is aware, however, of serious deficiencies in this defense posture and has given top priority to its nuclear weapons program. It is not clear what kind of weapons delivery system the Chinese will choose to deploy--a force composed of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and long-range submarines, or one of ICBM's. The ICBM would give the Chinese leadership the greatest psychological satisfaction, and this seems to be the course they are pursuing. However, a long-range missile force will be very costly to a country in which materials and skilled personnel are scarce and may provoke a preemptive strike by the United States. Ultimately they may settle on a mixed force of ICBM's and shorter range missiles, deploying the former primarily for their prestige value. The acquisition of a credible nuclear force is sure to have a significant impact on Chinese strategic thought and diplomacy,

no matter what form the force eventually takes. Communist China has never been a full participant in the family of nations. Its isolation can be attributed in part to the U. S. containment policy, but its own behavior has contributed to the breakdown of its contacts with the outside world. However, this trend could be reversed if China adopted a deterrent posture. Deterrence is a policy of interaction and requires a certain minimum of communication. There is no a priori reason to believe that the Chinese cannot learn the rules of deterrence. If they do so, it will be an important first step toward fuller and more responsible Chinese participation in the wider concerns of the international community.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

1187

Fuchs, Georg, Edith Jarisch, and Walter Kranzer. [NUCLEAR THREAT TO MANKIND: NUCLEAR WAR IN VIEW OF SCIENCE] Atomare Bedrohung der Menschheit! Der Nuklearkrieg im Urteil der Wissenschaft. Wien, Verlag für Jugend und Volk [1968] 68 p. illus. RA1231.R2F76

Bibliography: p. [70]

Partial contents.--Foreword, by Viktor F. Weisskopf.--Physical effects, by Walter Kranzer.--Chemical effects, by Edith Jarisch.--Biological effects, by Georg Fuchs.

Considers, among other things, the damage to human cells and global contamination of the atmosphere caused by radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions. No shelters or civil defense measures can adequately protect the population against the biological effects of nuclear war.

1188

Iinuma, T. A., and others. ACCUMULATION OF FALLOUT CAESIUM-137 IN NEWBORN INFANTS. Nature (London) v. 222, May 3, 1969: 478-480. Q1.N2, v. 222

Reports the results of an experiment to test an earlier report that fallout cesium-137 in powdered milk accumulates in the bodies of infants. Iinuma and his colleagues find that the cesium-137 concentration is higher in the infant than the mother between the 80th and the 170th day of the infant's life and "that the internal dose of ^{137}Cs can be critical in infants between 0 and 180 days old." The high cesium-137 concentration results from the infant's own low body weight and the high cesium-137 content of the powdered milk.

1189

Kusin, Aleksandr. NUCLEAR THREAT AGAIN? Daily review; translations from the Soviet press, v. 14, Oct. 15, 1968: pt. 2, [item] 3, 1-2. Slav Rm

According to foreign press reports, the setting up of atomic minefields on the West German border with Czechoslovakia and East Germany will be discussed at NATO's forthcoming meeting. The dispersion of nuclear fuel over large areas represents a great danger for the country offering its territory for atomic minefields. Man cannot adapt to radiation, and hereditary changes occur in his cells, which lead to the birth of defective children. The nuclear minefields increase the probability of accidental explosions and raise the level of radiation. In a report to the U. N. General Assembly the U. N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation held that the slightest increase in radiation can bring about an avalanche of radiation injuries. Now that the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been reached, the spreading of mines with nuclear warheads over vast areas seems to be sheer madness. It is hoped that common sense will prevail over the war hysteria caused by the "failure of the counter-revolutionary collusion in socialist Czechoslovakia."

1190

Polskoi, G. CBW: THE PENTAGON'S SILENT KILLERS. New times, no. 15, Apr. 16, 1969: 16-17. D839.N483, 1969

The U. S. chemical and biological (CB) weapons program has steadily expanded: Research appropriations have soared, new testing grounds are needed, and over 50 U. S. colleges and universities and many research and educational establishments in other countries now have CB research arrangements with the Pentagon. This expansion follows logically from U. S. military doctrine; the U. S. Army Field Manual points out that "the U. S. is not a party to any treaty, now in force, that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or non-toxic gases, or smoke or incendiary materials or of bacteriological warfare." World opinion condemns CB weapons; the Soviet Government advocates that all states observe the Geneva Protocol and refuse to use CB agents.

1191

Povaliaev, A. EFFECT OF RADIOACTIVITY ON PLANTS GIVEN. In U. S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 479; Sept. 30, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,558) p. 31-37. AS36.U56, no. 46,558

Translated from Voennye znaniia, no. 8, 1968, 22-23. Slav Rm

Answers the question: "What is the destructive action on plants from nuclear explosions, and what are the possibilities of using soil subject to radioactive contamination for growing plants?" Povaliaev describes how to rid the soil of strontium and concludes that, if the imperialists launch a nuclear war, the agricultural workers of the Soviet Union can do much to preserve the health of the nation's population.

1192

Sidel, Victor W. [CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE] Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Jan. 1969: 33-34. TK9145.A84, v. 25

Review of The Silent Weapons: The Realities of Chemical and Biological Warfare by Robin Clarke, annotated as item 690 in v. 5, no. 2, of this bibliography under the title of its English edition, We All Fall Down: The Prospect of Biological and Chemical Warfare; and Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal by Seymour M. Hersh, annotated as item 1572 in v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography.

Praises both books for their comprehensive coverage of an aspect of military research and development that heretofore has had far too little publicity but criticizes both for giving inadequate attention to prospective methods of arms control or disarmament. Sidel argues

that the time is ripe for "bold new proposals" in this field and suggests that, given the natural revulsion these weapons inspire, progress toward their control or elimination could be much more rapid than has been the case with nuclear armaments.

1193
SILENT WARFARE: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AT WORK. Army digest, v. 24, Mar. 1969: 4-10. illus. U1.A827, v. 24

The United States is developing chemical and biological weapons to deter their use by the Soviet Union, which is better equipped defensively, offensively, militarily, and psychologically for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) than any other nation in the world. In addition, Russian strategists consider that chemical tactical weapons may be used in conjunction with nuclear weapons. The United States, on the other hand, is developing not only incapacitating and lethal chemical and biological weapons but also defensive equipment such as protective masks, clothing, and detection devices to enable the individual soldier to operate under most CBW conditions.

1194
Sternglass, Ernest J. INFANT MORTALITY AND NUCLEAR TESTS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Apr. 1969: 18-20. illus. TK9145.A84, v. 25

The growing evidence that no threshold exists below which radiation causes no somatic and genetic damage suggests that even the low intensity radiation emitted by fallout from nuclear-weapons tests may be injurious to man. If so, the harm is most likely to manifest itself as a change in the fetal and infant death rates for some very large population. That such changes have occurred and can be corollated with nuclear testing activity has been established in studies of fetal death rates for the Albany-Troy, N.Y., area; New York State; and the United States. Similar changes have been found in the statistics on infant mortality in the United States. Recently these changes have begun to assert themselves in statistics for the world as a whole. It has been established that the fetus may suffer fatal harm if a parent is exposed to low-level radiation just prior to conception, or if the fetus itself is irradiated during the early, most sensitive period of its development. When these findings are considered in conjunction with the evidence given above, the conclusion can scarcely be avoided that fallout from nuclear tests is responsible for the changes in the decline of the fetal and infant death rates. This hypothesis ought to be investigated immediately to determine with certainty whether a causal relationship exists between nuclear testing and changes in infant and fetal mortality. In the meantime, all nations must refrain from further atmospheric or shallow underground nuclear testing.

1195
Synge, Ann. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. New Blackfriars, v. 50, Feb. 1969: 256-263. BX801.N35, v. 50

Within the past year the public has become increasingly aware of the dangers of chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Much of this resurgent interest can be attributed to the publicity accorded an international conference on CBW held in London in February 1968 and to the open house sponsored by Britain's chemical defense research facilities at Porton Down on October 24, 1968. The CBW arsenal already includes chemical irritants such as tear gases, persistent agents like mustard gas, the highly toxic nerve gases, and a range of incapacitating and deadly microbiological agents; other, even more awesome weapons are likely to be developed in the future in the absence of adequate controls. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, but there is a good deal of controversy whether the provisions of the Protocol should be enforced. Numerous spokesmen feel that, in addition to being useful in attaining military objectives, CBW weapons are in some ways more humane than other weapons of mass destruction. While in certain circumstances this could be possible, the dangers inherent in the use of these weapons seem to override their "attributes." Once one agent is introduced in combat, the temptation arises to use increasingly powerful agents. Furthermore, the effects of CBW weapons are highly unpredictable and, more than other modern weapons, they insulate the user from the terrible consequences of his actions. Thus steps should be taken to reinforce the prohibitions against these weapons.

1196
Tschirley, Fred H. DEFOLIATION IN VIETNAM. Science, v. 163, Feb. 21, 1969: 779-786. Q1.S35, v. 163

Reports the results of an onsite assessment of the ecological effects of the U.S. defoliation program in Vietnam, which was sponsored by the State Department and conducted by Fred H. Tschirley of the Department of Agriculture. Since Tschirley had only one month to complete his survey, his observations were limited to areas that had received intensive doses of herbicides. He based his conclusions upon aerial and ground inspections of the affected areas, interviews with foresters and others knowledgeable about local conditions, and previous scientific studies on the effects of herbicides upon vegetation. While the study showed that the defoliation program definitely had caused ecological changes in Vietnam, none of these changes were considered irreversible. However, the available information was too scanty to make any definite predictions, and Tschirley recommended that a continuing assessment of the defoliation program follow the conclusion of the Vietnam War.

1197
Van Middlesworth, L. RADIOIODINE IN THE BIOSPHERE DURING 1968. Nature (London) v. 221, Mar. 15, 1969: 1041-1042. illus. Q1.N2, v. 221

Describes the use of bovine and ovine thyroid glands collected in Australia, Colombia, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Formosa, and the United States to measure the extent of contamination of the biosphere with radioiodine by the Chinese Communist nuclear tests of December 1967 and those of France during July-September 1968. Although the rate of atmospheric contamination fell substantially after 1959, this study indicates that radioiodine is being released into the biosphere almost continuously. Most of this material can be attributed to atmospheric testing, but a residue remains, whose source, although it cannot be traced, might be leaks from nuclear reactors or underground tests.

1198
Volchok, H. L., and M. T. Kleinman. STRONTIUM 90 YIELD OF 1967 CHINESE THERMONUCLEAR

EXPLOSION. Journal of geophysical research, v. 74, Mar. 15, 1969: 1694-1696.
QC811.J6, v. 74

Fallout from the reported thermonuclear detonation in June 1967 by the Communist Chinese was detected in New York City in early 1968. By using several empirical constants relating deposition in New York City to global meteorological phenomena, a Sr^{90} yield for this test of 198 kc was deduced. This result is in good agreement with the values obtained by other investigators. (Abstract supplied)

1199
Witze, Claude. IS IT GUNS VS. GHETTO? Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Mar. 1969: 15, 19.
UG633.A65, v. 52

The new administration is facing the most heated debate on national defense issues since Roosevelt became embroiled with the America First Committee over presenting Great Britain with some old destroyers. At the center of the debate is the tendency of many Americans to equate "the nation's social security with its defense security." Critics complain that the millions spent for armaments could be better spent on social needs and accuse the aerospace industry of neglecting to apply its vast resources to helping current domestic problems. These arguments are a distortion of the truth, however, for there is a good deal of evidence that the aerospace industry has invested more effort and money in solving urban problems than any other industry, and military experts have shown that defense preparedness is essential to America's survival. Those who cynically refer to the Pentagon as a "citadel of war" forget that the Defense Department is actually trying to ensure peace. In his final message to Congress, outgoing Defense Secretary Clark Clifford warned that the Russians will be capable of degrading America's assured destruction capacity in the forthcoming decade; thus, while the need to rehabilitate the ghetto is a reality, so is the need for defense strategy to "gravitate in the direction accommodated by the best [that] technology can afford."

2. Economic

1200
ARMS COSTS ESCALATE. Business week, no. 2056, Jan. 25, 1969: 42, 44.
HF5001.B89, 1969

Comments on and cites reasons for the soaring costs of military hardware and notes that certain projected arms purchases have already been scaled down. Increasingly, congressional critics are assessing blame for the escalating costs on management --at both the Government and contractor levels.

1201
Bassir, Olumbe. ARMS CONTROL AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS. Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 1-25. JX1974.A1A72, v. 1

The developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America procure or manufacture arms and maintain armed forces for internal and external security or to enhance their international prestige. North America, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union are the major arms suppliers. As one would expect, this trade in weapons is disastrous for economic development. Some states spend as much as 20 percent of their national income on weapons when the diversion of as little as 2 percent to this purpose could paralyze national growth. What is needed to stop this tragic waste is a better system of international order. Regional arrangements like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) can play a useful role, but a universal organization will still be needed. For this reason the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations must be strengthened, the organization itself must be universalized through the admission of Communist China, and an international police force and judicial institutions must be established. Provisions for general and complete disarmament and a redistribution of the world's income from the rich nations to the poor ones must also be made. The United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union must take the first steps toward world order unilaterally. Each of them might begin by accepting a self-imposed ban on the manufacture or testing of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons or by reducing their military budgets by 10 percent and diverting the freed resources to the developing nations. In this way disarmament would remove two threats to world peace at once--the arms themselves and world poverty.

1202
Butz, J. S. TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1970S: ITS PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, May 1969: 36, 38-44, 47. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Although advanced technology has become big business in the United States in the past 20 years and has developed a number of weapons and devices that have contributed to the nation's security and well-being, public reaction to the "military-industrial complex" is at an alltime high. Critics discount defense expenditures as a colossal waste and portray the military as a self-perpetuating caste. The advanced technology business does indeed face a crisis, but not the one with which it is charged. There is an urgent need to overhaul management completely in the defense industry, but this can be accomplished only if the public and Congress can be convinced of the need for a continuing program of technological development in order to give it their support. Under the stewardship of Robert McNamara, the Department of Defense (DoD) sought to save money by cutting corners on research and development, and the results were sometimes disastrous. High costs are frequently inevitable in the advanced technology business, but it must be recognized that military technology contributes greatly to the progress of civilian technology and that the DoD has borne almost the entire cost of advanced technological development in recent years. If, as some economists maintain, "technological change has a primary role in promoting economic growth," the benefits of military technology are all the more obvious.

1203
California. State Dept. of Employment. THE POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF INDUSTRIAL SKILLS FROM DEFENSE TO NONDEFENSE INDUSTRIES. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [n.p.] 1968. 2 v. (ACDA/E-102)
HC107.C23D43

[V. 1] Partial contents.--Glossary of terms.--Introduction.--Summary.--Characteristics of occupations covered in study.--Labor market outlook.--Job transfer prospects for defense occupations.--Description of procedure and general methodology.--Bibliography.
[V. 2] Partial contents.--Technical appendix.

Seeks "to gain insight into the extent to which skills of industrial workers in the production of missiles are potentially transferable to nondefense industries and to anticipate manpower problems involved in mass layoffs of these workers. A secondary objective . . . is to develop a model that may be used for similar studies in other industries."

1204
CRITICS FIRE AT MILITARY BUDGET. Business week, no. 2059, Feb. 15, 1969: 112-114, 116. illus.
HF5001. B89

Concerned over rising military costs, more and more Congressmen are beginning to challenge Pentagon budget requests. Indicative of this trend is the campaign in the Senate against U. S. deployment of the expensive Sentinel ABM system. The increased congressional scrutiny of military spending is due principally to the low performance records and 200 to 300 percent cost overruns of past major defense programs and to mounting skepticism over the wisdom of America's basic military commitments. Other contributing factors include the funding demands of social programs and the need to reduce overall Government spending. In the past, few Congressmen dared to challenge the recommendations of the powerful Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. No major weapons system was ever vetoed; in fact the administration was forced into several programs it did not want, such as the development of the ABM and the advanced manned bomber. Several of the more outspoken proponents of defense economies maintain that the defense-oriented "committees are loaded with hawks" and feel the best way to achieve budget cuts is to place a ceiling on the entire budget.

1205
Dudley, Leonard, and Peter Passell. THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. Review of economics and statistics, v. 50, Nov. 1968: 437-442.
HA1. R35, v. 50

Analyzes the influence of the Vietnam War on American "direct overseas expenditures, . . . the import content in domestically produced war materials," and net exports--the latter in the form of export diversion and price increases indirectly effected by the war. The war contributed $4 billion to the 1967 deficit in the U. S. balance of payments. Were America not involved in the war it would have had a surplus in the account, given "that the real United States GNP had been less by the amount of war materials and service expenditures," and "that capital flows remained unchanged." Further escalation of the war would disproportionally increase the deficit, provided no adequate measures were taken to reduce domestic consumption.

1206
Hoffman, Fred S. THE COST CRUNCH AND NATIONAL SECURITY. National guardsman, v. 23, Mar. 1969: 2-5. illus. UA42. N24, v. 23

Comments on the increasing cost of maintaining the Nation's security--specifically, the spiraling weapons costs. Hoffman states that an end to the Vietnam War will result in some savings, but, if allowance is made for inflation, the prospect of applying these savings to improving national security is dim.

1207
ISRAEL'S WAR CLOUDS HAVE A SILVER LINING. Business week, Feb. 1, 1969: 42-44. illus.
HF5001. B89, 1969

Examines the possibility that the buildup of the Israeli military industry could be a blessing in disguise. Large investments in military industries are expected to generate the same boost for Israeli electronics, chemical, metal, and optical industries that defense and space outlays have produced for the United States. One of the most important contributions to the Israeli economy is the huge amount of capital from outside sources, which helps to cover the large trade deficit that Israel has accumulated during the past year. However, these contributions will have to increase since it is expected that the drain on Israel's reserves will be even greater this year.

1208
Kaufman, Richard F. PENTAGON PROCUREMENT: BILLION-DOLLAR GRAB BAG. Nation, v. 208, Mar. 17, 1969: 328-332.
AP2. N2, v. 208

Decries the present U. S. defense procurement policy and offers suggestions to minimize wastes associated with military contracting. Kaufman asserts that "perhaps the greatest problem in the field of public affairs today is the reluctance of the average citizen to be critical of military assertions and military policy decisions," and he advocates that military research, analysis, and policy studies be undertaken without military and defense establishment support.

1209
Knoll, Erwin. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT RIDES HIGH. Progressive, v. 33, Feb. 1969: 14-17. illus.
AP2. P8655, v. 33

Predicts expansion of the military-industrial complex under the Nixon administration and notes the optimism among defense contractors concerning the possibility of new defense expenditures. Knoll points out discrepancies in defense procurement practices: Price competition is the rule in awarding defense contracts, but exceptions are generously invoked; the final costs of research and development contracts are usually more than double their original estimates; and "major defense contractors earn profits about seventy per cent higher than the average for firms engaged primarily in non-defense work." Regardless, the defense establishment should not fear a cutback of military appropriations; most Congressmen are too concerned "that their constituencies get a fair share--or more--of the military largesse."

1210
LaFond, Charles D. ACCUSATIONS ROCKING THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY. Electronic design, v. 17, Mar. 1, 1969: 25-26, 28. illus.
TK7800. E437, v. 17

Reviews the conclusions reached by Richard A. Stubbing in his master's thesis, entitled "Improving the Acquisition Process for High Risk Military Electronics Systems," and the response to the paper by representatives of the electronics industry. Stubbing, an analyst in the U. S. Bureau of the Budget, asserts that the weapons systems developed in the past two decades have a low performance record, which he blames largely upon the unreliability of overly complex electronics subsystems. Furthermore, he accuses the

aerospace companies of making excessive profits. Industry spokesmen have denied these charges and pointed out that experimentation in sophisticated electronics was needed to meet the demands of the crash weapons development program instituted in response to the strategic arms race begun in the 1950's.

1211
LaFond, Charles D. 1970 U.S. BUDGET IS NIXON'S PROBLEM NOW. Electronic design, v. 17, Feb. 15, 1969: 52, 54, 56. TK7800.E437, v. 17

Reports the allocation of from $11 to $12 billion to the electronics industry in President Johnson's final budget. Most of the money is intended to fund the electronics requirements of defense projects, including an extensive Navy shipbuilding program, the Sentinel ABM system, and the Poseidon and Minuteman III missile programs. In addition, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental Science Services Administration, the Coast Guard, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Aviation Administration are all scheduled to receive funds to meet electronics needs.

1212
Rosen, Gerald R. DILEMMAS OF DEFENSE. Dun's review, v. 93, Feb. 1969: 34-36.
HF1.D8, v. 93

Notes that before President Nixon makes a decision on ABM deployment he must face the problem of what new tactical and strategic aircraft to build and whether or not to construct a new generation of ICBM's. Rosen believes a $100 billion defense budget for fiscal 1970 will make it exceedingly difficult to keep the dollar's strength from eroding further and concludes that the only way the President can stem the mounting pressure to deploy an expensive ABM is to negotiate an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.

1213
Rosen, Gerald R. ISRAEL: WAR-PEACE ECONOMY. Dun's review and modern industry, v. 93, Apr. 1969: 64-68, 71. illus. HF1.D8, v. 93

Despite the continuing state of undeclared war, daily life goes on as usual for 90 percent of the Israelis. The 6-day war not only strengthened Israel's security but also contributed to the development of the economy. The Israelis have attracted more and more foreign industries--predominantly American--by offering rich incentives to foreign investors, especially those willing to locate in remote areas. Textiles, citrus fruits, and diamonds are now among Israel's principal exports, and its tourist industry has flourished since the recent war.

1214
Ströhm, Carl G. [THE SOVIET UNION: MORE CANNONS--LESS BUTTER] Sowjetunion: Mehr Kanonen--weniger Butter. Christ und Welt, v. 21, Dec. 20, 1968: 7. BR4.C37, v. 21

Ascribes the pronounced increase in the Soviet military budget to a return to Stalinism of the Soviet leadership. Ströhm considers the influence of the Soviet military establishment on the country's rulers and its defense spending. The increase of the military budget represents a defeat for Communist "liberals" who hoped for the expansion of the consumer goods sector in the Soviet economy.

1215
Thiel, Elke. [THE STATIONING OF TROOPS AND THE ECONOMY; CONSIDERATIONS OF THE CURRENCY SETTLEMENT] Truppenstationierung und Wirtschaft; Betrachtungen zum Devisenausgleich. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Sept. 1968: 470-474.
U3.W396, v. 17

Reviews Bonn-Washington and Bonn-London settlements to offset American and British foreign-currency losses caused by stationing U.S. and British troops in the German Federal Republic and considers a number of possible long-range settlements to replace the present ones.

1216
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPONSORED FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH. Hearing, Ninetieth Congress, second session. pt. 2, May 28, 1968. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 69 p.
P&GP RR

Partial contents.--Statement of Adm. Hyman G. Rickover.--Insertion for the record: Correspondence between Senator Fulbright and officials of the Department of Defense concerning the Pax Americana study.--Appendix: Defense Department sponsored research with academic institutions, fiscal year 1968. Research projects related to foreign policy matters completed to date during fiscal year 1968. Foreign area research projects and policy planning studies, active fiscal year 1968.

Examines the role of the Department of Defense (DoD) in funding and conducting social science research. Rickover deplores the declining efficiency of the DoD, which he attributes to the growth of a civilian "General Staff" with its standard of cost effectiveness. He contends that the military value of social science research is at best questionable and should be conducted by Government agencies other than the DoD, if at all. He recommends the preparation of a "Who's Who" of the "military-scientific complex" as a first step in purifying the DoD and restoring it to its proper function.

1217
Wang, Szu-cheng. CHINESE COMMUNIST NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET. Chinese Communist affairs, v. 5, Dec. 1968: 42-44.
DS777.55.C4495, v. 5

Attempts to determine Communist China's actual defense expenditures for 1967 on the basis of official figures and a private press report. Charts detailing Peking's annual defense budget in both gross and percentage terms for the years 1950-59 and 1967 are presented. Wang arrives at a figure of JMP 22.5 billion for defense in 1967 by including hidden expenses charged to categories other than defense.

1218
Waterkamp, Rainer. [BIG BUSINESS AND WORLD PEACE] Big Business und der Weltfrieden. Europäische Begegnung, v. 8, Oct. 1968: 486-488.
P&GP RR

Military conflicts are largely influenced by the defense industry and the economic motives that underlie arms transactions. Historical evidence abounds of big business' taking economic advantage by expanding into the arms market. Since research and development

costs of sophisticated modern weaponry exceed the capacities of private companies, the state now finances and controls this area to a great extent. For example, there is a growing dependence of American industrial enterprises on the Government. Never before did national security depend as much on the solution of technological problems as it does today. Defense expenditures consume one-tenth of the U.S. social product. "Reorganization of defense according to its functional aspects has led to the radical centralization not only of [military] command but of armaments planning as well." Because of the necessary secrecy of military patents and inventions it is difficult for a government to choose contractors through genuine public bidding, and there is a growing concentration of defense contracts in a very limited number of firms. The virtual elimination of competition on the side of the producers has, of course, an impact on the prices at which a government buys their products. World armaments now cost $180 billion yearly while the world is largely starving. It is a mistake to consider defense industry the most important factor for full employment, for in the long run an oversized defense industry hampers rather than induces economic growth--hence the importance of plans and efforts to transform that industry into the civil one. Even the big business community has come to realize that death alone is the logical end of an unabated arms race.

1219

Weidenbaum, Murray L. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. A paper to be presented to the Fourteenth Annual Institute of World Affairs, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington, March 21, 1969. St. Louis [1969] 20 l.
HC110. D4W43

The increasing interdependence of the military establishment and private defense industry is seriously affecting the free-market mechanism and the entrepreneurial character of the private firm. The Government price for goods and services is no longer determined by the interplay of relatively impersonal markets, and the defense establishment has gradually taken over, either directly or indirectly, many of the private business manager's decisionmaking functions. This close relationship between the Pentagon and private industry must be reduced. The following changes in governmental procurement policy and practice are suggested merely as steps in the right direction: to make interest on working capital an allowable cost of military contracts so that defense companies will not be financially dependent upon the Federal Treasury, to "streamline and reduce the variety and scope of special provisions in procurement legislation and regulations" to provide private enterprise with more creativity and imagination, to broaden the competitive base by encouraging commercially oriented companies to consider military work and defense companies to diversify into commercial markets, to award military subcontracts to small businesses and other industries that are not actively participating in the military market as prime contractors, to curtail the leasing of plants and equipment to major military contractors so that their competitive advantage will be reduced, and to emphasize desired results "rather than prescribing the detailed manner in which industry should go about designing and manufacturing the end product." Governmental policymakers and administrators should constantly attempt to steer the "difficult middle course between governmental arsenalization of industry . . . and private interest obtaining high profits unrelated to either" their risks or investment. Further, they should seek a "balance between government and business interests which would strengthen simultaneously both the national defense and the private enterprise system."

3. Ethical and Social

1220

Ashworth, A. E. THE SOCIOLOGY OF TRENCH WARFARE 1914-18. British journal of sociology, v. 19, Dec. 1968: 407-423. HM1. B75, v. 19

Describes some significant social and sociopsychological dimensions of trench warfare taken as an instance of modern mass war. Ashworth focuses attention on a contradiction that developed in many sectors of the trench network between the formal or officially sanctioned norms defining the relationship of the combatant to his enemy and the informal norms that, arising out of unique battlefield conditions, actually came to govern the relationship. The formal norms decreed an aggressive and hostile attitude toward the enemy, but in many sectors of the line the operative norms were reciprocity and a "live and let live" approach. In the individual soldier, this conflict between the activities and norms demanded of him by military elites and his own "internalized and socially derived attitudes relating to the inviolability of persons" often resulted in reduced combat effectiveness and pronounced self-alienation. In the case of the French mutinies of 1917, it can be argued that the existence of this informal organization between the opposing armies and the alienation of the individual soldier from the war, its aims, and his own military duties contributed in a substantial way to a "radical reformulation of military goals."

1221

Boffey, Philip M. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: IS THE SMITHSONIAN REALLY A "COVER"? Science, v. 163, Feb. 21, 1969: 791-796.
Ql. S35, v. 163

While it is an established fact that the Smithsonian Institution is conducting a biological study on migratory birds in the Pacific under an Army contract, there is no sound evidence to support the recent allegations by NBC News that the Smithsonian is serving as a cover for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) activities in that area. Some Smithsonian officials acknowledge the fact that the Army may have used some of the project data to locate a "safe" CBW test site but insist that none of their employees are directly involved in searching for such a site. They assert that the survey has uncovered invaluable information on the breeding and migratory habits of birds in the central Pacific and that probably no other source would have provided the almost $2.8 million utilized by the 6-year-old project. Although the project itself was classified until last year, its director Philip S. Humphrey maintains that the scientific findings have "never, never been classified." NBC apparently based its charges upon the existence of a 1965 military CBW test, which was partially observed by a scientist from the Smithsonian project but never involved direct Smithsonian participation; testimony by former U.S. Senator Joseph Clark, who based his statement upon information derived from NBC News; and a letter from an anonymous source relating the project to CBW purposes. Such flimsy evidence hardly proves that the Smithsonian was used as a "cover" for military operations. However, "the whole episode provides a striking illustration of how an

institution can get caught in a changing moral climate." Although when the project was begun in 1963 there seemed to be no particular harm in accepting a classified defense contract, today such a connection is deemed "suspect" and should be avoided by an institution that wishes to maintain an "unblemished reputation."

1222
Djilas, Milovan. THE UNQUENCHABLE FIRES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Central European federalist, v. 16, Dec. 1968: 8-12.
D418.5.C9C4, v. 16

Long before the events in Czechoslovakia it had become evident that communism as an ideology and a world movement had fallen into conflicts and crises. Czechoslovakia made the first conscious step toward the transformation of Communist society into a union of collective property with personal freedom. The Czechoslovak leaders' strength and equanimity lay in the fact that they clung firmly to the idea of human freedom and national sovereignty and remained faithful to their plan until the foreign power crushed them. It was a moment when new ideas united with the existence and the essence of a nation. Because these ideas arise from the nation's vital needs, nobody can stifle them; they are social realities and national requirements and potentialities. The Czechs and Slovaks astonished the world by their moral resistance, restored faith in the unquenchable thirst for truth and the indestructibility of freedom, and thus brought about an unprecedented ideological, moral, and political defeat of the Soviet Union. Communism, although torn apart, is still alive, and its existence is inexorably linked with the rest of the world. The conflicts and dilemmas involved are only specific forms of the same conflicts and dilemmas that beset contemporary mankind. In a divided world only dogmatists and despots can remain intact. A great battle has been lost on Czechoslovak soil, but there is no reason for despair because not a single hope or truth has been extinguished. All that is needed is more suffering, clearer vision, and more resolute struggle.

1223
Goldsmith, William, and Constantine Cretekos. UNHAPPY ODYSSEYS. Archives of general psychiatry, v. 20, Jan. 1969: 78-83.
RC321.A66, v. 20

Case studies of psychiatric disorders in 10 veterans of combat duty in the Vietnam War. This paper focuses on adjustment problems encountered by returnees to the continental United States and finds evidence that bears out R. R. Grinker's hypothesis of the ego depletion syndrome, which is thought to result from the frustration of infantile desires for dependency gratification in the returning soldier. These cases also confirm G. Zilboorg's remark that "man cannot easily turn from destruction to construction, from hate to love, from revengefulness to forgiveness, from cultural relaxation to cultural restraints."

1224
Hatfield, Mark O. SENATOR HATFIELD ARGUES THAT THE DRAFT IS WRONG--A VOLUNTEER ARMY IS THE ANSWER. New York times magazine, Mar. 30, 1969: 34-35, 37, 39, 42, 44, 46, 49, 52, 54. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1969

The present method of conscripting men for military service in the United States fails to meet any of the essential requirements of a military manpower procurement program: It does not respect individual liberties, it does not ensure equal treatment of all those eligible for military service, and it is not an efficient method of providing both the quantity and quality of men needed for national defense. The proposed lottery system is no answer to these difficulties. The only feasible alternative is an all-volunteer army. The arguments that a volunteer program will not produce enough men or that it will lead to an "all black" army or one of "mercenaries" or "military elites" are refuted by the evidence. Besides meeting the three requirements discussed above, a voluntary army would have one additional advantage: Deprived of the power of conscription, the President will be prevented from embarking on foreign military adventures that do not have the support of the Congress and the American people.

1225
Hess, Wilhelm. [PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE; QUESTIONS AT THE 82D CONVENTION OF GERMAN CATHOLICS] Friede im Atomzeitalter; Fragen auf dem 82. Deutschen Katholikentag. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Oct. 1968: 505-508. U3.W396, v. 17

Reports on the attitude of the German Catholics' convention, held in Essen September 4-9, 1968, to problems of peace and war in modern times. The convention considers that military conflicts, including those between the superpowers, can be prevented through the development of methods to settle international disputes. While it is still possible to conduct a just war, its scope and means must be strongly limited by existing conditons and in absolute terms; a balance of terror is a precarious foundation for peace. The arms race can be stopped by arms control, for which the states must give up some of their sovereign rights.

1226
Kash, Don E. FORCES AFFECTING SCIENCE POLICY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Apr. 1969: 10-17. TK9145.A84, v. 25

Proposes solutions to the social problems created by the interaction of research and development (R&D) policy with its political and economic environment. Kash explains how anxiety over the growth of the military-industrial complex, the involvement of the universities with the Government, and other second-order consequences or "latent functions" of Government-sponsored R&D has combined with a new concern about the quality of American life to provoke public demands that R&D policy be brought under more systematic control. He points out that these demands raise fundamental and as yet unanswered questions about how a technological society is to be managed and what its goals should be. The task of finding the answers properly belongs to industry and the universities, but it is already evident that the most promising problem-solving technique is systems analysis.

1227
Leavitt, William. TOWARD A HUMANE TECHNOLOGY. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, May 1969: 64-66, 71. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52

The misuse of technology, not technology itself, has exacerbated the problems that currently plague not only the United States but society in general. In fact, technology is "indispensable to the solution of social problems" just as it has been essential to the nation's

security. The effective application of technology to both military and civilian needs requires a definition of the specific purposes for which it is to be used and a willingness to make the necessary investment to achieve them. The application to social problems is more difficult because of the broader scope and more decentralized decisionmaking processes of such problems. Technology will therefore be most effective in ameliorating social problems if applied on a community basis with the voluntary participation of private industry. The large-scale centralized planning characteristic of the military should be employed only where the nature of the problems makes it necessary.

1228
O'Ballance, Edgar. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF WEAPONS. Revue militaire générale, no. 2, Feb. 1969: 212-219. U2.R48, 1969
Includes summaries in French and German.

Traces the evolution of weapons development and discusses the illogical pattern of popular reaction to specific types of weapons. O'Ballance believes the acceptability of weapons in the future may have to be considered as carefully as cost-effectiveness and that the military will have to give as much attention to introducing a new weapon as a food company does to marketing a new product. He concludes that totalitarian countries are not plagued by this problem but that "this only indicates that the benefits of the freedoms of democracies . . . bring extra military responsibilities to defend them."

4. Other

1229
THE ABM: A NUCLEAR WATERSHED. Time, v. 93, Mar. 14, 1969: 22-27. illus. AP2.T37, v. 93

Brief history of the ABM controversy, a description of the proposed Sentinel operation, a summary of arguments for and against the system, a discussion of the problems facing President Nixon in reaching a decision on deployment, and a thesaurus of defense jargon.

1230
ABM: SCIENTISTS' LOYAL OPPOSITION FINDS A FORUM. Science, v. 163, Mar. 21, 1969: 1309-1311. Q1.S35, v. 163

Excerpts from testimony by three eminent scientists before Senator Albert Gore's subcommittee on international organizations and disarmament. Herbert F. York, a professor of physics at the University of California, emphasized the technical drawbacks of the Sentinel system, asserting that it will be exceedingly difficult to reach the high level of precision needed to make the system infallible. George B. Kistiakowsky, professor of chemistry at Harvard, warned that by shortening the lead time for the development of a heavy missile defense system, the deployment of the Sentinel could lead to a dangerous acceleration of the arms race. The former director of defense research and engineering under President Eisenhower, Herbert F. York, suggested that the Sentinel and other major strategic options should not be considered in isolation but in relation to the country's overall strategic requirements. He proposed the establishment of a task force made up of experts independent of Government agencies to make a comprehensive study of U. S. "weapons technology and of the factors which bear upon the decisions the nation must make regarding ongoing strategic forces and policies."

1231
THE AIR FORCE BLUEPRINTS ITS FUTURE. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, May 1969: 77-78, 81-82, 85-86, 88-89. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52
Symposium held at the Air Force Association's convention in Houston, Mar. 21, 1969.

Discusses the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and Communist China and recent trends in the politicomilitary situation and contends that changes in the strategic environment necessitate a refinement of strategic concepts and the development of new weapons to implement these concepts. The need for "operative deterrents" to supplement the present concepts of assured destruction and damage limitation is stressed.

1232
Besson, Frank S. MOBILITY IN THE MODERN ARMY. Defense transportation, v. 26, Jan./Feb. 1969: 33-38. illus. U1.A88, v. 26
Adapted from an address at the National Defense Transportation Association Forum, Oct. 14, 1968.

Notes the advances made in transportation techniques and equipment that enable the soldier to arrive quickly at an enemy target area and overcome obstacles to mobility once he reaches the area. Besson describes future improvements and uses of military containers and concludes that the effort to maximize containerization has been slow because "break bulk operations have been the curse of military terminals forever."

1233
Boffey, Philip M. CONGRESS: MUSKIE SEEKS COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGICAL BACKLASH. Science, v. 163, Mar. 14, 1969: 1179. Q1.S35, v. 163

In recent hearings conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, several prominent scientists endorsed Senator Edmund S. Muskie's proposal to establish a select Senate Committee on technology and the human environment. To overcome objections of Senators who feared the new committee might infringe upon their jurisdictions, the proposal calls for the committee to be made up of three members "from each of seven standing Senate committees whose activities affect the individual and his environment." The committee would have no power over legislation but would serve principally as a study group to investigate the possible adverse consequences of military and civilian technology. Although none of the witnesses advocated the total abolition of military security, the former scientific adviser to President Kennedy, Jerome B. Wiesner, suggested that a lessening of secrecy surrounding military programs would tend to produce wiser decisions on such programs as well as help reduce the tensions between America and its rivals that often arise from unnecessary secrecy.

1234
Brennan, Donald G. THE CASE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Apr. 1969: 433-448. D410.F6, v. 47

The various reasons for favoring ABM deployment--specifically, deployment of a system intended to be effective against a major Soviet attack rather than of a

"thin" system against a Chinese attack--need clarification. Such a defense could alter significantly the situation following a nuclear war by lessening damage to production and transportation resources, thus speeding economic recovery and reducing potential American fatalities substantially. Even if it failed to perform as expected, it might cause the Russians to fit their existing missile force with decoys without increasing significantly their number of rockets; this would reduce the total payload available for warheads and thereby reduce potential damage to the United States during a war. The ABM defense would also provide protection against possible attacks of a disguised origin or a possible unauthorized launch and would complicate an attacker's plans. The assertion of many ABM critics that America will face a larger enemy offensive force if defensive forces are deployed is questionable. A buildup in enemy offensive forces will depend upon the difficulty of nullifying the defenses; "it is about as expensive to nullify a good defense as to build it." Another criticism of the ABM is its cost. For some perspective on costs, however, one should note that the United States has spent $50 billion on air defense in the past 20 years, and "it is a good bet that the current air-defense system is and has been less important as insurance for the country than the major proposed [ABM] systems would be." ABM critics are concerned with the system's impact on deterrence. The recognition that ballistic missile defense [BMD] deployment interferes with a security based upon an assured-destruction capability led critics to oppose missile defense rather than opt for a strategy based upon defense. However, considering the effectiveness of modern defense and the difficulty of limiting damage to one's own country with an offensive strategy, perhaps U.S. resources could be utilized more effectively if they were committed to defensive rather than offensive forces. If both the Americans and the Russians possessed heavy defenses, the assured-destruction forces of both countries would be significantly degraded. The final major concern of missile-defense critics is that BMD deployment will lead to an offensive-defensive arms race or complicate arms control problems. However, the development of such a race depends upon "whether or not Soviet and American attitudes are lined up the same way. Considering that Soviet attitudes appear favorable to defense and American attitudes ought to be, an obvious way to improve prevailing strategic postures would be to limit offensive forces primarily and defenses only secondarily through arms control arrangements. This is more in line with the traditional aims of arms control--reduction of the possibility of war or mitigation of its consequences if it occurs. Neither an arms race nor appreciably higher expenditures need result if deployment is managed intelligently.

1235

Carter, Luther J. CONGRESS AND THE MILITARY: MANY MEMBERS TAKE A HARDER LOOK. Science, v. 164, Apr. 18, 1969: 278-281.
Q1.S35, v. 164

With the sharp increase in defense expenditures necessitated by the Vietnam War and costly new weapons systems, a number of Congressmen have begun to reconsider their previously unquestioning attitudes toward military requests. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee departed from precedent by soliciting the advice of academic scientists in its challenge of the proposed ABM system. A new foreign relations subcommittee, headed by Senator Stuart Symington, has been established to examine American security commitments abroad. Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has agreed to consider the testimony of independent scientists in the committee's ABM hearings, while Senator Edward Kennedy has formed his own staff of experts. Senator Allen J. Ellender, who will probably succeed Senator Richard B. Russell as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, has long been a critic of the Pentagon's spendthrift policies. In the House, the Democratic Study Group, whose membership is severely critical of the ABM, has initiated studies of defense policy, as has the recently activated foreign affairs subcommittee on national security policy. In order to make its review of military questions effective, Congress may have to establish special staffs or commissions of scientific advisers.

1236

Cousins, Norman. ABM: PRESIDENT NIXON'S VIETNAM? Saturday review, v. 52, Mar. 8, 1969: 22-23. Z1219.S25, v. 52

U. S. deployment of an ABM system will lead to increased international tension, a tragic deferment of much needed domestic programs, relentless pressures on the American economy, and a "world of no return." Obvious consequences of deployment would be the development of a decoy missile system and the packaging of greater megatonnage in missile warheads, which in turn would be followed by retaliatory offensive deployment. If President Nixon wants to demonstrate that military power has not yet become an end in itself and a law unto itself, he should forgo ABM deployment; if he goes ahead with the system, the ABM may become for Nixon what Vietnam became for Johnson.

1237

Doyle, Vincent A. CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY INTO MILITARY AFFAIRS. A study prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 8 p. P&GP RR

At head of title: 90th Cong. 2d sess. Committee print.

Contents.--Preface by Senator J. W. Fulbright. --Introduction.--The literature and precedents.--The ultimate problem.--Judicial review of claims of executive privilege.--Judicial disposition of claims of privilege based on the need for military secrecy. --Congressional initiation of a judicial test.--Conclusion.

Examines the problem of the conflict between the power of Congress to demand information concerning military affairs from the President and his privilege to withhold it. The study concludes that the power of the Executive to withhold information could deprive Congress of the tools to fulfill its constitutional role but that an unlimited power by Congress to demand information could infringe upon the Executive's consitutional role.

1238

FROM SENTINEL TO SAFEGUARD. Christian century, v. 86, Mar. 26, 1969: 396-397.
BR1.C45, v. 86

President Nixon missed a virtually unprecedented opportunity to renounce the "action-reaction phenomenon" when he decided to go ahead with a limited ABM system, which might give impetus to new rounds of offensive weapons competition, accelerate the spread

of nuclear weapons, and forestall strategic arms limitation negotiations. Had President Nixon been more responsive to the counsels of the scientific community and certain leaders of his party, he "could have struck simultaneous blows for peace, for economy and for the reordering of national priorities." However, it would be unfair to judge the President too harshly--he inherited the Sentinel system from his predecessor, and although he could have opted for a thick system, he cut it back and moved its deployment away from the cities.

1239
Greenberg, D. S. NATO: SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS DIVISION A MINIATURE NSF FOR THE ALLIANCE. Science, v. 163, Feb. 28, 1969: 915-917. Q1.S35, v. 163

Since its creation in 1958 NATO's Scientific Affairs Division "has evolved into one of the more unusual scientific offshoots of the cold war." Non-NATO nations, including East European countries, frequently participate in conferences sponsored by the division, which also allocates part of its $4.4 million annual budget to postgraduate scientific fellowships and research grants. Over the past 10 years the division has financed advanced training for more than 8,000 scientists and supported conferences involving the participation of a total of some 30,000 scientists. In addition, it has proposed the creation of a European Institute of Technology and is currently contemplating involvement in the fields of computer research and oceanography. At the present time it is unclear whether the latter plans will be carried out because they "involve subjects that are already being handled by existing organizations that, in many cases, are having a difficult time getting resources" and because "American scientific leaders no longer seem to consider the division as important as they once considered it."

1240
Humphrey, Hubert H. "SAFEGUARD": A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES. Saturday review, v. 52, Apr. 5, 1969: 28-29. Z1219.S25, v. 52

President Nixon did not contribute to U.S. military security, to the development of a more rational strategic arms policy, or to a more sensible ordering of national priorities with his decision to deploy a limited ABM system. Instead, he "sacrificed a rare opportunity for a bold U.S. initiative to slow down the spiraling arms race." The urgency for arms limitation talks "before the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. climb to the next plateau of offensive and defensive strategic weaponry" must be stressed; such talks cannot wait for a general settlement of political problems. Impending advances in offensive strategic weapons and America's long-neglected domestic problems emphasize the urgency for talks and the need to rearrange national priorities.

1241
Javits, Jacob K. CAN PRESIDENT NIXON STOP THE ARMS RACE? Saturday review, v. 52, Mar. 1, 1969: 14-16, 63-64. Z1219.S25, v. 52

A major debate on national security and the nuclear arms race has focused upon Sentinel deployment. While proponents of deployment stress the importance of dealing from a position of military strength, perhaps the issue should be approached from a broader perspective. As President Nixon stated, "military strength is not enough." He went on to say that "for arms control to be successful, we must first establish prerequisites and incentives" and that mutual knowledge of "what the other is about" must exist. This goes to the heart of the Sentinel deployment debate. If the President lifts the present hold on Sentinel procurement and site location, the nuclear balance may be destabilized, a new cycle in the arms race may be launched, and arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union may be harmed. Moreover, the staggering cost of the weapons system will affect the U.S. balance of payments and divert money from pressing domestic problems. Synchronization of national security programs and the "evolution of a strategic doctrine, stressing the nonbelligerent aspects of our national security posture," as the President has advocated, would be more beneficial for national security than the proposed new weapons system. Nonmilitary "trade offs" or options, such as a peace in the Middle East, would achieve big security gains and save on weapons expenditures. The United States should "use the whole range of political and diplomatic action open to [it] to preserve a climate of freedom in the world" and not allow a concentration in nuclear weaponry to limit the range of available alternatives, especially if nuclear arms limitation compatible with security can be gained through negotiation. The United States should seek to shape the strategic environment of the 1970's so as to "make possible, encourage, and enhance the kind of evolution in Soviet society and the kind of development of our own policy that are necessary . . . for world peace."

1242
Kuczynski, Jürgen. INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION AND THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS. Scientific world, v. 12, no. 4-5, 1968: 29-31. Q1.S8415, v. 12

Although there is less international cooperation among scientists today than during the Renaissance, scientific development is progressing more rapidly than ever before and plays an increasingly important role in social life. The basic cause of this contradiction is that modern nations are "arming for a possible war." The secrecy of military research, which accounts for an estimated 70 percent of all research in the natural sciences in the Soviet Union and the United States, leads to an immense duplication of effort. Moreover, the high cost of sophisticated research excludes from participation the scientists of poorer countries--a problem compounded by the "brain drain" from poorer to wealthier countries. Although it is unrealistic to expect the discontinuance of military research in the near future, the limitation of armaments, which is a realistic goal, would free large sums of money for other purposes. Scientific research would inevitably benefit since science has already penetrated the public or civilian sector so thoroughly; this "would mean nothing less than an expansion of precisely those spheres of scientific activity in which international co-operation is possible," as is evident from the miraculous progress since World War II of the two German states and Japan, which thrived because of the arms limitations imposed on them.

1243
Long, Franklin A. STRATEGIC BALANCE AND THE ABM. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Dec. 1968: 2-5. TK9145.A84, v. 24

The rapidity of technological change and the variety and complexity of modern weapons systems are the

chief factors responsible for the uncertainty that presently characterizes the strategic balance. The deployment of a complex ABM system will greatly increase these already existing uncertainties and might touch off a new phase in the arms race, changes in diplomacy and strategy, and a movement toward greater symmetry in opposing nuclear forces. At worst, it might upset the strategic balance completely and tempt one of the nuclear powers into a first strike. It would certainly undermine mutual trust between the superpowers and for this and other reasons drastically reduce the possibility of a strengthened U.S.-Soviet détente or new arms control agreements. Even agreements already ratified would be jeopardized. ABM deployment would also have a deleterious impact on the alliance systems in Europe. NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be weakened, and the pressure in Western Europe would be increased for the development of some kind of independent nuclear force.

1244
McGovern, George S. THE ABM: UNSAFE AT ANY PRICE. Progressive, v. 33, Feb. 1969: 21-24.
AP2.P8655, v. 33

ABM deployment would be a national blunder--the arms race would escalate, Soviet-American relations would worsen, and enormous funds would be diverted from pressing domestic and global problems. The proposed system, even in its heaviest form, would be ineffective, considering the high levels of offensive armament that both major powers will possess by the mid-1970's. Proponents of the ABM have not rebutted military and scientific arguments that the system is militarily ineffective because "the true reasons for funding the ABM are not military and scientific, but economic and political." The military can reward the states of cooperative Congressmen: "The creation, continuance, or abolition of a defense plant or installation may affect thousands of jobs and millions of dollars." Further, Congressmen fear criticism for jeopardizing the nation's security if they vote against proposals. Military procurement should meet national security needs rather than satisfy the financial and military appetite; money, talent, and resources must be redirected toward meeting the needs of the American people.

1245
Martin, Laurence W. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL. Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 61-67.
JX1974.A1A72, v. 1

Critics of the ABM system suggest that it is highly destabilizing because it might make the outbreak of war more likely through one of the superpowers' acquisition of a first-strike capability and stimulate a new arms race, which would raise the general level of tension and bring about a severe deterioration in diplomatic relations between the superpowers. An ABM could cause a spiraling arms race whereby a country that believed it had to increase its offensive capabilities to offset the other's defensive system would cause the other country to increase either its defensive system or its offensive forces. But the ABM does not necessarily have to produce these results; only in the case of perfect defense are deterrence and defense incompatible, and since partial defense leaves a degree of vulnerability it must continue to exercise a powerful deterrent effect. In addition, it would be unreasonable to ignore Russia's refusal to admit that the ABM was destabilizing. It is not a foregone conclusion that an American ABM will stimulate a great increase in Russian strike forces because a Soviet offensive response to such an ABM would "have to compete with other pressing demands, including BMD itself, upon a [Soviet] military budget already constrained by other demands upon the national economy." It is difficult to foresee the effects of ABM deployment on Soviet-American relations, and it is just as impossible to assert whether the ABM is compatible with the fundamental purposes of arms control. The ABM affects not only the strategic balance but also such existing or proposed arms control measures as the atmospheric test ban treaty and proposals to expand it. As long as the test ban treaty exists, it must be regarded as a limitation upon ABM development. ABM deployment could also undermine proposed agreements to curb fissile material production because large-scale production will probably necessitate renewed requirements for fissile material. Some experts believe the adoption of the ABM will work against the chances of securing nonproliferation agreements that involve nonnuclear states because these nations have always predicated nonproliferation measures on the restraint by the existing nuclear powers in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Others argue that superpower possession of extremely advanced offensive weapons would deter lesser powers from developing nuclear weapons. However, it remains to be seen whether these nonnuclear powers will want to acquire nuclear weapons to improve their power position vis-a-vis the major powers or in relation to smaller nations.

1246
Melman, Seymour. WHO DECIDES TECHNOLOGY? Columbia forum, v. 11, winter 1968: 13-16.
AS30.C59, v. 11

Argues that military technology is socially determined, examines the decisionmaking apparatus for determining that technology in the United States and lists, with brief comments, statements of ideology that "contribute to the maintenance and extension of the decision power of America's new military industry management."

1247
Moldauer, Peter. THE ABM COMES TO TOWN. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Jan. 1969: 4-6. illus.
TK9145.A84, v. 25

Deployment of the Sentinel ABM system was originally intended for area defense, but it is now clear that the system will be used primarily for the point defense of cities and military installations. Since the location of Sentinel sights in populated areas has a number of drawbacks--in particular, the danger of serious accidents--there must have been a compelling reason for this change of plans. Apparently, it was decided that Sentinel could not give adequate protection to American cities if deployed as an area defense but could do so if deployed for point defense. The first of these conclusions is valid but the second is highly questionable. Even deployed as a point defense, Sentinel, by general admission, is incapable of defending the cities against a major attack by ICBM's, and for a number of reasons it would be equally ineffectual against a more primitive attack by one of the smaller powers. The intention to provide partial protection against both kinds of attack is an insufficient ground for introducing powerful, accident-prone nuclear warheads into metropolitan areas. It has been suggested that the thin Sentinel system is merely a prototype for a thick system, which

will provide full protection against attack by the Soviet Union, and that construction of a prototype is the only way to discover defects in the design system. If this is true, one wonders why there is so little concern among officials about possible defects in the system's vaunted safety mechanisms. It is a dubious procedure to spend billions of dollars and endanger millions of Americans to construct a prototype of a system whose feasibility is not attested to by any existing evidence.

1248
Nelson, Bryce. M.I.T.'S MARCH 4: SCIENTISTS DISCUSS RENOUNCING MILITARY RESEARCH. Science, v. 163, Mar. 14, 1969: 1175-1178. illus.
QI.S35, v. 163

Approximately 30 universities participated in the March 4 programs that were initiated by three physics graduate students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to discuss the misuse of scientific knowledge by the military. While the student speakers expressed greater moral indignation at the destructive orientation of much Government-sponsored research than most of the faculty representatives, both groups emphasized the need for scientists to concern themselves more with the consequences of their work. Some advocated rejection of all war-related research, whereas others asserted it was permissible for scientists to work for the Government if they shared in the decisionmaking process. Few concrete proposals for action resulted from the March 4 sessions, but, believing "that ideas can transform the relationship between science and the nation's vested military interests," most of the participants felt the meetings were at least a first step in the direction of the changes they desired.

1249
NIXON'S ABM DECISION--WHAT IT MEANS. U.S. news & world report, v. 66, Mar. 24, 1969: 38-39. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 66

In contrast to former President Johnson's Sentinel ABM system, which emphasized the protection of major population centers, President Nixon's proposed Safeguard missile defense program is intended primarily to protect U.S. offensive missile sites. The new system is expected to cost from $6 to $7 billion and is designed almost exclusively as a defense against Communist China's nuclear potential. Montana and Idaho have been selected for the initial missile sites, which will take at least 4 years to construct. While the President expects the Senate to challenge his proposal, he maintains that "the ABM is worth the fight," particularly since, in addition to its strategic merits, it would also give the United States a stronger bargaining position in arms control talks with the Russians.

1250
ON 'NUCLEAR SUFFICIENCY' [editorial] Christian century, v. 86, Feb. 12, 1969: 203.
BR1.C45, v. 86

What is meant by President Nixon's pronounced preference for nuclear sufficiency instead of nuclear superiority or parity? It is hoped that Prof. George Rathjen's assertion "that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have achieved a level of 'sufficiency in strategic forces' in the sense that each side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other" is influencing the new administration. However, sufficiency could turn out to be merely "a cool cover for the heating up of the arms race." It was disconcerting that the President linked strategic arms limitation talks to a Middle East settlement and that Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird defended Sentinel deployment as a "bargaining point" in possible U.S.-Soviet talks. The costs of new missile systems are too enormous to "be made contingent upon the meager prospects for a Middle East solution nor regarded as a token for one-upmanship." Senator Edward Kennedy's entry into the ranks of the anti-ABM forces is welcome. "Sufficient is sufficient. Enough is enough."

1251
Pout, H. W. FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR THE FORCES. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 114, Mar. 1969: 29-30, 32-34, 36-38.
U1.R8, v. 114
"A lecture given at the R.U.S.I. on 16th October 1968." Discussion included.

Discusses the probable impact that scientific and technological advances will have on various aspects of military operations--deterrence, surveillance and intelligence, control and communications, mobility and logistics, and weapons. Practically speaking, the most significant scientific development is the relative ease with which very complex and costly weapons can be devised. Pout concludes by noting that tactical nuclear weapons, "the ultimate in the old-fashioned way of fighting," and chemical incapacitants, "the most humane weapons possible for use in war," must be ruled out at present for political reasons.

1252
Pruck, Erich F. [THE EFFECTS OF TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGY ON THE LEADERSHIP OF ARMED FORCES] Auswirkungen totalitärer Ideologie auf die Führung der Streitkräfte. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Sept. 1968: 442-450. U3.W396, v. 17

Discusses the tendency of the Soviet military establishment to win from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union greater independence in commanding the Armed Forces. Pruck considers the problem in its historical perspective and tries to evaluate the leeway the party can give Soviet marshals and generals without jeopardizing its own position or ideology. He also considers the length to which Soviet military leaders can subject their decisions to party control without losing their professional integrity--for example, "in the middle of the Czechoslovak crisis in August 1968, the chief of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, General of the Army Kazakov, let himself be removed from his post 'for health reasons.' "

1253
Rapoport, Anatol. CLASSIFIED MILITARY RESEARCH AND THE UNIVERSITY. Humanist, v. 29, Jan./Feb. 1969: 4-10. BL2700.H78, v. 29

An argument against university participation in classified military research, followed by comment from several professors. Alfred de Grazia, Henry M. Pachter, and Ernest Van den Haag criticize Rapoport's assertion that classified military research hinders the realization of the university ideal--a community of scholars dedicated to the pursuit of truth. Only Raoul Naroll supports Rapoport's position by arguing that in peacetime the university should conduct only Defense Department research that does not interfere with the free marketplace of ideas.

1254
Rosenberg, Milton J. THE DRIFT TOWARD DOOMSDAY: BLIND STRATEGY OF MISSILE DEFENSE. Nation, v. 208, Feb. 10, 1969: 168-174. illus.
AP2. N2, v. 208

The current debate over U. S. deployment of the ABM reflects the characteristic unwillingness of the Nation's military strategists to consider the political and social consequences of new weapons projects. Aside from the questionable technical capabilities of the proposed Sentinel system, there is good reason to believe that its deployment will prompt a dangerous escalation of the arms race and retard any possible progress toward the conclusion of effective arms limitation agreements. Moreover, a U. S. ABM may lead Soviet analysts to conclude that America is aiming for a first-strike nuclear capability and thus increase tensions between the two nations. It could also provoke the Chinese Communists into retaliatory actions and, if supplied to America's allies, could eventually lead to their acquisition of offensive nuclear weapons. By consuming precious resources, the Sentinel and its complementary shelter-building program "will not only exact vast human cost from the socially neglected" but also increase the danger of "full domestic conflict." If the Sentinel and similar future monstrosities are to be blocked, the American public and more courageous Congressmen must exert a greater influence on the formation of strategic policies, which in the past has been left "to the military, to the games-theory analysts and defense intellectuals, and to hawkish Congressmen busy building their quick careers."

1255
Rosenberg, Milton J. SAFEGUARD: PUBLIC RELATIONS AS A WAY OF DEATH. Christian century, v. 86, Apr. 16, 1969: 508-512.
BRl. C45, v. 86

President Nixon's announcement concerning the Safeguard system calmed an uneasy public but squandered a major opportunity to freeze the arms race. The Safeguard system has the basic flaws of the Sentinel system: It has only a limited defensive capability and will be obsolete when deployed. Moreover, the President's assurances that the Russians will not mistake the Safeguard's purpose and that the Sentinel will never be used for city defense are questionable. The ABM's basic appeal results from the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) and vice versa. The interaction of ABM's and MIRV's threatens to escalate the arms race, destabilize the "delicate balance of terror," and increase the risk of thermonuclear war. The Nation must "strive vigorously and creatively for arms control and for ultimate disarmament while still searching for a true political settlement between the great powers." The attempt to defeat the ABM represents the desire to turn disillusionment into hope; if ABM deployment can be halted, a beginning will have been made.

1256
Rothstein, Robert L. NIXON'S ABM: VERY THIN INDEED. New republic, v. 160, Mar. 29, 1969: 15-18.
AP2. N624, v. 160

Discounts the Nixon administration's arguments that the ABM "will protect us from accidental attacks, from a Chinese attack within the next decade, and from a direct Soviet attack against our land-based retaliatory forces." Nor is the contention that the ABM will serve as a bargaining point in negotiations with the Soviet Union convincing. In the author's view the most likely explanation for the decision to build the ABM is one that has not been publicly stated, that of making possible "limited nuclear reprisals" in situations short of total war. The weakness of this strategy is that it presupposes continued American military superiority in order to be effective, a condition that is unlikely to last. Because of its present strategic inferiority, the Soviet Union must respond to deployment of the ABM by increasing its own defenses. The time is therefore ripe for a "prudent gamble" on the part of the United States since it would be risking little and may gain much.

1257
Rothstein, Robert L. REFLECTIONS ON THE ABM DECISION. New republic, v. 160, Mar. 22, 1969: 19-21.
AP2. N624, v. 160

The ABM decision reflects the difficulty in successfully opposing defense policies that are backed by the military and their supporters on congressional committees that deal with military affairs. In many ways the position of the military is understandable, for they have been trained to protect the homeland and build the best possible fighting force. For them perhaps the ABM represents not only a chance to limit damage in the event of an attack but also an opportunity to restore some degree of normalcy to the strategic environment, which was radically changed by the advent of offensive nuclear weapons. The military may feel that the ABM, by reducing the dangers of escalation, would give the United States "greater freedom in handling future Koreas." The military backing of the ABM also represents their propensity to seek technological solutions to strategic problems. However, weapons development alone cannot guarantee national security in a nuclear environment, for there is always the fear that their effectiveness will be undermined by new technological advances. Ultimately "there are only political solutions to the problems created by nuclear weapons." The introduction of new military hardware often serves only to destablize the situation; while it can be argued that no reasonable statesman would risk nuclear war, it is also true that "the characteristics of the available military systems surely condition the nature of decisions taken."

1258
RUSSIAN SCIENCE POLICY. Nature (London) v. 221, Jan. 25, 1969: 307-308. illus.
Q1. N2, v. 221

A summary and critique of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's forthcoming report on science policy in the Soviet Union. The report covers central planning and organization, manpower, higher education, and the relationship of science to industry. Trends toward greater autonomy for firms and research institutions and more investment in research and development were discovered, as well as a considerable increase in the quantity and quality of personnel engaged in scientific work. On the other hand, Soviet science suffers from a major weakness in the generally low quality of teachers and is also faced with the problem of resolving the tensions between centrifugal and centripetal, and ministerial and academic, approaches to organization. Moreover, it must come to grips with the challenges posed by the competition for resources among consumer industries and ambitious space and defense projects; the growing

complexity of the Soviet economy, which has rendered simplistic and authoritarian planning methods ineffectual; and the progress of industry beyond the stage where it is still possible to proceed by imitating the West.

1259
Shoup, David M. THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM. Atlantic monthly, v. 223, Apr. 1969: 51-56.
AP2.A8, v. 223

America has become a militaristic nation: It possesses an immense military establishment, millions of patriotic and frequently bellicose citizens, and a gigantic defense industry. This militarist culture, created by the exigencies of World War II and nurtured by the Korean War, became an accepted part of American life during the cold war years. It feeds upon the basic appeals of anticommunism, national defense, and patriotism and is inspired by vast amounts of money, military research, and the concepts of Defense Department-supported think tanks. At the root of this militarism is the professional military--"probably one of the best organized and most influential of the various segments of the American scene." The high-ranking professional's sense of duty enables him to plan defense policy more effectively than his civilian counterpart; fierce interservice rivalries, the threat of Communist aggression, and the frequent promotions that result from combat motivate him to involve his country in military ventures. In addition, veterans organizations and a powerful complex of defense industries encourage America's militarism, which "is in full bloom and promises a future of vigorous self-pollination--unless the blight of Vietnam reveals that militarism is more a poisonous weed than a glorious blossom."

1260
THAT ANTIMILITARY MOOD [editorial] Life, v. 66, Mar. 21, 1969: 38. AP2.L547, v. 66

The current antimilitary mood in the United States is healthy but dangerous. While "it reflects the restoration of a more balanced perspective after nearly two decades of unprecedented peacetime influence for the armed forces," it could easily damage America's defense posture and sap the military's strength and morale. The United States must maintain a strong defense establishment; military preparedness has kept the Nation out of war for nearly 25 years and reduced the frequency of cold war alarms. National confidence in the military could be enchanced if the selective service system were replaced with a more equitable one and U.S. defense needs were reassessed on the basis of America's foreign policy objectives.

1261
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPONSORED FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, second session. May 9, 1968. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 98 p.
P&GP RR

Investigates Department of Defense activities in sponsoring foreign-policy-oriented research. Testimony by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Directer of Defense Research and Engineering, is included.

1262
Walsh, John. ARMS AND THE SCIENTISTS: A LONG DIALOGUE CONTINUES. Science, v. 163, Mar. 28, 1969: 1436-1438. Q1.S35, v. 163

While the current debate over U.S. deployment of the Sentinel ABM system represents a new freedom in discussing the merits of a proposed military system that would not have been possible earlier in the cold war, it is not yet clear to what extent open discussion can actually affect the decisionmaking process. The scientific opponents of the ABM are all "products of the wartime incubator of statesmen of American science," who for many years have advocated a policy of finite containment and the conclusion of arms control agreements. In recent years these university scientists have had to compete with the "defense intellectuals" who surround top White House and Pentagon policymakers in an official advisory capacity. The latter tend to belong to the school of infinite containment and generally have a greater impact than the academic experts upon the officials who are responsible for America's security. Fearing a technological breakthrough in weapons development by the enemy, these officials have traditionally opted for the policies that maximize the integrity of the U.S. deterrent. Yet the furor in Congress created by the academic dissenters on the ABM issue seems to imply that they may have at least a limited effectiveness in decisionmaking.

1263
Witze, Claude. THE FIGHT OVER THE ABM: DEBATE OR WITCH-HUNT? Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Apr. 1969: 34-38. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Press reports and congressional debates reflect the emotionalism that characterizes the controversy over U.S. deployment of an ABM. The news media have repeatedly sided with the ABM opponents and have deliberately emphasized their arguments over those of their adversaries who have attempted to explain the need for missile defense. Too often congressional criticism of the ABM has been more demagogic than rational. Many Congressmen lashed out against the so-called military-industrial complex and even blamed it for the Nation's social and economic ills. Some went so far as to advocate nuclear parity with the Russians; most dismissed the ABM's importance to national security as pointed out by defense experts. In addition to representing a "general uprising against military opinion," the congressional outbreak was stimulated by the indignation of alarmed citizens over "the alleged peril of having nuclear weapons in the neighborhood."

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1264

Cukwurah, A. O. THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. Manchester, Manchester U. P.; Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., Oceana Publications [c1967] 267 p. maps.
JX4111.C8
Bibliography: p. 234-245.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. General: International boundaries. Delimitation and demarcation of international boundaries.--pt. 2. Boundary disputes: causes.--pt. 3. Settlement: Stability and finality as primary object of boundary settlement. Diplomatic settlement of boundary disputes. Arbitration and judicial settlement. Effectiveness of adjudication in boundary disputes.

Points out the legal distinction between an international boundary and an international frontier--that the first denotes a line, and the latter, a zone or the territory about the line. Cukwurah also stresses the difference between international and national boundaries and explains that only an island nation-state devoid of any overseas territories can be free from the international boundaries problem. Only pacific methods of settling boundary disputes are considered. The importance of international boundaries in international life has been growing rather than declining in recent years.

1265

Deml, Ferdinand. IS THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC AN ENEMY STATE? Central Europe journal, v. 16, Nov. 1968: 342-343.
DB200.7.S74, v. 16

The Soviet Union has dug up the "enemy state clause" of the United Nations Charter of 26 June 1945. This clause has long been obsolescent, but the Soviet action has caused a world-wide discussion. If articles 53 and 107 of the Charter were still valid, the wartime Allies, including Russia, might indeed claim the right to intervene in the German Federal Republic under any pretext, however flimsy. But the United States, Great Britain, and France have repeatedly declared that the two articles are no longer valid. One formal declaration was contained in similar letters from the three governments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In fact even the Soviet Union has for all practical purposes abandoned the right to intervention by the decree of 25 June 1955 terminating the state of war with Germany, and by the resumption of diplomatic [relations] with Germany. According to international law and historical usage there can be no exchange of ambassadors between enemy states. The United States, Great Britain, and France, now Allies of the German Federal Republic, have once more stated that they regard the enemy state clause of the Charter as obsolete, and that any Russian attempt to intervene in the Federal Republic would be regarded as an attack on a NATO ally. (Abstract supplied)

1266

Fenwick, Charles G. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1968. 1142 p. (Oceana book no. 366)
JX3110.F4F6
Bibliography: p. 133-135.

Partial contents.--Character and scope of foreign policy.--The community of nations.--Who speaks for whom in the world of nations.--National security: 1776-1920.--National security: 1920-1942.--The United Nations.--The rule of law under the charter, 1945-1968.--Responsibility of the state for the protection of aliens and their property.--Special obligations toward neighboring states.--Titles to territory; national boundaries.--The high seas.--Treaties and conventions.--Economic and social problems.--The settlement of international disputes: arbitration and judicial decision.--Forcible procedure by war.

Considers the major institutions of international law, their historical development, and their relevance to contemporary international relations. Fenwick discusses, among other things, the potential impact of the atomic bomb and the cold war on the future development of international law and points out that war has lost its legal character. Hostilities short of war such as the French-British Suez expedition of 1956, the American involvement in South Vietnam, and the 1965-66 intervention by the Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic are also discussed.

1267

Halderman, John W. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW; CHARTER DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND SITUATIONS. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1966. 248 p. JX1977.H23
Prepared in connection with the United Nations studies program of the Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--Scope of the "rule of law."--Disputes and situations involving charter law.--Attribution to United Nations of quasi-legislative and judicial authority.--"Collective measures" and "peaceful settlement" functions.--"Decisions" and "enforcement" in human rights cases.--Powers of Assembly and Security Council to apply collective measures.--Major sources of confusion: "recommendation," "permissiveness," "peace-keeping operations."--Legal versus political approach.

Argues that the rule of law in international relations could be promoted if the application of law in the U. N. handling of disputes and problems were improved. Halderman contends that principles and procedures for

handling such situations must be evolved if a secure peace is to be achieved.

1268
Meade, James F. THE GREAT TERRITORIAL SEA SQUABBLE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Apr. 1969: 45-53.
Vl. U8, v. 95

The difficulty of reaching general agreement on the proper breadth of territorial seas lies in the discrepancy between stated claims and the underlying values they are supposed to protect. Some claims appear to be manifestly disingenuous, such as the Soviet Union's pretention that a 12-mile limit is necessary to protect its coastal fisheries. Other claims bear little relation to reality: Libya, for example, insists on a 12-mile limit to safeguard fishing rights that are scarcely exercised. Several nations, particularly the Arab States and the Soviet bloc, have used territorial claims as diplomatic weapons, as in the Arab attempt to prevent Israeli use of the Gulf of Aqaba. American policy has been ambivalent, nominally insisting on a 3-mile limit but de facto acquiescence in more extensive claims. There is a need to formulate objectives that are both acceptable and attainable, among which the 3-mile limit appears to offer the most promise. Bilateral or multilateral talks are to be preferred over large multinational conferences as a means of achieving these objectives.

1269
Münch, Fritz. THE PSEUDO-STATAL REGIME. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Dec. 1968: 367-371.
DB200.7.S74, v. 16

Concludes a series of articles on the status of territory under military occupation and the mass expulsion of its inhabitants. The author presents an abundance of material to prove that it is not possible, according to international law and in the opinion of authoritative politicans, to consider the Munich Agreement null and void ab initio. Mr. Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was questioned about the Munich Agreement, replied that it was one thing to say that a treaty was unjust and quite another to say that it was never concluded. That would be a dangerous precedent for the sanctity of treaties. Likewise the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that during the war the Sudetenland was German territory. The Tribunal by no means held this true of countries which Germany did not acquire until during the war. That same military tribunal also decided that Germany's possession of the Sudetenland was the result of an international agreement and that the Munich Pact did not create a situation of belligerent occupancy subject to the restrictions of the Hague Convention. This refutes the frequently made assertion that the CSR has been in a state of war with the German Reich since the Munich Agreement. Münch also shows clearly that the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany cannot be regarded as a sovereign state. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1270
Revesz, Laszlo. [CHANGE IN THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGNTY] Wendung in der sowjetischen Souveränitätstheorie. Der klare Blick, v. 9, Oct. 16, 1968: 1, 4-5, 7. P&GP RR

Traces the development of the Soviet doctrine of sovereignty and points out the deemphasis in recent Soviet writings of the sovereignty of Socialist states except the Soviet Union. For interstate intrabloc relations the principle of "socialist internationalism," aimed at securing Soviet hegemony, takes precedence over the norms of general international law, especially when the question of following "general precepts" of socialism is concerned. This, the Soviet authors contend, is a collective matter of all Socialist states and cannot be left to their individual discretion. In their treatment of sovereignty outside the bloc, the Soviet writings underline its importance for the Third World's nations.

1271
Rumpf, Helmut. [CLASSIC OR PROTOCOLAR SOVEREIGNTY] Klassische oder protokollarische Souveränität. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Nov. 1968: 654-668.
D839.A885, v. 19

Considers the traditional concept of national sovereignty anachronistic because of growing supranational cooperation, which requires the deliberate and sometimes imposed renunciation of sovereign rights by states. Since sovereignty has lost a great deal of its classical substantive meaning, the notion of merely protocolar sovereignty should suffice to maintain interstate relations. Rumpf traces the evolution of the sovereignty concept from the time of the Congress of Vienna and discusses the development of the Soviet doctrine of sovereignty from Lenin's time until today.

1272
Schweisfurth, Theodor. [MOSCOW'S DOCTRINE AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM] Moskauer Doktrin und sozialistischer Internationalismus. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Dec. 1968: 710-719.
D839.A885, v. 19

Justification by Moscow of its intervention in Czechoslovakia has brought out anew the Soviet legal doctrine on the sovereignty of Socialist states designed to provide a legal basis for the Soviet Union's hegemonic position among them. The doctrine is based on a "specific interpretation of 'proletarian-socialist internationalism.' " Soviet jurisprudence has come to recognize principles of general international law--such as respect for sovereignty, nonintervention in internal affairs of other states, and nonaggression--as binding on all states, but in regard to relations between capitalist and Socialist worlds only. In the Soviet view the type of international law in use between capitalist states is inferior to that applied in relations between Socialist states. Socialist international law embodies adequate "democratic" norms of general international law. However, its dominant characteristics, the Soviets point out, are those rules derived from the principle of proletarian-Socialist internationalism that became normative through custom or through agreements and treaties between Socialist states or through international decisions and resolutions of Communist Parties. Socialist internationalism comprises the principles of "brotherly friendship" and "close cooperation" between Socialist states and the duty of each such state to act in accordance with the interests of the common Socialist world system. It also includes the principle of "brotherly mutual aid"--the right to obtain political, economic, military, or other help, and the duty to give it in the interest of the Socialist community of states. Soviet doctrine interprets the sovereignty of the Socialist state in terms of the Socialist world system, "collectively"; it decidedly rejects an "individualistic" interpretation of it--the one made from the standpoint of individual national interests. The doc-

trine limits the sovereignty of Socialist states internally by prohibiting them from changing their socio-economic structure and externally by forbidding them to withdraw from the community.

1273
White, Irvin L. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INTERNATIONAL LAW-IN-ACTION: A PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL. International studies quarterly, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 46-69. D839.B2, v. 13

Suggests that an analytic framework based upon a modified majority-rule principle provides the best method for determining empirically "what the international law-in-action on any particular international legal problem is at any particular time."

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1274
Barišić, Marijan. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SUPERPOWERS. Revue of international affairs, v. 20, Jan. 5, 1969: 14-19.
D839.R4, v. 20

Recently U Thant stated explicitly that the use of force in international relations has assumed such proportions that it constitutes a direct threat to the very existence of the United Nations. As examples he cited the Vietnam War, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and other alarming phenomena. The weakness of the United Nations also became evident in the disarmament negotiations, where bilateral dealings between the superpowers are gaining ground and are pushing the United Nations into the background. The victims of the forcible interventions were mainly the small and middle-sized nations, and the interventions prompted many delegates to reaffirm their support of the U. N. Charter, which condemns the violation of the people's right to self-determination, sovereignty, and independence. In an attempt to strengthen the United Nations, the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Harmel, and others have appealed to the great powers to renounce their right of veto and thus increase the effectiveness of the U. N. Security Council. Nobody expects an early achievement of disarmament, as the sociopolitical prerequisites for it are still lacking, but the United Nations has been instrumental in some partial achievements. Hence there is still hope that the United Nations can bring about a world disarmament conference in which all countries would participate. Broadly conceived international gatherings may lead to prompt and effective action toward disarmament and the development of a collective security system. In the United Nations a new constellation becomes more and more evident, with the two superpowers on one side and all the other nations on the opposite. If the superpowers continue to achieve understanding between themselves outside of the United Nations, the other countries may also decide to consult on their own, but with the purpose of furthering the role of the United Nations in promoting multilateral democratic international relations.

1275
Beichman, Arnold. THE OTHER STATE DEPARTMENT: THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS; ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY. Foreword by Leland M. Goodrich. New York, Basic Books [1968] xxii, 221 p.
JX1977.2.U5B43 1968
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--The UN and American foreign policy.--The United States mission--its legal structure.--The UN and multilateral diplomacy: social and political--USUN and how it functions.--The Assistant Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission: who rules?--Henry Cabot Lodge, 1953-1960.--The USUN Chief.--Adlai Stevenson, 1961-1965.--Arthur J. Goldberg.--The early days.--Congress and USUN.--State Department and USUN: who, whom?--Organization charts.--Index.

Explores the roles of the U.S. Mission Chief to the United Nations and the U.S. mission to the U.N. (USUN) in relation to the U.S. Government, public opinion and press media, U.N. delegations, and special-interest groups and shows that USUN has almost as many involvements in the course of its operations as does the State Department. Beichman concludes that USUN has become a direct participant in foreign policy formulation within the State Department and that over the years the mission has achieved some measure of autonomy.

1276
Cousins, Norman. THE EISENHOWER LEGACY. Saturday review, v. 52, Apr. 12, 1969: 30, 95.
Z1219.S25, v. 52

General Eisenhower's advice on the military-industrial complex and his belief in world peace through world law are especially significant today. The influence of America's defense establishment has become more pronounced; almost everyone benefits from preparations for war. However, since only peace offers defense in a nuclear age, "a degree of world organization far beyond the present capacity of the United Nations" is needed--"specificially . . . a U.N. with law-enforcing authority in matters directly related to world security." Achieving world law may be difficult, but trying to get by without it may be even more difficult and explosive.

1277
Folin, Jacques de. [THE INTERNATIONAL EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS] Les organisations internationales européennes et les relations entre l'est et l'ouest. Politique étrangère, v. 33, no. 5, 1968: 491-526.
JX3.P6, v. 33

Four international European organizations, one universal, the other three Western in character, are endeavoring to promote or consolidate détente by developing commercial, cultural, and technical relations between Western and Eastern Europe. Each organization has its own methods, objectives, and geographical composition. But all have one common goal: to put into operation an international system to weaken or even erase the divisions in Europe. The author assesses the results of these endeavors, which depend on the nature of each organization. In the spring of 1968, some interesting possibilities were brought to the forefront after years of cold war. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia what can happen? The development of technical contacts between East and West has the advantage of not depending too much on political factors. One can witness even in difficult circumstances an amelioration of relations between the two parts of Europe in which the East cannot see systematic attempts of infiltration or subversion. The efforts of the international European organizations are not always spectacular; however,

they are necessary for détente. (Abstract supplied, translated)

1278
Gordenker, Leon. THE 'NEW NATIONALISM' AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. International studies quarterly, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 31-45.
D639.B2, v. 13

"An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in March 1968 at Washington."

Defines "new nationalism" as "current doctrines and policies which give overwhelming importance to the development of legally existing states, rather than to any cosmopolitan or transnational movement or institution," examines its effect upon international organizations, and concludes that it could reduce international cooperation and inhibit the activity and growth of such organizations.

1279
Hasluck, Paul. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 39, Oct. 1968: 411-416. illus.
JX1162.A33, v. 39

Address delivered to the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 9, 1968.

Asks whether recent hopes for world peace were illusory, considering the Soviet invasion of Czechslovakia and its adverse effects upon disarmament, diminishing international assistance for economic development, the unresolved conflicts in the Middle East and Vietnam, and the racial problems in Africa. Hasluck argues that international cooperation would be advanced if nations were to observe the U.N. Charter.

1280
Hoagland, Hudson. TECHNOLOGY, ADAPTATION, AND EVOLUTION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Jan. 1969: 27-30. TK9145.A84, v. 25

The rapid progress of 20th-century science and technology has caused social maladjustments that are dangerous enough to threaten the survival and health of the human species. The two most serious dislocations are the world population explosion and nuclear weapons. The crucial question is whether man can adjust quickly enough to these new scientific and technological challenges. His one advantage in the struggle is his ability to evolve psychosocially rather than biologically, the former method being roughly a thousand times faster than the latter. Population can be controlled by increasing death rates or decreasing birth rates. Since the first alternative has no advocates, the solution must be found in birth control measures. Man now has the means to control his reproductive instincts but unfortunately too often lacks the motivation. Overpopulation is so serious a problem, however, that, if voluntary controls fail, more drastic measures will have to be introduced. If world population growth continues at the present rate, overcrowding may trigger a nuclear war, which will certainly solve the population problem, perhaps permanently. The most serious obstacle to a better world is man's own beliefs and values, which have not kept pace with the advance of science and technology. Man is a prisoner of his own limiting loyalties. He can overcome the grave dangers that threaten him in only one way: The nation-state must be disarmed and subordinated to supranational law, which will be promulgated and enforced by a world federal government.

1281
Wright, Quincy. THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. Notre Dame lawyer, v. 44, Apr. 1969: 527-547.
LL

Suggests that the foundation for an international system requires governmental understanding of actual and emerging world conditions, national commitment to the United Nations, and the maintenance and development of international law and organization. Wright concludes that governments must recognize that only a secure world will promote national security and that such a "world under both present and future conditions requires a general commitment to the image of an international world."

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1282
Preston, Adrian. CANADIAN NEWS-LETTER: CANADA AND THE CROSS-ROADS OF "PEACE-KEEPING." Army quarterly, v. 97, Jan. 1969: 159-165. Ul.A85, v. 97

The necessity to reappraise Canada's role as an international peacekeeper has been brought to light by the erosion of the concept of collective security in view of the great powers' capacity for mutual destruction, the failure of U.N. forces to prevent the Arab-Israeli War, the unification of Canada's Armed Forces, and a resurgence of nationalism. Although Canada showed little enthusiasm to participate in international military forces prior to World War II, its attitude changed with the success of the Allied coalition. A history of nonviolent anticolonialism and an essentially neutralist outlook seemed to make Canada peculiarly fit for a new role in world politics, that of middle-power peacekeeper, which brought with it more problems than expected, resulting in widespread criticism and impatience with techniques. Under the leadership of Lester Pearson, Canada offered various proposals to strengthen and centralize the peacekeeping machinery. These proposals notwithstanding, the ad hoc and improvised character of present arrangements may prove best in the long run. The decision to withdraw U.N. forces just prior to the Arab-Israeli War provoked severe criticism, and, coinciding as it did with the debate over unification, created serious misgivings over the effectiveness of such forces. These doubts are augmented by the "new mood of nationalism" and introspection sweeping Canada. It is in this context that a choice in defense policy must be made.

1283
Schofield, B. B. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE DEFENSE OF SHIPPING. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Mar. 1969: 36-41. Vl.U8, v. 95

Currently there is no effective arrangement to protect shipping against the threat of growing Soviet seapower. While it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would risk provoking a land battle by initiating a general war at sea, it is plausible that Russia may deploy its naval strength to intervene in local conflicts, which may result in the harassment of Western maritime forces. Convoys are still considered the best protection for trading vessels but are impractical for all shipping.

Therefore, arrangements are needed "to enable the necessary forces to be quickly deployed in those areas where the threat is sufficiently serious to make convoy mandatory." One possible solution would be the creation of a "Maritime Defense Organization," made up of all interested shipowning nations in the free world. Each member would contribute a quota of escort vessels and maritime reconnaissance aircraft in proportion to the size of its mercantile fleet. A supreme commander would be appointed to organize the forces for countering any attempt to interfere with shipping. Admittedly the proposal for the creation of a worldwide naval collective security organization requires further study, but there is too much at stake to delay much longer.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1284

Bagnall, Joseph A., comp. PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, A GRAND AND GLOBAL ALLIANCE; THE SUMMONS TO WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW. Minneapolis, Burgess Pub. Co. [1968] 172 p.
JX1974.7.B33
Bibliography: p. 147-172.

Partial contents.--Foundations for world peace: a chronology of accpmplishments, 1961-1963.--pt. 1. John F. Kennedy, the senatorial vow: "Disarmament"; address delivered at Washington, D. C., December 11, 1959.--pt. 2. John F. Kennedy, power and commitment: "A Grand and Global Alliance"; excerpt from the inaugural address, January 20, 1961.--pt. 3. Concordant views: "The Rule of Law for Nations"; delivered before the Academy of Political Science, New York, New York, April 13, 1959, by Richard M. Nixon. Treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons; text of a statement during signing in Washington, D. C., July 1, 1968, by Lyndon B. Johnson.--pt. 4. A dialogue of dissent: "Victory over Communism Must Come before the Achievement of Lasting Peace"; an address to the United States Senate, March 15, 1960, by Barry M. Goldwater.--pt. 5. Classroom discussion syllabus.

Addresses by John F. Kennedy that outline a worldwide peacekeeping structure based upon a foreign policy with profound long-range commitments. Concordant and dissenting viewpoints of other prominent Americans follow.

1285

Berezowski, Zygmunt. POLAND AND THE EMERGING NEW EUROPE. Poland & Germany, v. 12, Jan./June 1968: 3-9. DK418.5.GP55, v. 12

A worldwide emancipation trend away from the hegemony system that was imposed on Asian and European nations immediately after World War II portends an end to the superpowers' "monopoly in shaping world affairs." In Europe preservation of the Yalta system depends on the sheer preparedness of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to engage in hostilities at any time. It increases the nuclear war threat rather than adding to the Continent's security--a fact of which the people on both sides of the Iron Curtain are increasingly wary. Furthermore, it blocks Europe's unification, which, together with a transformation of the Continent's defense system, could really avert that danger. Yet Soviet imperialism, German irredentism, and the indifference of U. S. policy toward unification impede the removal of that barrier. Russia strives for the kind of German reunification that would give it control over all of Germany, but it is also seriously concerned about a potential renascence of Germany as the most powerful rival to Russia in Europe. German territorial claims and irredentism, which are still discernible in the Federal Republic's policies, only reinforce central and East European misgivings about the future of a reunited Germany. Germany with its prewar boundaries would inevitably regain its predominant position in Europe and upset the territorial equilibrium indispensable for the Continent's unification. Inviolability of the postwar frontiers, along with abatement of the superpower dual hegemony in Europe, is then clearly a prerequisite for the unification of Europe and the restoration of independence to all European nations. To this end run the Continent's evolutionary processes, overt and clandestine, now gathering strength on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Even within Communist parties themselves some sober-minded circles recognize the crucial significance of this force for the future of Europe. Poland's geographical situation implies danger against which it must seek security. Polish and Russian interests coincide in heading off the danger of eastward German expansion; they collide in regard to Russian ambitions for westward expansion, for the realization of these ambitions would seriously endanger the very bases of Polish national existence. "In this epoch of liquidation of empires, the Soviet Empire is an anachronism which must sooner or later be abolished."

1286

Boulding, Kenneth E. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE PEACE RESEARCH MOVEMENT. Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 43-58.
JX1974.A1A72, v. 1

The peace research movement involves approximately 200 social scientists who are concerned with applying the scientific method to the "problem of diminishing the incidence of war and increasing the incidence of peace in the international system." Drs. Hanna and Alan Newcombe, editors of the Peace Research Abstracts Journal, maintain that the movements' legitimacy, which has been established in the intellectual community by the quality of its people, has been established with the political leadership of no country but Sweden; the movement obtains grants from governments and foundations because of its participants, not because the donors particularly desire to foster peace research. The Newcombes assert that, although the movement has "not come out with an imposing set of conclusions for solving the world's problems," it has had an impact. Peace researchers have undertaken studies of the international system, crisis and conflict resolution, attitude change and human learning, the impact of war industry and disarmament on the economic system, and international law. The motivations of members of both the peace research movement and the peace movement--a movement of protest--are similar, but the two groups do not work together. At present, peace researchers are not engaged in studying either the peace movement or the effects of various types of peace action.

1287

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. PEACE AND POWER: LOOKING TOWARD THE 1970'S. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, winter 1968-69: 531-540.
D839.A85, v. 6
Reprinted from Encounter, Nov. 1968.
AP4.E44

"Unless thought is now given on how to construct a new framework for peace in the 1970s," international instability will be intensified in the coming decade. For the first time in its history the world will be confronted by two overlapping global military powers. Although the United States has softened its attitude toward the Soviet Union in recent years, Russia continues to condemn publicly the United States for its so-called imperialist ambitions. As the Soviet strategic capacity approaches U.S. levels, Russia may assume a more active world role, and the possibility increases of direct clashes between U.S. and Soviet intervention forces. Apprehension over possible intervention by one of the superpowers may even induce preemptive intervention on the part of the other superpower. To halt the current dangerous trends in international relations, steps should be taken toward forging "a community of the developed nations." By endeavoring "to define certain common objectives in the fields of development, technological assistance and East-West security arrangements," these nations may be able to overcome the nationalist and ideological rivalries that have characterized their relations. The Soviet Union would probably support the creation of formal links between Eastern and Western organizations because of its own pressing economic and technological needs and its desire to retain its influence with the East Europeans, who will inevitably be drawn closer to the West. As a tremendous world power with a tradition of global consciousness, the United States should strive to "convince the Soviet Union of the futility of its strategy of conflict in international politics" through a mixture of courtship and reciprocity and should attempt to stimulate mutual cooperation through the initiation of regularly scheduled informal conferences between the superpowers.

1288
Conte, Arthur. [IS FRANCE'S DIPLOMACY IN DANGER?] La diplomatie française en péril? Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 70, Dec. 1968: 52-56. H3.R4, v. 70

Surveys the world's tension areas, citing the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean as a primary factor of instability in the international community. Conte believes civilization is entering a serious crisis and concludes that France, with its long historical experience and high culture, can restore confidence and reestablish hope in world peace.

1289
Debré, Michel. THREE GREAT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES. Review of international affairs, v. 20, Jan. 5, 1969: 8-9. D839.R4, v. 20

The growing number of international crises and disputes proves that the international community is unable to create a just and peaceful system under which the rights and freedom of peoples would be duly respected. This situation and the lack of progress toward genuine and controlled disarmament are causing anxiety and fear of a general war. If peace is to be preserved, three principles must be observed by all states. First, the right of the people to determine their fate must be respected. France recognized long ago that great empires and reserved territories, maintained to preserve hegemony or based on power of arms, are an anachronism that the oppressed people are not willing to tolerate. Therefore France helped its colonies to achieve independence. The second principle is noninterference--the duty of nations to let other nations decide their government and way of life. Observing this principle, France condemned the intervention in both Southeast Asia and Czechoslovakia. Finally, the world must respect international law, whose essential provisions make up a code of behavior, the violation of which leads to situations endangering peace. Such a case occurred in the Middle East where the participants failed to abstain from threats and use of force and occupied foreign territories in clear violation of international law. France and Yugoslavia share the view that preservation of peace requires a coordinated effort of the great powers to solve international disputes before they develop into general conflicts. These disputes should be settled by the United Nations, provided the provisions of its charter are honored. Both countries appreciate the U. N. effort to promote international cooperation and restrict the effects of dispute, and both are ready to contribute--together or individually--to progress toward world peace.

1290
Dobrowolski, Stanisław W. THE WESTERN INTEGRATION PROCESSES AND THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. Polish Western affairs, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 104-127. DK443.P618, v. 9

Traces postwar efforts toward the political, economic, and military integration of Western Europe. Dobrowolski considers the development so far of the Western European Union, the European Economic Community, and NATO of questionable value for East-West accommodation in Europe and consolidation of European peace and security. He does not rule out that some integration processes, particularly economic ones, might prove useful for a collective security system in Europe.

1291
EUROPEAN SECURITY. New times, no. 13, Apr. 2, 1969: 1-3. D839.N483, 1969

The idea of a European conference originated at the 1967 meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Bucharest, where the main areas of the effort to strengthen European security were outlined: promotion of good-neighbor relations based on the peaceful coexistence of sovereign states, dissolution of all military alliances in Europe, prevention of West Germany from gaining access to nuclear weapons, recognition of the present European frontiers, and a German peace settlement recognizing both Germanys as sovereign states. The idea was presented again in the appeal issued at the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's Political Consultative Committee on March 17, 1969, because now is the time to get the conference under way. The appeal stressed that all European countries including both Germanys must participate because, nothwithstanding their differing social structures, all have common interests. The essential conditions for the endeavor are the inviolability of existing borders, recognition of East Germany as a sovereign state, and West German renunciation of its claims to West Berlin. No attempt must be made to change the Socialist system in the East European countries. The Soviet Union has approved the appeal and insists on an early meeting of the representatives of the European states to prepare for the conference.

1292
Hacker, Jens. [THE "GERMAN CONFEDERATION"; AN INADEQUATE MEANS FOR A RESTORATION OF A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ALL-GERMANY] Die "deutsche Konföderation." Ein untaugliches Mittel

für die Wiederherstellung eines freien und demokratischen Gesamtdeutschlands. Parlament, v. 18, Oct. 19, 1968: suppl. B 42/68. 30 p.
D839. P3, v. 18

Considers that existing Western and Eastern plans for German confederation are unrealizable because of the incompatibility between the sociopolitical systems of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. Hacker analyzes the meaning of confederation under international law and discusses at length various East German plans for and Western concepts of a confederated Germany.

1293
Italiaander, Rolf, comp. [PEACE IN THE WORLD, BUT HOW? THOUGHTS BY WINNERS OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE. WITH A PREFACE BY CARL FRIEDRICH VON WEIZSÄCKER] Frieden in der Welt, aber wie? Gedanken der Friedens-Nobelpreisträger. Mit einem Vorwort von Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Stuttgart, J. Fink, 1967. 119 p. (Politikum-Reihe, Bd. 15) JX1963. I78

Partial contents.--There is no alternative to peace, by Rolf Italiaander.--Development of the peace movement, by Bertha von Suttner.--Brotherly chain around the whole world, by Fridtjof Nansen.--Germany after World War I, by Gustav Stresemann.--Elements of durable peace, by Arthur Henderson.--The false religion, by Viscount Robert Cecil of Chelwood.--The overcoming of nationalism, by Emily Greene Balch.--The Quakers and peace, by Henry J. Cadbury.--Science and peace, by Lord Boyd Orr of Brechin.--The United Nations Organization and world peace, by Ralph J. Bunche.--Guilty of inhumanity, by Albert Schweitzer.--Three focal points, by George C. Marshall.--No peace without freedom, by Lester B. Pearson.--Africa, fraternity and freedom, by Albert John Luthuli.--Nuclear dangers, by Linus Pauling.--Nonviolence as a moral force, by Martin Luther King.--Who received the Nobel Peace Prize, by Rolf Italiaander.--Conferment of the peace prize after 1945, by August Schou.

Collection of essays on the need for and ways toward permanent world peace.

1294
Konstantin, Prince of Bavaria. [GERMANY'S STRATEGY] Deutschlands Strategie. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Sept. 15, 1968: 436-439.
U3. W38, v. 12

Suggests that the solution to the partition of both Germany and Europe can be found only through supranational processes that may restrict the German Federal Republic's leeway in the conduct of its foreign policy but that in the long run will bring about hemispheric unification, on which a viable peace and security system can be built. Pursuit of that goal must not be inspired by the Continent's potential rivalry to the superpowers, for they will never allow such unification to occur as would challenge their hegemonical position.

1295
Major, Randolph. OSLO CONFERENCE ADVANCES PLANS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEMAKERS ACADEMY. World federalist, Dec. 1968/Jan. 1969: 3-5, 13. illus. JX1901. W825, 1968/1969

Outlines discussion at a conference of the Peacemakers Academy Committee and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway, November 14-17, 1968, concerning the "objectives, curriculum, and development of an academy for training in conflict resolution" and reviews conference recommendations to the Peacemakers Academy Committee and the future board of the academy.

1296
Pearson, Lester B. BEYOND THE NATION-STATE. Saturday review, v. 52, Feb. 15, 1969: 24-27, 54.
Z1219. S25, v. 52

Steps are urgently needed toward the creation of a world community in which the sovereign freedom of all states is subordinated to the universal goals of "peace, security, and progress." Existing international institutions demonstrate the growing need and support for greater worldwide cooperation, but states are still slow to relinquish sovereign power. While the political aspects of nationalism must be submerged in order to achieve international unity, the cultural traits of national groupings need not be obliterated. As demonstrated by the United Kingdom, a viable political structure can include different national societies. Thus trends toward political separatism must be discouraged, but the rights to cultural and social uniformity must be preserved.

1297
Seeland, Rolf. [APPEASEMENT; A METHOD FOR SOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS] Appeasement; Eine Methode zur Lösung internationaler Konflikte. Hamburg, E. Böhme, 1968. 156 p. (Schriftenreihe zur auswärtigen Politik, Bd. 6)
JX5475. S4
Bibliography: p. 152-156.

Partial contents.--Explanation of the notion of "appeasement."--Systematization of Neville Chamberlain's idea of appeasement.--Critique of Neville Chamberlain's idea of appeasement.--Runciman mission.--Appeasement and John Kennedy's peace strategy.

"Shows appeasement as a model of political action . . . applicable toward any state," regardless of era. Seeland discovers the influence of Chamberlain's ideas on President Kennedy's peace strategy toward the Soviet Union. He ascribes the failure of the prewar British appeasement effort toward Germany to the pursuit of the right idea by the wrong method.

1298
Siegler, Heinrich, Freiherr von, ed. [EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNIFICATION 1949-1968. DOCUMENTATION OF PROPOSALS AND POSITIONS] Europäische politische Einigung 1949-1968. Dokumentation von Vorschlägen und Stellungnahmen. Bonn, Siegler [1968] 435 p. (Dokumentationen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik eV.)
JN15. S47

Contents.--Chronological index of contents.--Index of sources.--Documentation.--Subject index of contents.

Gives the German texts of official pronouncements by the German Federal Republic, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, the Soviet Union, the European Movement, the European Communities of the Six, the Council of Europe, the European Political Community,

the European Political Union, the European Parliament, and their political leaders and representatives on European unification or the political unification of Western Europe. The collection includes documents reflecting the abortive efforts to create the European Defense Community.

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1299
Fenske, Hans. [GERMAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS] Deutsches Nationalbewusstsein. Mannheim, Pesch-Haus Verlag, 1967. 38 p. (Freiheit und Ordnung, Nr. 56) DD76. F39

Contents.--Crisis or renewal of German national consciousness?--What do the terms nation and people mean?--National feeling in older German history.--Change of meaning of the word nation into the modern concept of national.--Problems of the German nation-state in the 19th and 20th centuries.--Two basic positions of the present discussion.--Can history be of any help to us?--What must we do?

Underlines the German people's devotion today to the idea of the cooperative nation-state--one trying to solve problems in harmony or cooperation with other nations. Today's "German people is a community of common concern, not an absolute center of loyalty" as it was in the past. This new attitude is common to both West and East Germans and constitutes an important factor for German reunification.

1300
Fetscher, Iring. MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PEACE SECURITY. Modelle internationaler Ordnung. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Friedenssicherung. [Braunschweig, Internationaler Arbeitskreis Sonnenberg, 1967] 88 p. (Zwischen gestern und morgen, Heft 9) JX1963. F46

French, English, and German texts. Reprinted from Gesellschaft, Staat, Erziehung, no. 1, 1967. Bibliographical footnotes. JA86. G4, 1967

Surveys political concepts of securing peace, from those of Dante to the present. Fetscher considers such historical review and analysis relevant to the contemporary problem of finding an adequate model for a viable world order of permanent peace. He deems the approach of today's political science too narrowminded to deal properly with a problem of such magnitude and diversity.

1301
Graebner, Norman. COLD WAR ORIGINS AND THE CONTINUING DEBATE: A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 123-132. JX1901. J6, v. 13

Reviews recent literature dealing with the origins of the Soviet-American confrontation. Graebner notes that most historians accept World War II and its aftermath as the beginning of the cold war, and even those who prefer an earlier date agree at least that it entered a stage of new intensity at that time. The principal area of disagreement among historians has been the fixing of responsibility for the cold war. The orthodox American view, which blamed the cold war on Soviet expansionist policies and which was widely accepted--with a few notable exceptions--throughout the 1950's, has recently been challenged by revisionist historians who argue that American hostility and aggressiveness forced the Soviet reaction. The author concludes that the debate will be largely resolved only when one fundamental question has been satisfactorily answered: "Why did the United States after 1939 permit the conquest of eastern Europe by Nazi forces, presumably forever, with scarcely a stir, but refused after 1944 to acknowledge any primary Russian interest or right of hegemony in the same region on the heels of a closely-won Russian victory against the German invader?"

1302
Kielmansegg, Peter, Graf von. [INTRODUCTION. PT. 1: THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. CHAPTER ONE: THE JULY CRISIS] In his Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg. [Frankfurt am Main] Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion [1968] 747 p. map (Athenaion-Bibliothek der Geschichte) D531. K45

Bibliography: p. 697-722.

Partial contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The outbreak of the war. Chapter 1: The July crisis.

Probes into the basic causes of World War I to show that the ethos of the era and the contemporary system of military alliances made the outbreak of a major war in Europe inevitable. Kielmansegg stresses that colonialism and nationalism contributed to a hypertrophy of interstate conflicts, which had to be decided by war as a legitimate instrument of policy, for in a prevailing view of the period, peace was not an autotelic good. Moreover, the general image of war lagged badly behind an imminent reality, and there were highly rational environmental reasons favoring German efforts to seek a political settlement by military means. In historical perspective, World War I profoundly contributed to World War II, the permanent demise of Europe's political supremacy in the world, and the modern polarization of the world into two antipodal systems.

1303
Sombart, Nicolaus. [PEACE RESEARCH] Die Friedensforschung. Frankfurter Hefte, Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, v. 23, Dec. 1968: 821-828. AP30. F555, v. 23

Considers doctrines underlying or determining peace research from the time of Comte until the present. Sombart sees in the institutionalization of peace research a danger of its becoming "an alibi for people who arm in order to be able to disarm."

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

1304
Bahr, Hans E., comp. [WORLD PEACE AND REVOLUTION; NINE POLITICAL-THEOLOGICAL ANALYSES] Weltfrieden und Revolution; neun politisch-theologische Analysen [Reinbek bei Hamburg] Rowohlt [1968] 314 p. (Rowohlt Paperback, 65)
JX1952. B23
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Peace without revolution?, by Hans Eckehard Bahr.--World revolution as peace, by Sven G. Papcke.--Totalitarianism and imperialism in the year 1967, by Hans-Jürgen Benedict.--Pathology of organized peacelessness, by Dieter Senghaas. --Violence and social change, by Lewis A. Coser. --Lessons of a long, hot summer, by Bayard Rustin. --Schalom: Hebrew-Christian provocation, by Hans P. Schmidt.--Beautiful words beyond the fronts?, by Hans-Jürgen Benedict.--Herbert Marcuse and the prophetic tradition, by Hans Eckehard Bahr and Hans-Jürgen Benedict.

Considers factors conducive to peace or revolution in both the historical perspective and contemporary reality. Senghaas underlines the irrelevance of deterrence in the modern age and considers questions of arms control and disarmament.

1305
Beaufre, André. SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL. Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 27-41.
JX1974. A1A72, v. 1

Nuclear weapons can create stability or instability. A situation exists today in which neither superpower has a first-strike capability and both have assured destruction capabilities. Those who challenge the stabilizing role of the nuclear balance believe nuclear weapons cannot have a stabilizing influence and that it is immoral to base peace on dangerous weapons. The latter is a sentimental argument that is unrealistic, while the former is the result of outdated information that fails to take into account the second-strike capability. There are, however, two destabilizing elements: the development of a sophisticated intercept system and the proliferation of nuclear decision centers. The first element, unless it is totally effective, does not adversely affect the current mutual deterrence, but the second creates a grave danger of instability. A "democratization" of nuclear weapons, which would make the atom bomb a very cheap weapon, is very likely to occur in the 1980's, making "an effective system for nuclear arms control . . . absolutely necessary in the next ten to fifteen years." The problem of proliferation is political and requires political solutions; the technical solutions that have been offered cannot be realistically applied. Soviet-American attempts to achieve a nuclear monopoly, by favoring first the creation of allied nuclear forces and then the nonproliferation treaty, have been unsuccessful because of the growing independent nuclear power of France and Communist China and the failure to include in a nonproliferation treaty specific guarantees against conventional as well as nuclear aggression. Attempts at disarmament measures to stabilize the nuclear environment must be viewed in light of national disarmament policies, which often reflect political motives rather than genuine arms control policy. When the United States had a nuclear monopoly the Soviet Union tried to influence public opinion for propaganda purposes by proposing sweeping and unrealistic disarmament measures, which the United States rejected. With the advent of the Chinese danger, however, the superpowers shared "common interests which should have led to more substantial agreements. But cold-war aspects remained dominant because of Germany and Vietnam." Today the superpowers are working together to control proliferation. Despite the generous initiatives and the rapprochement between the superpowers, disarmament remains charged with hidden propaganda motives. However, the prospect of proliferation must lead to a new disarmament policy that will provide for an agreement between the nuclear powers in conjunction with the nonnuclear states and establish an international system of control.

1306
Bretnor, Reginald. DISARMAMENT: DEADEND AND DETOUR. Michigan quarterly review, v. 8, winter 1969: 33-42. AS30. M48, v. 8

Efforts to end war will be more successful if they are directed toward deactivating the warmaking mechanism of nation-states rather than toward negotiating disarmament agreements. To disarm a technological society is impossible; the weapons of sovereign nations can be limited only through self-imposition and lack of economic resources and of scientific and technical knowledge. But more importantly, weapons do not cause war; they simply provide the instruments to wage it. Statesmen, whose power is derived from and sustained by conflict, wage war and, therefore, must relinquish the right to make war; they must denounce war as an instrument of policy by making it constitutionally illegal. A law to ban war should be demanded of every nation and should be a requirement for U.N. membership. Its general adoption would "lead inevitably to a greater openness in international relations . . . [and eventually] would achieve the declared goal of 'disarmament.'" Another condition for U.N. membership should be the recognition of the principles of limited "world citizenship." The creation of a world citizenship would reinforce the steps taken by individual nations to deactivate their warmaking mechanisms without affecting their national sovereignty. Membership in this world citizenry should represent "as wide a spectrum of human knowledge and endeavor as possible, and not only men whose reputations come from cooperation and creative effort, but also those who have risen through direct competition with their fellows." In the United Nations, world citizens would serve as a permanent panel of respected arbiters "upon whom disputing nations could call, agreeing to abide by their conclusions." The renunciation of war in domestic law and the principles of world citizenship are goals worth pursuing; "if half of the effort . . . expanded in the past fifty years of fruitless talking about disarmament had been devoted to them, both 'disarmament' and a durable world organization might already have been achieved."

1307
Buchan, Alastair [interview] CAN U.S. QUIT AS "WORLD POLICEMAN"? U.S. news & world report, v. 66, Feb. 17, 1969: 48-51. illus.
JK1. U65, v. 66

Comments on the major foreign policy issues now facing the United States--the Vietnam War, the arms race, ABM deployment, NATO, U.S. relations with the underdeveloped countries, Soviet-U.S. rivalry in the Middle East, and, above all, the limits of American power. Buchan argues that satellite monitoring

systems offer the Soviet Union and the United States a priceless opportunity to reach an agreement that restricts the level of their strategic arsenals, but he warns that this opportunity will be lost with the deployment of MIRV's, which will make it impossible to use satellites to get "an accurate inventory of the size of . . . main strategic forces." The deployment of ballistic missile defenses will also make agreement more difficult. The likelihood of a conflict involving major powers is somewhat less today, but in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans the potential for violence is as great as ever. The best that the United States and other developed countries can do is to prevent "expensive and dangerous hardware" from being introduced into these regions.

1308
Czernetz, Karl. [EUROPE AND THE PEACE] Europa und der Frieden. Wien, Europa Verlag [1968] 264 p.
D1060.C9

Contents.--Preface.--For Europe's unity: European consciousness. Europe's unity. Europe's unity and the peace. Austria needs Europe. How much does non-Europe cost us? Europe and the neutrals. Europe's responsibility.--For the world's peace: Development of Austrian foreign policy. Martial spirit of dictatorships. Balance of war threat. Armistice in the cold war? What chances has peace? New strategy and old politics. The world without Kennedy. Revolutionary billions. America and Russia. The International's peace message. Austria in a new phase of world politics. Israel--justice and peace. For peace in Vietnam. Awakening--to what?--About the author.

Inquires into the role and political identity of Europe between nuclear giants and into the mission of neutral Austria in Europe. Czernetz sees in continental supranationalism--unity based on the preservation of the plurality of peoples and cultures--the best future for Europe. Austria has no chance to become ideologically neutral, but it can make an important contribution to a relaxation of tensions and to a consolidation of peace in Europe by playing the role of a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe.

1309
Dirks, Walter, comp. [PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. TRANSLATED FROM THE DUTCH BY HUGO ZULAUF] Friede im Atomzeitalter. Aus dem Niederländischen übers. von Hugo Zulauf. Hrsg. von Walter Dirks. Mainz, Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag [1967] 94 p. (Grünewald-Reihe)
BX1793.A26D55

Translation of Met Pacem in Terris onderweg.

Points to the encyclical "Pacem in terris" as presenting ways to remove international tensions between democratic and Communist countries and between rich and poor nations. Dirks considers also measures of unilateral disarmament as possible means to that end and refers to several such steps already undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union.

1310
Neild, R. R. WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO DISARMAMENT? ANNUAL MEMORIAL LECTURE, APRIL 1968. London, David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies [1968] 20 p. (David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. Annual memorial lecture, April 1968).
JX1974.N4

Although the arms race continues, "disarmament has almost been abandoned as a seriously discussed objective of policy" in recent years, despite the partial test ban treaty, which is essentially a "clean air bill," and the nonproliferation treaty, which is not a disarmament measure since it seeks only to perpetuate the nuclear monopoly of the status quo. Perhaps the most important reason for the declining interest in disarmament has been the loss of intellectual leadership. Older intellectuals who once pressed for disarmament have lapsed into silence while younger ones "have been sucked into the military business" and are increasingly "involved not in questioning what should be done about the arms race . . . but in devising the new weapons and new moves in the arms race." The problem with the thinking of these new strategists "is the way in which moral and political values are handled--or ignored." Cost analysis, systems analysis, and game theory are represented as objective methods of research and problem solving, but since in practice it is impossible to separate facts from values--especially if more than a narrow technical question is involved--these methods only obscure the implicit values of the strategists. The game theorist determines the solution to a problem in advance by abstracting from consideration all moral and political concerns but fails to substitute any meaningful values. The intellectual's acceptance of the strategic status quo is partly due to the tendency to focus on short-term, limited problems--a practice that inhibits the evaluation of long-term effects of decisions arrived at individually. This critique of the military-industrial-intellectual complex must be qualified, however, by recognizing that these militarist doctrines developed mainly during the Kennedy administration and that reaction to President Johnson's Vietnam War policy and to militarism in general appears to be increasing. Little is known about the direction of thinking in the Soviet Union, but a number of lesser powers have recently taken a more independent position on disarmament, which it is hoped will be Britain's course.

1311
Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S. U.S. POSITIONS AT EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT NIXON. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 60, Apr. 7, 1969: 289-290. JX232.A33, v. 60

Text of a letter dated Mar. 15, 1969, from President Nixon to Gerard Smith, U.S. Representative to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Outlines the U.S. position on matters relating to the seabed, nuclear testing, fissionable materials production, chemical and biological weapons, strategic arms limitations, and nuclear and conventional arms reductions in general. The President stresses that "efforts toward peace by all nations must be comprehensive" and that there can be no progress toward arms control as long as "the policies of confrontation prevail throughout the world as the rule of international conduct."

1312
Rehm, Walter. [MILITARY ALLIANCES] Militärbündnisse. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Oct. 1968: 498-502.
U3.W396, v. 17

Alliances rest on a community of interests between the parties in either changing the status quo or preserving it. In modern times an alliance, whether offensive or defensive, may provide for the use of military means without formal declaration of war.

The general military concepts shared by parties, their common theory of war, and their common strategic planning are essential for the effectiveness of the alliance. A doctrine of equal partners professed by all alliance members when confronted with a claim to leadership by one or some of them usually causes intra-alliance tensions, as do differences in commitments between the parties, different perceptions of a threat of war, and different attitudes toward deterrence. However, the perfect alliance is never attainable. Alliances are of limited duration; even those designed to be permanent have expired after some time. The ones that endured in the form of a state, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United States, and the German Reich of 1871, did so because of exceptional circumstances and sometimes only after bloody self-assertion.

1313
Stanford University. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL; A CONTINGENCY STUDY, 1967-1976. Stanford, Calif., 1968. 2 v.
JX1974.7.S73

Prepared for the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Partial contents.--Introduction.--After Mao: alternative leadership types and their general policies.--Communist Chinese strategy and military capabilities, 1967-1976, and their implications for arms control.--Economic factors and arms control.--The external environment.--Leadership perception, response, and policy initiative.--Scenarios.--Communist China and the prospects for arms control in the next decade.

Assesses the various factors that are likely to determine Communist China's policies and views on arms control for the period from 1967 to 1976. Volume 1 summarizes the findings of the basic report contained in volume 2. Three scenarios are constructed on the basis of the projections of China's policy goals "to illustrate the arms control potentialities inherent under varying domestic Chinese and world conditions of high probability." From these scenarios it is concluded that the prospects for Chinese participation in arms control arrangements would be most favorable if Chinese leadership becomes less militant, if its progress in weapons technology is stymied, and, "if out of concern for her own security, the leaders of China are impelled by a crisis situation to initiate discussion of Western/Soviet-sponsored measures." Appended are lists of the top Communist elite at the beginning of 1968 and tables portraying economic projections and estimates for China.

1314
Stone, Jeremy J. ARMS CONTROL: WHERE IS IT? Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 111-117.
JX1974.A1A72, v. 1

Arms control is here "broadly defined as an attempt to establish limits on military strategy--on its expenditures, its weapons and its uses of them--by a greater emphasis on non-military values and on the long run." Nonproliferation is a major concern of arms control; nonproliferation efforts should be directed toward buying time and forestalling nuclear-weapons programs until a significant change in world attitudes occurs and further deferment of these programs can result. Another problem for arms control is missile defense. The arms controller must accept the forces of technology and politics, point them out to the involved parties, and try to ensure the avoidance of minor weapons competitions; moreover, he should attempt to slow the arms race and draw attention to other issues. Arms controllers should ensure that the military chooses new methods of deployment, which will "last for a relatively longer time with as few ill effects of changeover as possible." The scope of the problem must be recognized, arms control carefully planned, and progress measured "in ever-lengthening periods between revolutions of weapons deployment." Arms control must consider how to terminate nuclear wars. Its main interest here lies in encouraging further and more complete military investigation of this problem. U. S. arms control policy should be directed toward policing U. S. military policy in the Third World; for example, arms control interests in Vietnam should include the extent to which Hanoi is given an "out" by U. S. defense policy, the disproportion between U. S. threats and U. S. inducements, treatment of Vietcong prisoners, and methods of U. S. ground and air warfare. Arms control policy should reject the concept of the multilateral nuclear force: "Exploiting the fascination with nuclear weapons to build an alliance . . . seems a frivolous use of destructive power no matter how far-reaching the political arrangements sought," and such weapons systems result in an interplay between strategic and political issues, which makes their adoption or rejection complicated and politically and militarily disruptive.

1315
Wagar, W. Warren. THE OUTLOOK FOR MAN. Fellowship, v. 34, Nov. 1968: 9-14.
JX1901.F45, v. 34

The problems of war, poverty, and technocratic dehumanization cast a dark shadow over the future of man and civilization. War is the most immediate danger, and, as long as the nation-state continues to be the principle of political organization for the international community and nationalism remains the only locus of its emotional commitments, efforts to ensure peace through détente, arms control, or regionalism are futile. Poverty, which takes the form of an unequal distribution of the world's scarce resources between rich and poor in the United States and between developed and underdeveloped states in the international sphere, magnifies the danger of devastating wars. The problems here are truly formidable, and the unchecked growth of world population may render them completely insoluble. Meanwhile, almost nothing is being done to work out a solution. Unlike the first two problems, the growth of "technicism," with its almost irresistible demands for greater social discipline and organization, threatens "the survival not of Homo sapiens, the 'naked ape,' but of humanitas, of all in human life that gives value and meaning to the human person and to the Family of Man." Improved technical sophistication and behavioral science will exacerbate, not alleviate, this danger. Only a new world order superseding the nation-state and encompassing all of humanity offers a slim hope that mankind can escape from these dilemmas. Unfortunately, the generation of prophets of world civilization--Toynbee, Chardin, Jaspers, Northrop, and Mumford--has found too few disciples. Men today are still unwilling to make the necessary commitment to the "City of Man." For this reason, the task ahead is one of persuasion and conversion in a movement that must be worldwide and essentially religious. At the moment, the outlook for man is not encouraging, but, being men, we must not abandon all hope.

1316
Young, Elizabeth. [A REVIEW OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THE LATE SIXTIES, EDITED BY JAMES E. DOUGHERTY AND J. F. LEHMAN.] Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Dec. 1968: 29-31.
TK9145.A84, v. 24

Questions the validity of certain of the political assumptions common to most of the contributors but finds the book otherwise "honest, businesslike, fair, and only rather monotonous." The author considers the views expressed in this volume to be typical of the "American arms control community" and directs most of her criticism at what she takes to be fallacies in the thinking of that community. She specifically attacks an alleged preoccupation with maintenance of the balance of power, concomitant failure to consider the full range of possibilities for structural change in the international system, treatment of issues "by bits and scraps" divorced from "large and liberal ideas," disregard of moral and ethical categories of action, and insensitivity to history and larger political concerns.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

1317
Foster, William C. U.S. PROPOSES WORLDWIDE SEISMIC INVESTIGATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 60, Jan. 20, 1969: 58-64. JX232.A33, v. 60

Statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) on December 5, 1968, together with texts of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on December 20, 1968, dealing with the "Question of General and Complete Disarmament" and the "Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests."

Expresses U.S. support for General Assembly draft resolutions dealing with nuclear testing, chemical and biological warfare, and general and complete disarmament. Foster also outlines recent U.S. research on the seismic detection of underground nuclear explosions and proposes that a series of underground nuclear tests be conducted for the specific purpose of further advancing work in this field.

1318
Gt. Brit. Foreign Office. DISARMAMENT: THE PATH TO PEACE. London, H.M. Stationery Off., 1968. 39 p. JX1974.G625 1968

Partial contents.--Foreword.--Glossary of technical terms.--pt. 1. The British approach to disarmament. --pt. 2. Documents: Joint Statement by the United States and the USSR of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. Summary of the Western Plan for General and Complete Disarmament. Summary of the Soviet Plan for General and Complete Disarmament. Treaty banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial bodies. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty submitted to the UN General Assembly March 1968. Draft Resolution of the Security Council on Security Assurances proposed by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.--pt. 3. Chronology of events.

Presents the British view of the problems, ultimate goal, and best methods of disarmament as of April 1968. The necessity for a gradual approach to disarmament is stressed so as not to upset the present balance of power, which is the principal factor in maintaining peace.

1319
Zamiatin, L. M. TOWARD FURTHER PROGRESS IN SOLVING THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, Feb. 5, 1969: 6-7.
D839.C87, v. 21

Statement at a press conference held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Jan. 20, 1969.

Translated from Pravda and Izvestiia, Jan. 21, 1969. Izvestiia headline: "Concrete and positive program."

The favorable acceptance of the Soviet Government's Memorandum on Several Urgent Measures for Cessation of the Arms Race and for Disarmament by the 23d session of the U.N. General Assembly indicates that now is a promising time to put these measures into effect. Realizing this, the General Assembly recommended that the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament examine the memorandum, called for strict observance by all states of the principles and aims of the 1925 Geneva Protocol that bans the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, adopted a resolution on the urgent need to stop nuclear and thermonuclear tests, and called on all nations that had not yet done so to sign without delay the Moscow treaty that prohibits nuclear-weapons tests. The General Assembly welcomed the agreement reached by the Soviet and U.S. Governments in 1968 to begin talks on reciprocal limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means for the delivery of nuclear weapons, including defense systems. The Soviet Union is ready to begin serious talks on disarmament matters. It would like to counterpose the policy of aggression and provocation pursued by a group of nations--first and foremost the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany--with a policy of cooperation among states with different political systems. European security can be safeguarded not through an arms race but through peaceful cooperation, the attainment of the genuine relaxation of international tensions, and the settlement of international problems by peaceful means at the negotiating table. However, it must be understood that in view of the strengthening of aggressive NATO policies and military preparations the Soviet Union must consolidate the security of the Socialist countries and lend assistance to those peoples fighting for independence or defending themselves against the forces of aggression and war.

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

1320
Brennan, Donald G. A START ON STRATEGIC STABILIZATION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Jan. 1969: 35-36. TK9145.A84, v. 25

Early U.S. proponents of arms control and disarmament stressed the need to limit or reduce offensive forces but made no objection to plans to retain or expand active defenses. Since the early 1960's, however, opposition to active defense--in this case, ballistic missile defense--has grown. Critics of the ABM are convinced that the costs of deploying this new weapons system will outweigh any benefits. They tend to equate peace with a situation in which both superpowers possess an "assured destruction capability" and fear that the ABM will cancel this out for one or both of the antagonists. This attitude is not shared by the Soviet Union, and the resulting divergence of opinion between American and Soviet officials has made it more difficult for them to find a mutually acceptable way to stabilize the arms race. However, because of the decision to deploy the Sentinel system, dramatic improvements in defense technology, and a loss of faith in the "assured destruction" theory of deterrence, the American attitude may be changing toward greater acceptance of active defenses. If so, now is the time to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union for a ceiling on offensive forces. In this first step air and missile defenses could be ignored, but if it seemed desirable a limit could be negotiated on the rate of deployment of defensive missiles. At a later stage the ceiling on offensive forces could be revised downward. Success here would be greatly facilitated if both sides possessed substantial defense forces.

1321
THE CHANCES FOR AN END TO THE ARMS RACE. U.S. news & world report, v. 66, Feb. 3, 1969: 32-33. illus. JK1.U65, v. 66

The quick Soviet offer in January to begin arms control talks with the United States in the near future is indicative of the Soviet Union's desire to put the new Republican administration to an early diplomatic test as well as of its hope to relieve economic pressures at home and freeze the arms race at the present level of U.S.-Soviet parity. Nevertheless, in light of the mutual distrust that still exists between the two countries neither the Soviet offer nor the prompt U.S. reply gives much reason for optimism about the outcome of the proposed talks. Mr. Nixon has already been warned that the Soviet offer may be a trap to induce the United States to delay deployment of multiple warhead missiles. Some military men also fear that the talks may retard the buildup of NATO strength now deemed so vital after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The unsolved problem of inspecting and verifying arms control agreements still looms as a major obstacle to progress. Finally, many officials are dubious about Soviet willingness to make any of the concessions that would be necessary for the two sides to reach agreement. On the other hand, it is evident that the Soviet leadership is under great pressure from Russian consumers to reduce the military budget, and Clark Clifford has stated that with what is known of the foreign and domestic restraints on Soviet decisionmakers the United States can be "reasonably confident that their expressed interest in strategic arms talks is genuine." However, the new administration clearly intends to proceed with caution. The United States must carefully weigh the cost of sacrificing its overall lead in nuclear technology, particularly in the development of multiple warheads, against the advantage of a Soviet pledge to abandon plans to deploy as many as 2,000 ICBM's, which is double the number programed for deployment by the United States.

1322
Foster, William C. PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Apr. 1969: 413-421. D410.F6, v. 47
First article in a section on strategic weapons.

Progress in weapons technology together with economic and political factors not only emphasizes the necessity of measures to limit the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race but also has created a favorable climate for the conclusion of such measures. Today both superpowers' nuclear arsenals are geared to a second strike, thereby minimizing the temptation to initiate a nuclear attack. Unfortunately, several weapons systems are being contemplated that could make a first strike more attractive. Not only would this upset the existing strategic balance, but it would complicate the negotiation of arms control agreements by introducing uncertainties regarding the nuclear equation. While it may not be possible initially to negotiate a comprehensive "freeze" on weapons systems, step-by-step progress toward this goal is feasible. Once both sides realize the futility of attempting to attain nuclear superiority, they should be able to reach agreement on halting weapons development "at a level of 'mutual sufficiency.' " In addition to technical considerations, economic and political factors favor the conclusion of arms control agreements. While the Soviet Union and the United States are likely to remain distrustful of one another for some time, both countries appear to be interested in decreasing the costs and risks of the arms race.

1323
Froman, Lewis A., and Michael D. Cohen. THREATS AND BARGAINING EFFICIENCY. Behavioral science, v. 14, Mar. 1969: 147-153. BF1.B4, v. 14

A major focus of gaming research has been the effect of the availability of threat on the joint efficiency of play in variable-sum bargaining games. This research employs an experimental instrument designed to avoid the pitfalls pointed out by critics of earlier research in the area. The resulting data support the proposition that the availability of threat reduces bargaining efficiency. (Abstract supplied)

354-025 O - 69 - 6

1324
Kissinger, Henry A. THE VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Jan. 1969: 211-234.
D410. F6, v. 47
Reprinted in Survival, v. 11, Feb. 1969.
U162. S9, v. 11

Analyzes the reasons for the failure of American strategy in Vietnam, which was brought to light by the Tet offensive, and indicates some major problems in negotiating a settlement of the war. Kissinger finds that "the basic problem [of American strategy] has been conceptual: the tendency to apply traditional maxims of both strategy and 'nationbuilding' to a situation they did not fit." Guerrilla warfare is concerned with the control of population, not territory. The American concept of "secure areas" reflects a legalistic bias that fails to account for the reality of dual power that obtains in many areas. The Tet offensive became a watershed for American strategy by demonstrating that "there are no secure areas for Vietnamese civilians" and thus forcing a reevaluation of policy. Kissinger notes that each of the participants in the war must operate within its own limitations, material as well as psychological. Given these different perspectives, informal communications and agreement on basic goals acquire an added importance, a fact that is particularly apparent when the problems in achieving a cease-fire and establishing a coalition government are considered. The author concludes that the best procedure "may be to seek agreement on ultimate goals first and to work back to the details to implement them." The American objective should be to arrange for the mutual withdrawal of external forces in order "to create a maximum incentive for the contending forces in South Vietnam to work out a political agreement."

1325
Kraslow, David, and Stuart H. Loory. THE SECRET SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM. New York, Random House [1968] 247 p.
DS557. A692K7 1968

Partial contents. --pt. 1. Marigold: A toast to something worthwhile. -Picking targets at Tuesday lunch. -Diplomacy needs pizzazz. --pt. 2. Little gidding in Vietnam: Dean Rusk's antenna and U Thant. The three-month war. -Four, fourteen or forty. --pt. 3. Channels and phases: The inviting mood of Ho Chi Minh. -Wilson took it like a man.--Two letters to Ho Chi Minh. -The man in the white dinner jacket. -Summer channel, spring talks.

Chronicles the diplomatic efforts of the United States to launch a Vietnam peace offensive in 1967. The authors state that "the Johnson Administration missed opportunities over the years to secure, if not peace, at least negotiations; if not negotiations, at least talks." The question today is whether the United States can achieve better terms in a Vietnam settlement than might have been obtainable a year ago or even earlier.

1326
Louvish, Misha. THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. Jewish frontier, v. 36, Jan. 1969: 4-7.
DS149. A324, v. 36

The immediate aim of current Arab terrorism against the Israeli population and installations is "to compel Israel to withdraw her forces from the areas she occupied in the Six-Day War." Its ultimate aim is to destroy Israel by resuming the struggle against it from positions held before the war. Significantly, Arab terrorists are being trained and organized in Jordan with the help of regular Jordanian forces, Jordan and Egypt persistently refuse to enter into direct negotiations with Israel despite the latter's appeals, and Nasser has made it clear that no recognition of Israel and no final peace settlement can be expected from the Arabs regardless of what reasonable concessions Israel might be ready to make. Unable to dismiss the possibility of an all-out Arab attack, Israel must seek deterrence against such a threat by strengthening its own forces; "here the negotiations with the U. S. over the supply of the Phantom jets is of considerable importance." By their refusal to negotiate with Israel under United Nations chairmanship or indirectly through U. N. emissary Dr. Gunnar Jarring, Jordan and Egypt are responsible for the failure so far of the Jarring mission. The mission was established by a U. N. resolution that the two sides be brought together and be helped in reaching agreement. Israel clings to the faintest hope of a change in the Arab leaders' attitude. It knows that the vast majority of Arabs do not support Arab terrorist activities and want to live in peace. The overwhelming majority of Israelis oppose the yielding by Israel of occupied areas without a permanent peace settlement with the Arabs.

1327
Maevskii, Viktor. NOT AN EASY TASK, BUT A REALISTIC ONE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, Feb. 19, 1969: 14. D839. C87, v. 21
Condensed text of an article in Pravda, Feb. 2, 1969.
Slav Rm

Receives with appreciation the favorable response of the Western press to the statement on the Soviet Union's policy of disarmament, which was presented at a press conference in the U. S. S. R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 20, 1969. Maevskii emphasizes that the U. S. disarmament policy was extensively discussed within the U. S. Government, which adopted a positive approach. He feels that now, when the agreement on serious measures to curb the arms race and lessen the nuclear threat has become a realistic task, the time has come to start negotiations as soon as possible.

1328
Mathematica, inc., Princeton, N. J. MODELS OF GRADUAL REDUCTION OF ARMS [by Robert J. Aumann and others] Submitted to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Princeton] 1967. 2 v. illus. JX1974. M42
Includes bibliographies.

Partial contents. --Overview of the notion of "threat" and its relation to bargaining theories. --Overview of bargaining theories. --Overview of repeated game models. --Overview of proliferation models. --v. 2. The notion of "threat" and its relation to bargaining theories, by John P. Mayberry. --Bargaining theories: A generalized Nash solution for two-person cooperative games with incomplete information, by John C. Harsanyi. --Repeated game models: Repeated games with incomplete information--a survey of recent results, by Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler. A formal information concept for games with incomplete information, by R. E. Stearns. Discounted repeated games with incomplete information, by John P. Mayberry. --Proliferation models: Exploration of a stability concept for armed nations by means of a game-theoretical model, by Herbert Scarf. Security equilibria for a modified version of Scarf's deterrence model, by Reinhard Selten and Reinhard Tietz.

Reports the results of research into the use of mathematical models to elucidate the principles involved in negotiating arms control agreements. Problems of strict (zero-sum) and partial (non-zero-sum) opposition, coalitions, threats, incomplete information, and repetitive conflict situations are explored through the use of the mathematical theory of games. Practical negotiations generally involve a combination of several of these problems in a total situation too complex for comprehensive treatment by current analytical methods. However, additional research should produce more inclusive formulations, and, in the meantime, current results can be combined "intuitively" for use in practical situations.

1329
Young, Kenneth T. NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS; THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE, 1953-1967. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill [c1968] xv, 461 p. (The United States and China in world affairs) E183.8.C5Y6
Bibliography: p. 427-443.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. The setting. The Eagle and the Dragon; contact and impasse. Origins of contacts and negotiations.--pt. 2. Peking's initiatives rebuffed: The single agreement on the repatriation of civilians. Impasse over the renunciation of force and over Taiwan. Peking's proposals for bilateral contacts in 1956-57.--pt. 3. The Taiwan crisis, 1958: The ambassadorial talks in the outbreak of the crisis. Ten talks at Warsaw. The aftermath of the crisis.--pt. 4. Washington's initiatives rejected: Washington's initiatives in 1959-61. 1961-66; Asian crises and nuclear deadlock. Unsuccessful American efforts for bilateral contacts.--pt. 5. The negotiations appraised: Format and machinery. Appraisal of results and consequences. Confrontation--ideological, historical and emotional. Adversary negotiating with Peking. A look at the future.

Analyzes the relations between the United States and Communist China since the Korean armistice of 1953. Part 1 reviews the overall tone of the dealings between the two countries, which have been marked by harsh uncompromising attitudes on both sides. Although the exchanges between the Governments have consistently resulted in impasse, they at least have provided a useful facility "for exchanging views and notifying intentions." Parts 2 to 4 cover in chronological order the various contacts between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. The final chapters evaluate the framework and results of the Washington-Peking diplomatic exchanges. Young concludes that "in facing [the] arduous, complex, and long-suffering ordeal of 'adversary' negotiations with the Chinese Communists" the American negotiators should attempt "to reduce the emotional intensity of the love-hate syndrome in Sino-American relations and to become more objective and realistic about Chinese matters." Appended are the texts of several documents pertaining to the Sino-American exchanges.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

1330
Howard, E. M. CRISIS CONTROL--THE PROBLEMS OF LOCAL CONFLICTS. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Dec. 1968/Jan. 1969: 45, 47-50, 52. UA646.F5, v. 13

Illustrates the techniques of "crisis management" in local conflicts through a recapitulation of the major diplomatic events surrounding the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Howard concludes that the most important factor conditioning the crises of today is the nuclear balance of terror and that "crisis control is still a matter of old-style intelligent diplomacy, not of mathematical techniques."

1331
Pinckney, Thomas C. THOUGHTS ON THE LIMITATION OF WAR. Air University review, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1969: 79-83. TL501.A5574, v. 22

Discusses seven categories of limitations for the control of war suggested by Robert E. Osgood. While Pinckney does not question the importance of the three types of limitations that have received the most attention--geography, weaponry, and targets--he elects to focus on the remaining four--manpower, number of belligerents, intensity, and duration. He maintains that neither the number of troops nor the number of belligerents committed to a war is of decisive significance since an increase in numbers does not necessarily lead to escalation. The intensity with which a war is fought may or may not be significant depending on the geographical area affected. Duration is a key consideration, however; long war is disadvantageous both militarily and politically because it entails a sacrifice of the initiative and greater human cost than in a short war. The author concludes that duration is second in importance only to geographical considerations in preventing escalation.

2. Conventional Arms Transfers

1332
Engelmann, Bernt. THE WEAPONS MERCHANTS. Translated from the German by Erica Detto. New York, Crown Publishers [1968] 224 p. illus. HD9743.A2E563
Translation of Meine Freunde die Waffenhändler.

Report on arms trade businesses--individual, corporate, and governmental--in the fifties, with emphasis on supplies to North Africa and the Near East.

1333
Haahr, John C. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, May 1969: 12-21. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Defends the U.S. military aid program to Latin America by emphasizing that a new arms race does not exist in South America despite Peru's acquisition of French Mirage fighter aircraft. Haahr concludes with a list of recommendations to improve the aid program based on the threat of internal subversion in Latin America.

1334
Hasan, Zubeida. SOVIET ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN AND INDIA. Pakistan horizon, v. 21, fourth quarter, 1968: 344-355. DS376.P32, v. 21

When considered in the broad context of the cold war, the Soviet-Pakistan arms agreement appears to be a logical culmination of trends established in the early 1960's. At that time the pattern of rigid alinements that characterized U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1950's gave way to a policy of peaceful coexistence, and the

importance of Western-oriented military pacts to which Pakistan belonged receded. Moreover, India's crushing military defeat by the Chinese in 1962 demonstrated the hazards to the Kremlin of a one-sided Asian policy. Thus Moscow began to cultivate friendly relations with Rawalpindi. Disillusioned over the U.S. decision to grant large-scale military assistance to India, Pakistan responded positively to Russia's overtures and began moving toward a more neutral position in Southeast Asia. During this normalization period of Soviet-Pakistan relations, Russia abandoned its pro-India stance on the Kashmir issue and assumed a non-partisan role in mediating the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir. President Ayub Khan took advantage of Pakistan's growing friendship with the Soviet Union to complain of the massive quantities of Soviet arms supplied to India. The President considered the influx of Russian arms into India to be particularly menacing in the post-Tashkent period because the United States had terminated its military assistance to Pakistan in 1965. Finally, the Kremlin heeded Pakistan's warning of the dangers of the growing military imbalance on the subcontinent and in 1968 agreed to deliver arms to Pakistan. Even though Soviet leaders insisted that this action was not intended to jeopardize Russia's long-standing ties with India, the latter soundly denounced the move. While India publicly based its protestations on fears of Pakistani aggression, it was in actuality more disturbed by the change in Soviet policy that the arms agreement signified. Accustomed to a special relationship with Russia, India considered the neutral posture adopted by Russia toward India and Pakistan to be a victory for Pakistan.

1335

[ILLEGAL EXPORT OF WEAPONS FROM SWITZERLAND] Die illegale Waffenausfuhr aus der Schweiz. Flugwehr und -Technik; Arme et technique de l'air, v. 31, Jan./Feb. 1969: 15-18.
TL503.F625, v. 31

Reports on proceedings by Swiss Federal authorities against officials of the Oerlikon plant of a Swiss concern, Bührle & Co. A.G., for alleged illegal exportation of guns, munitions, and rockets to Israel, Egypt, and Nigeria.

1336

Miksche, Ferdinand O. [EFFECTS OF ARMS TRADE ON WORLD POLITICS] Auswirkungen des Waffenhandels auf die Weltpolitik. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Oct. 20, 1968: 494-495.
U3.W38, v. 12

Since the end of World War II the world has been spending an average of $165 billion yearly for armaments, which is only $21 billion less than its annual spending on that war. The Third World's annual share of $12 billion for armaments is twice as high as the average amount it receives yearly from Western treasuries for its own economic development. Total annual arms transactions with the Third World amount to at least $1.3 billion, but their real value must be $3 to $4 billion because arms are greatly undersold to those nations for political reasons. The United States supplies 60 countries in Asia, South America, and Africa with war materials valued at $450 million yearly, of which $300 million is for military aid. British and French arms trade with the Third World is predominantly commercial and amounts to $150 million and $200 million per year respectively. Annual arms transactions between the Soviet bloc nations and the Third World amount to $400 million, but their real value must be about one-third higher since production costs of arms are far lower in the Soviet bloc than in the West. As a rule Soviet sales, except those to Vietnam and Cuba, are designed to be economically profitable for the Soviet Union. Some of the Third World nations profitable by selling imported arms to third parties, although they are contractually prohibited from doing so. A genuine arms race in the Third World began in 1955 when the Soviet Union started to expand its influence through arms supplies. Until 1964 the race centered mainly around the quantity of weapons. Since then the emphasis has been to a great extent on quality and sophistication. Such a situation portends enormous risks for the world, and its solution depends almost exclusively on the world powers. As long as crisis centers in the Third World are being newly created by an arms trade that far surpasses economic aid to that area, it is unrealistic to believe in East-West détente.

1337

Smith, Adele. NORTH AFRICAN ARMS RACE. Atlantic monthly, v. 223, Feb. 1969: 20, 22, 24, 26, 28.
AP2.A8, v. 223

While public attention focuses upon the Egyptian-Israeli arms race, the four other north African countries are quietly stockpiling their arsenals. At present they are arming against each other to protect their borders and defend their national sovereignty, but their arms "could be combined in the cause of Arab unity in the event of another holy war with Israel." The Russians, Americans, and British, who have become the principal arms suppliers, would probably not become involved in a north African or Middle Eastern war, from which they would, however, benefit economically. The main actor in this weapons buildup is Algeria, which has acquired $250 million of Soviet equipment since 1964 as a response to a war with Morocco. Algeria has forced Morocco to respond to this weapons buildup, but the latter is spending only 12 percent of its budget on defense in comparison to Algeria's 24 percent. Morocco's preference for Western military aid displeases the Russians, who consider it strategically important. Libya's startling entry into the arms race probably resulted from fear of the Soviet buildup in Algeria and Egypt. Libya, which has signed a contract with Great Britain for a Rapier missile system and has pledged $1.135 billion for defense over the next 5 years, has no need for Russian aid; strategically it is not important to the Russians and, along with Tunisia, will probably be left alone. Tunisia, which would prefer to spend its resources for economic development, cannot ignore the weapons buildup of its neighbors; faced with the threat of Algerian aggression, it has obtained a military agreement with the United States.

1338

STOCKING THE ARSENALS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. Atlas, v. 17, Jan. 1969: 42-43.
AP1.A83, v. 17
Translated from Der Spiegel, Hamburg.
Newsp

Emphasizes the magnitude of the arms race in the Middle East. The article notes that the Americans, Russians, Czechs, and French have poured approximately $3.5 billion worth of arms into the area since the armistice and concludes that a new war is more likely today than it was a few months ago.

1339
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES. Hearing, Ninetieth Congress, second session, on S. 3092 to consolidate and revise foreign assistance legislation relating to reimbursable military exports. June 20, 1968. Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 43 p.
KF26. F6 1968f

Includes testimony by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul C. Warnke on behalf of the Foreign Military Sales Act and a copy of a letter from Under Secretary of State Nicholas B. Katzenbach urging committee support of the act. Warnke assured committee members that the current proposal contained more effective controls than past arrangements and by abolishing the revolving fund would enable Congress to review annually all credit sales programs. In stressing the importance of the legislation to U. S. foreign policy objectives, he quoted Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford's statement that the military sales program substitutes "for what in many cases might otherwise be a vastly more expensive direct American military presence."

1340
Victor, A. H. MILITARY AID AND COMFORT TO DICTATORSHIPS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Mar. 1969: 42-47.
VI. U8, v. 95

While the provision of U. S. military aid to countries with dictatorial forms of government is generally accepted when it seems to serve immediate U. S. security interests, the support of authoritarian type regimes in areas where no real external military threat appears to exist is frequently criticized. Many Americans consider assistance projects directed almost solely toward internal security uses immoral and detrimental to America's long-range goal of fostering democracy unless the recipient governments truly represent the people. However, as demonstrated by Castro's rise to power, "the interests of the United States may be jeopardized by the withholding of military assistance because of the type of government of the recipient country." Moreover, in many respects the prospects for eventual democratization are better under the direction of military dictatorships than under weak regimes that do not enjoy popular support and are highly susceptible to overthrow by Communist-controlled movements. If the United States insists that the governments receiving military assistance initiate economic and social reforms, an environment suitable for a representative type government can evolve in countries now subjected to authoritarian rule. Iran is a good example of a country with an authoritarian government that is expediting progress by "revolution from the top." In addition to promoting needed reforms, military forces can contribute directly to the development of their country through civic action programs. "Under these circumstances, the provision of military assistance to an authoritarian type government may well serve both U. S. immediate security interests and a long-range goal of a world community of representative type governments."

1341
WILL FRENCH ARMS BOOM BACKFIRE? Business week, Feb. 1, 1969: 22, 24. illus.
HF5001. B89, 1969

France's embargo on armaments to Israel could hurt its fast-growing armaments business in other parts of the world. At stake are French arms exports estimated at $500 million in 1968, double the figure of 5 years ago. Israel, which has bought over $500 million worth of French arms over the past decade, is turning to the United States for military aid. The 50 Phantom jets America is selling to Israel will swell its weapons exports to around $1. 5 billion for the current fiscal year. However, France continues to make large armaments sales mainly as a result of De Gaulle's independent foreign policy. The French outbid U. S. competitors to equip the Belgian Air Force and are currently engaged in negotiations with Malaysia for the sale of 16 Mirage 5 aircraft. Meanwhile, the 50 Mirage 5's promised to Israel are at Istres Air Base near Marseilles. France maintains that they are Israeli property. Israel, which is still awaiting shipment of the aircraft, is reluctant to sue for return of its $100 million prepayment for fear of alienating its considerable sympathy among Frenchmen.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

1342
Alexeev, A. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND SECURITY. International affairs (Moscow) Jan. 1969: 10-14.
D839. I465, 1969

One criticism of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) is that it does not guarantee the security of the nonnuclear states and fails to provide for a convention or protocol on such guarantees. Many nonnuclear states, notably India and Brazil, have demanded a supplementary convention to guarantee the security of the nonnuclear countries from attack by a nuclear-weapon state. However, the NPT does provide for the security of states by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the emergence of more nuclear powers. In addition, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have agreed to a Security Council resolution that obligates them to take immediate measures to counter any nuclear aggression against a nonnuclear country. The resolution also affirms the right of a U. N. member to collective and individual self-defense under article 51 of the U. N. Charter. Furthermore, under article 6 of the NPT, signatories will "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." The NPT is only a partial disarmament measure, and such security demands undermine its very base and run "counter to the task of ensuring the security of all states and establishing stable international peace."

1343
AMERICA'S HIGH STAKES IN NUCLEAR TREATY. U. S. news & world report, v. 66, Mar. 10, 1969: 32-33. illus.
JK1. U65, v. 66

Reviews the major arguments for and against the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It is generally admitted that the Soviet Union will gain most from the treaty since it will keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of both West Germany and the East European satellites. The U. S. administration believes that the treaty promises "more hope than peril," but others are doubtful "whether the problems created by the treaty will be justified by its actual benefits."

1344
Beaton, Leonard. CONTROLLING THE ATOM MENACE. Survival, v. 11, Mar. 1969: 74-77.
U162. S9, v. 11
Reprinted from The Times, January 23, 1969.

The development of an effective gas centrifuge could bring enriched uranium within the resources of many countries and increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation. Regardless, powerful economic interests in the Netherlands, West Germany, and Britain "are seeking uranium enrichment facilities," and work on the centrifuge is being conducted in Japan and Australia. The British, Dutch, and Germans have begun official conversations to collaborate on exploiting the gas-centrifuge method. Dr. N. L. Franklin of the Atomic Energy Authority suggests three possible collaborative arrangements: the exchange of research and development information; the establishment of an international organization for the development, design, and manufacture of centrifuges or centrifuge plants; or the international construction and ownership of plants for the sale of enriched uranium. The British Government's objective of constructing joint plants for the sale of enriched uranium seems less dangerous than the sale of centrifuge machines "as long as the technology is kept secret." However, once the technique is proved, other participating countries that still required enriched uranium might build their own plants, and international collaboration would collapse. Britain's faith that the nonproliferation treaty will prevent the dangers of centrifuge development is ill founded: The treaty does not prevent countries from accumulating immense enriched uranium stockpiles, and it "neglects the possibilities for diversion and . . . for its denunciation at some later date."

1345
Fulbright, James William. TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Report together with supplemental views to accompany Ex. H, 90th Congress, 2d session. Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 21 p. (Executive report no. 91-1) P&GP RR

Recommends that the nonproliferation treaty be ratified by the Senate and concludes that it is the best treaty of its kind that can be negotiated at present.

1346
Goldwater, Barry M. NUCLEAR WEAPONS; TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Feb. 15, 1969: 262-263.
PN6121.V52, v. 35
Delivered before the U. S. Senate, January 20, 1969.

Argues against the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Senator Goldwater insists that the treaty will not deter the spread of nuclear weapons, will cause the United States to surrender its strategic options, and will increase U. S. military obligations.

1347
Greenberg, D. S. URANIUM: THREE EUROPEAN NATIONS PLAN TO BUILD CENTRIFUGE PLANTS. Science, v. 164, Apr. 1969: 53-55.
Q1.S368, v. 164

Despite U. S. efforts to discourage nuclear self-sufficiency in other nations, the Governments of West Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain have recently announced that their countries plan to cooperate in the construction of two centrifuge plants for the production of enriched uranium. Since the participants promised to adhere to existing arrangements for the prevention of nuclear-weapons proliferation and the centrifuge process is too complicated for technically unsophisticated countries, the immediate implications of the project are more political and economic than military in significance. France is reportedly outraged over the three-nation deal and has suggested "that Britain is acting irresponsibly in making Germany a partner in the production of enriched uranium." The United States is concerned over losing its domination of the world market for enriched uranium, which is projected to reach $1 billion per year by 1980. Nevertheless, the three countries plan to proceed with the venture and expect the first plant to be in operation by 1973.

1348
Harrison, Stanley L. THE ELUSIVE GOAL OF NONPROLIFERATION. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Apr. 1969: 26-37. illus. V1U8, v. 95

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable for both political and technical reasons, and the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) only confounds the problem by refusing to acknowledge this. The longstanding American policy of opposing proliferation should be abandoned in favor of a more realistic effort to "channel and control the inevitable." The basic reason for American opposition to proliferation is the fear that its own security is threatened by the increased possibility of nuclear war either accidentally or through escalation. This viewpoint is at best questionable because none of the potential nuclear nations has the resources to pose a serious threat to the United States. Public proclamations notwithstanding, the United States has given de facto aid to proliferation--directly in the case of Britain, indirectly in the case of France, which felt compelled to develop its own nuclear force after being refused equal status with Britain. The latter case illustrates the very real possibility that a policy of nonproliferation can lead to the weakening of NATO by creating distrust and suspicion. The time is ripe to take advantage of Soviet political misadventures, but the continued emphasis on nonproliferation prevents this. Aside from the problems nonproliferation causes for American diplomacy, there are "certain hard and inescapable facts [which] demonstrate that the issue of nonproliferation will not be resolved on a rationale of moral diplomacy or political desires." The scientific and technical abilities to produce nuclear weapons are available to any nation with an industrial base and sufficient motivation. Moreover, it is possible for a nation to undertake nuclear armament covertly because existing IAEA safeguards and control of nuclear reactors are only "nominal," and "these present and inherently unreliable safeguards are the very same that are to prevail under the nonproliferation treaty." The treaty is thus "ill-conceived." It infringes on the sovereignty of states by asking them to renounce the very means of security considered essential by the major powers. It is certain to breed suspicion and foment discord. The most that the United States can hope for through a continuation of its present policy is "a harvest of bitter resentment and disappointment."

1349
Hepp, Marcel. [THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. THE SUPERPOWERS DIVIDE THE WORLD] Der Atomsperrvertrag; die Supermächte verteilen die Welt. [Stuttgart-Degerloch] Seewald [1968] 128 p.
LL

Argues that the German Federal Republic should refuse to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The treaty is designed to consolidate the division of the world between the superpowers, whose guarantees against nuclear blackmail to nonnuclear-weapon signa-

tories lack legal substance. The treaty would in effect perpetuate the partition of Germany. American pressure on West Germany to accede to the treaty must be answered by counterpressure. The Federal Republic commands ample means--e.g., in the monetary field--to apply such counterpressure.

1350
HOW TO KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY. Nature (London) v. 221, Mar. 15, 1969: 985-986.
Ql. N2, v. 221

The preliminary agreement between Great Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands to establish a tripartite consortium to construct and operate gas centrifuges for the production of enriched uranium faces serious political difficulties and economic uncertainties. The agreement is a triumph for British diplomacy on the Continent and for this reason alone will be resented and perhaps opposed by France. More important, however, are the agreement's military implications. The warning has been sounded often enough that gas centrifuges offer smaller powers a way to escape from their obligations under the nonproliferation treaty. In the present case, the issue is particularly sensitive because West Germany is a party to the proposals. That the production facilities will be on British and Netherland soil is not likely to stifle criticism. Perhaps the only answer is to give International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors greater access to the consortium's operations than is required by existing treaty commitments. Of course, there is no guarantee that gas centrifuges will be economically competitive with existing sources of nuclear fuels. On the other hand, the desire of the three Governments to be independent of external sources of supply is understandable. It is not going to be easy to reach a final agreement; administrative problems alone may cause a breakdown of the project. Nevertheless, its is worth a try.

1351
Kramish, Arnold. [THE TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT THE CROSSROADS] Der Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen am Scheideweg. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Dec. 25, 1968: 897-907. D839. E86, v. 23

Outlines Soviet, British, and American positions on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and discusses the nonnuclear states' reservations to the treaty.

1352
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE IAEA. In International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, v. 10, no. 4, 1968: 3-9 illus.
QC770. I4955, v. 10

Outlines the major steps in the negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty and the role that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is expected to play in monitoring the treaty. The safeguards functions that the IAEA must assume will require a shift of emphasis in the agency's work, which heretofore has been devoted to promoting scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy but in the future will concern matters "of considerable political significance."

1353
Pence, Arthur W. CONTROLLING THE INEVITABLE; AN ALTERNATIVE TO NON-PROLIFERATION. Army quarterly, v. 97, Jan. 1969: 237-246.
Ul. A85, v. 97

The United States and other nations have sought to prevent the use of nuclear weapons with a policy of "tight national control and nuclear secrecy." The arguments against proliferation, however, are no longer able to prevail over the one compelling argument in its favor, the force of nationalism. Given the trends toward nationalism and regionalism and the apparent inevitability of proliferation, "the United States would be wise not to attempt to prevent nuclear proliferation, but to assist it so that some balance of power is maintained which will counteract independent adventures encouraged by militant nationalism." Controlled proliferation by the United States and the Soviet Union could serve as a stabilizing influence and lessen the danger of interregional nuclear war.

1354
Pilkington, Betty. DISARMING BUT NOT DISARMING. In Non-proliferation: two views. Commonweal, v. 89, Mar. 14, 1969: 721-722.
AP2. C6897, v. 89

Although U. S. ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty would imply that the United States not only preaches disarmament but is ready to practice it through binding international commitments, the treaty lacks any actual disarmament measure, such as a demand for the destruction, freeze, or cutback of nuclear weapons in possession of the nuclear powers; a promise of additional disarmament measures; or guarantee to protect the nonnuclear countries against attack. Instead, the two superpowers moved through the U. N. Security Council a resolution to accompany the treaty, which is virtually worthless because it requires unanimity in the Security Council--almost an impossibility when tension is endangering world peace. As the treaty covers only horizontal proliferation and disregards frightening vertical proliferation, some critics feel that the superpowers' main objective is "monopoly in perpetuity" and the discouragment of China's later foundation of a nuclear consortium. If the treaty is not followed by the superpowers' serious attempt to dismantle their own nuclear armory, it will not last.

1355
Podkliuchnikov, M. WHAT IS THE OCCUPATION OF "TOTAL KG?" Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, Jan. 16, 1969: pt. 1, [item] 3, 1-5.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Jan. 16, 1969.
Slav Rm

Some West German nuclear scientists who had moved to East Germany disclosed that work is beginning in West Germany to create conditions for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In some West German firms and nuclear research enterprises, feverish research is underway to provide for West Germany fissionable material consisting of enriched uranium and plutonium; fissionable material for peaceful use from other countries is being diverted to military uses; experiences of other countries in the field are being requested and obtained; a multipurpose reactor capable of producing pure plutonium has been built and a thousand-ton nuclear submarine designed. Patents for the production of heavy water and the division of hydrogen isotopes are being collected from Euratom. West Germany also has means for nuclear weapon delivery--Pershing missiles and Starfighter bombers--and trains pilots in dropping nuclear bombs. All these activities are being developed under the auspices of the Bonn government and hidden from West Germany's

NATO allies. West Germany's plan to develop its own nuclear weapons hinders it from signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

1356
Rogers, William C. DEPARTMENT EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 60, Mar. 10, 1969: 189-190. JX232.A33, v. 60

Urges Senate ratification of the nonproliferation treaty. Rogers points out that the treaty is a continuation of U.S. efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons that reach back to the early postwar years and that it accords with the "Administration's policy of negotiation rather than confrontation with the USSR." He stresses that the treaty will not adversely affect the interests of U.S. allies and that it "does not create any new security commitment by the United States abroad" nor "broaden or modify any existing security commitments abroad."

1357
Schnippenkoetter, Swidbert. [SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR NONNUCLEAR STATES?] Sicherheitsgarantien für die Nichtnuklearen? Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Nov. 1968: 645-653. D839.A885, v. 19

At the conference of nonnuclear-weapon states held from August 29 through September 28, 1968, in Geneva, two major tendencies confronted each other: one urging acceptance and implementation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the other pointing to the need for a more equitable distribution of rights and obligations between the nuclear and nonnuclear-weapon states than was stipulated in the treaty. However, the two groups were equally concerned with the security of the nonnuclear-weapons states. The conference dealt at length with problems of nuclear disarmament, nuclear safeguards, and the guarantee that the treaty does not adversely affect the nonnuclear-weapon states' technological development in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. The conference adopted a resolution submitted by the German Federal Republic that postulates universal renunciation of the use of force with both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons.

1358
Singer, Max. A NON-UTOPIAN, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURE WORLD. Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 79-97. JX1974.A1A72, v. 1

This paper describes "some of the basic political forces that might make believable and consistent a world in which . . . it is financially and technically easy for nations to acquire nuclear weapons, but . . . no sizable spread of nuclear weapons has taken place, or need be expected to take place." Such a state is possible without major changes in the international system and would not require nations to change their pre-1945 concepts of fundamental issues of their foreign and security policies. A nonnuclear world--a world with only a few nuclear powers and no tendency toward the general spread of nuclear arms--requires both global recognition that such proliferation "would be bad for the world" and "a general desire to make world politics proceed much as they would if nuclear weapons had never been invented." A presumption herein is that these weapons be maintained solely to prevent or counter the use of others of their kind and that no other political or military benefits--viz, no "positive benefits"--be drawn from them. A key element of the nonnuclear world would be, however, a general acceptance of the separation of nuclear issues from the rest of international politics. Characteristically, all of the present nuclear-weapon states are traditionally leading powers. Among the requirements for such a role are the country's discipline and rationality. A general spread of nuclear weapons with its equalizing effect on nations would place a premium on irrationality, irresponsible behavior by states, and the threat of such behavior. Proliferation might even proceed to the subnational level. The security of all would be jeopardized. The great powers could only be downgraded by such a trend. Thus it is in the interest of the nuclear powers to reduce the desirability of nuclear weapons for other nations by sacrificing positive benefits from their own nuclear weapons. Despite the nonnuclear powers' feeling of unfairness about the uneven distribution of nuclear-power status in the world, almost all of them would prefer the existing inequality to the general spread of nuclear weapons. A nonnuclear world would nullify the political significance of that inequality.

1359
Steenbeck, Max, and others. [A SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PREREQUISITES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WEST GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Wissenschaftlich-technisches Gutachten über die Schaffung von Voraussetzungen zur Produktion von Kernwaffen in der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik. Dokumentation der Zeit, Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 417, 1968: 14-28. DD261.D4, v. 20
Joint authors: Klaus Fuchs, Karl Rambusch, Justus Mühlenpfordt, Karl F. Alexander.

An examination of the development of the West German nuclear power program proves the German Federal Republic's intensive effort to achieve a high degree of autarky in that field. Since 1955 the Federal Republic has conducted large-scale nuclear research and development. In 1966 West German nuclear research facilities employed over 10,000 persons; by 1970 their number is expected to rise to 25,000. In terms of qualified manpower the German Federal Republic is already perfectly capable of producing nuclear weapons. West Germany's known uranium deposits are too small to satisfy the country's civil nuclear program. The Government does its best to procure raw uranium from countries that require no guarantee that their product be used solely for peaceful purposes. But even if the foreign supplies were entirely cut off, the country's own uranium resources would suffice for production of a militarily significant quantity of plutonium. The manufacture of nuclear weapons, particularly the final stage of the process, can easily be concealed. A multipurpose research reactor such as in Karlsruhe can at any time, without much difficulty, be transformed for production of plutonium in the amount adequate for manufacturing eight Nagasaki-type bombs a year. A similar reactor, with double the capacity will start its operation in 1970 in Niederaichbach. Existing light-water reactors can produce militarily significant amounts of plutonium. Furthermore, the Federal Republic has the capability to produce "bomb-pure plutonium" through its newly developed gas centrifuges--a process particularly suitable for the concealed manufacture of nuclear weapons. In addition, there are several other processes available in West Germany that can be utilized for nuclear arms production. The Federal Republic's plans for establishment of its own very expensive uranium-enriching plants are economically

senseless, but such plans make sense from the standpoint of a possible hydrogen-bomb production, for which the Federal Republic needs plutonium of a high-degree of purity. The more autarkic nuclear-power capability is, the more easily it can evade international control.

1360
Steinfels, Peter. A NUCLEAR SARAJEVO. In Nonproliferation: two views. Commonweal, v. 89, Mar. 14, 1969: 721, 723.
AP2. C6897, v. 89

While the nuclear nonproliferation treaty would help the United States and the Soviet Union to preserve their superpower status, it was not met with any enthusiasm when presented for ratification in the U. S. Senate because the Vietnam War and the invasion of Czechoslovakia make the superpowers' support of such a peacemaking measure suspicious. People, however, cannot learn "to live with the bomb" and wait until an irresponsible leadership or nuclear mishap produces a nuclear Sarajevo. In fact, the treaty is a good beginning and might lead to further disarmament measures and prevent West Germany from becoming a nuclear power, but to be efficient it must be part of an overall antiproliferation policy, which must begin with a U. S. -Soviet agreement to halt the arms race--especially in antimissile defense systems and further disarmament measures, such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban or establishment of nonnuclear zones. The appearance of a club of nonnuclear nations that would have renounced their nuclear potential might dissociate international prestige from possession of nuclear weapons, and a U. S. -Soviet understanding of the minimal security needs of India and Israel might impel those nations to renounce the unilateral nuclear guarantee that could bring about a fatal East-West confrontation.

1361
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, first session, on Executive H, 90th Congress, second session, Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Part 2. February 18 and 20, 1969. Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 300 p.
P&GP RR

Views of the Nixon administration on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Statements by Melvin Laird, U. S. Secretary of Defense; William Rogers, U. S. Secretary of State; Gerard Smith, Director, and Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission; and Earle Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, are included.

1362
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. Hearings on Executive H; 90th Congress, second session, Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
KF26. F6 1968d
Hearings held July 10-17, 1968.

Includes testimony by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Director of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glen T. Seaborg, Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé, Dr. Edward Teller, and others on the question whether the Senate should ratify the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). Among the issues discussed are the problem of adequate inspection and verification procedures; the effect of the treaty on national security, with special reference to its implications for an ABM system; and the effects on NATO, disarmament talks, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The text of the NPT and statements of various interested parties are also included.

4. Other (Accidental War, Command and Control of Weapons, etc.)

1363
Arnold, Emmett R. THE COMMANDER'S CONTROL OF HIS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS. Signal, v. 23, Mar. 1969: 31-39. illus.
UG1. M65, v. 23

Examines the problem of control over communications systems, especially at the theater Army level, brought about by the consolidation and entwinement of various systems and attempts "to define within reasonable limits the controls that should be exercised at successive echelons of command." The basic principle is that control should be "vested with none other than the commander for whom the communications is furnished." Accordingly Arnold recommends the establishment of a Defense Communications Command responsible for the Defense Communications System network and a similar authority for the Unified and Specified Commander so that "each and every echelon would have its own communications with direct control over it."

1364
Blumenfeld, Erik. CRISIS MANAGEMENT FOR EUROPE. Interplay, v. 2, Apr. 1969: 24-26.
P&GP RR

Europe should have a system of crisis management to attack the problems of conventional versus nuclear planning, prepare for a new stage in the development of Third World countries, and formulate future economic and monetary policies. European crisis is necessary because " 'big politics' returned to Europe in 1968." The "cultural revolution" in France, which unleashed an international monetary crisis brought under control by a conference in Bonn, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia have engendered an urgent need for such management--to be developed by and for Europe and the interest of the American partner in the Western alliance.

1365
Brennan, Donald G. THE RISKS OF SPREADING WEAPONS: A HISTORICAL CASE. Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 59-60.
JX1974. A1A72, v. 1

Generally it is hypothesized that the possible internal takeover of nuclear weapons facilities by some dissident or irresponsible group would occur in an underdeveloped country. However, one of the world's leading powers, France, was the first nation actually troubled by such an event. According to a senior member of the French nuclear establishment, French scientists at the Sahara nuclear weapons test site in central Algeria became concerned over "the security of their incipient nuclear explosive" during the 1961 "Revolt of the Generals" led by General Maurice Challe, former Commander-in-Chief of French forces in Algeria. Fearing possible seizure by the rebels,

the officials at the site obtained authorization from Paris for early detonation of the device. Because of the hasty nature of the detonation, it had a yield of less than one kiloton and was publicized as a failure. However, according to the scientists responsible for the test, it was a success since it was intended to destroy the fissile material on hand, not to provide a high yield. Had the rebels succeeded in obtaining the nuclear device, "they might have attempted to use it to blackmail the government," or even "used it destructively as a last act of bitter revenge." There is a lack of public awareness about the connection between the "Revolt of the Generals" and the "weak power" of the nuclear explosion. Nevertheless, the incident in the Sahara should serve as a reminder that dangers regarding the spread of nuclear weapons are not confined to underdeveloped countries.

1366
Brown, Harold. SECURITY THROUGH LIMITATIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Apr. 1969: 422-432.
D410. F6, v. 47

An agreement to limit strategic weapons must preserve nuclear deterrence between the superpowers and provide both nations with some damage-limiting capability in case of accidental or irrational war. Moreover, such an agreement cannot permit either side to achieve a first-strike capability, which is incompatible with mutual deterrence. Deterrence requires the ability to maintain a second-strike capability, together with defensive measures to complicate the enemy's attack problem. At present the United States has an excellent deterrent capability: Its retaliatory forces, which are composed of sea- and land-based missiles and bombers, make a Soviet first-strike capability virtually impossible. Although the United States can continue to be confident of maintaining deterrence, the ABM and the multiple warhead have introduced new elements of instability that provide a strong argument for their limitation through arms control agreements. An agreement that sets an ABM limit for city defense, bans mobile land-based missiles, and limits the size of missiles would contribute to America's deterrence capability. Without such an agreement, the larger the Soviet strategic forces become, the greater will be the probable error of American estimation of the Soviet MIRV threat. The combination of a growing Soviet ABM and MIRV threat would "produce a geometric increase in our uncertainty." An arms limitation agreement, however, would not eliminate war. New technology could produce presently inconceivable weapons to threaten the security provided by deterrence. A further problem in implementing such an agreement is a possible upgrading of air-defense systems, which could be given some ABM capability. In this case, an extensive Soviet ABM system would precipitate changes in the U.S. offensive posture that would mean the end of any agreement to limit U.S. offensive forces. Therefore, an arms control agreement should provide for an understanding of exactly what improvements would or would not be allowed. Conversely, such an agreement should not prohibit weapons improvements necessary to maintain deterrence.

1367
Burhop, E. H. [H-BOMBS ON GREENLAND] Des bombes H sur le Groenland. Monde scientifique, v. 12, no. 2, 1968: 5-6. Q2. M69, v. 12

Discusses the crash of a U.S. nuclear bomber over Greenland in January 1968 and emphasizes that the greatest danger of nuclear bomber flights is not the dissemination of nuclear contamination, nor even an accidental nuclear explosion, but their proximity to the Soviet Union. Burhop argues that an error in calculations or a deliberate intrusion into Soviet air space might precipitate a nuclear war. He believes these flights represent one of the more damaging aspects of American policy and that their termination could be a stage in a program to destroy all existing nuclear stockpiles and their means of production.

1368
Kennedy, Robert F. THIRTEEN DAYS: THE STORY ABOUT HOW THE WORLD ALMOST ENDED. McCall's, v. 96, Nov. 1968: 6-9, 148-152, 164-173.
TT500. M2, v. 96

Describes the high-level policy discussions that followed the announcement of missile-base construction in Cuba and the decisions that led to the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy contends that valuable lessons were learned from the confrontation--especially the importance of Presidential accessibility to many recommendations and opinions, of representation by many Departments of Government in discussions, of civilian control and direction of policy, of the need to question military recommendations, and of having allies. The final lesson of the crisis is the importance of attempting to determine another country's response to a particular course of action with a view to eliminating miscalculation and misunderstanding. It is vital to avoid public humiliation for the other nation and assure it that its national security is not adversely affected.

1369
Martin, Laurence W. RUSSIA EAST OF SUEZ. Spectator, v. 222, Jan. 10, 1969: 38-39.
AP4. S7, v. 222

The two inextricably interlocked military balances in the Middle East, that between the superpowers and that between the local states, pose a problem for the superpowers: How can they stabilize the local balance to prevent a regional crisis from escalating into a military confrontation or open war between themselves? This problem is almost unmanageable because "there are no clear-cut spheres of interest in the Middle East upon which the super-powers could impose a self-denying and self-policing ordinance." The pattern of arms supply illustrates this point and emphasizes the difficulty of stabilizing the balance and of deterring war through shipment of arms: Six major powers have supplied arms to the Middle East recently; several Middle Eastern countries obtain arms from as many as four major suppliers; four or five countries obtain arms from both Communist and Western sources; and motives for acquiring arms vary greatly. Thus, to prevent war the "super-powers will have to give priority to insulating their own relationship from the worst result that local turbulence might have." In this context the recent Russian sponsorship of peacemaking plans in the midst of a policy of active military penetration may well be genuine.

1370
Rathjens, George W. THE DYNAMICS OF THE ARMS RACE. Scientific American, v. 220, Apr. 1969: 15-25. illus. T1. S5, v. 220

Recent decisions by both the United States and Russia to deploy new offensive and defensive nuclear-weapons systems--the ABM and the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV)--threaten to destabilize

the present strategic military balance and decrease the security of both countries. For example, if one or both of the superpowers possessed MIRV's and an ABM system, a preemptive attack would seem more probable than it does now. However, because "the action-reaction phenomenon . . . has clearly been a major stimulant of the strategic arms race," neither superpower will permit its adversary to develop such capabilities without strengthening its own retaliatory force. Thus, since any attempt to develop damage-limiting capabilities is likely to provoke an escalation of the arms race, more effort should be directed instead toward minimizing the probability of a thermonuclear exchange and curtailing the strategic arms race. In negotiating arms limitation with the Soviet Union, the immediate objective should be to halt the action-reaction sequence or to moderate its pace to bring about a better chance to end the arms race. If an attempt to limit both MIRV's and ABM defenses through negotiation is impossible, control of the ABM alone must receive first priority. Any attempt to reach an agreement on the strategic balance is fraught with complications because the American and Russian positions are not symmetrical. And, while it is hoped that an initial understanding will not have to include specific agreements on such issues as foreign bases and dual purpose systems, a significant reduction in strategic weapons cannot be expected for some time. Risks in negotiating an arms limitation agreement must be compared to those that will confront the superpowers in the 1970's if no such agreement exists.

1371

Rathjens, George W. THE FUTURE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE: OPTIONS FOR THE 1970'S. Pref. by Joseph E. Johnson. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969. 53 p.
UA23.R18

The rapid and continuing growth of the Soviet Union's nuclear forces has aroused fears that America may be losing its strategic "superiority" over the Soviet Union. In present circumstances, however, debates over "superiority," or even "parity," make little sense. "Sufficiency" might be a better word to describe the capabilities of the superpowers at this point. The real danger to American security lies elsewhere. The present Soviet-American standoff is favorable to the success of a joint effort to bring the arms race under rational control; but this opportunity is almost certain to be short lived, since already there are several factors in the situation that threaten to undermine the existing strategic equilibrium and plunge the world into a dangerous and costly new phase of arms competition. The gravest danger is from the deployment of such breakthrough weapons as the ABM and the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV). This would entail an enormous expenditure of resources but would result only in reduced security for both powers. It would also increase the uncertainty of the two superpowers about each other's capabilities and intentions. This kind of uncertainty is so critical an element in the escalation of international tensions that progress in arms control is virtually impossible until such uncertainty is reduced. The United States can do little until it moves away from reliance on the threat of nuclear escalation to deal with conventional threats and subordinates the understandable concern with limiting damage to the more pressing need to break the action-reaction cycle of the arms race. As to Soviet-U.S. negotiations, "it would be a mistake to expect too much or to aspire to too little." It is certain that for the foreseeable future no very significant reduction in the size of existing deterrent forces will be achieved. In regard to the Chinese Communists there is little the United States can do "except to make sure that it does not give them more weight in its thinking than they deserve." Finally, it should not be assumed that political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union will soon be eliminated. Arms control may even be one major prerequisite to a resolution of these issues.

1372

Vladisavljević, V. MEDITERRANEAN CONFRONTATION. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Dec. 20, 1968: 2-4. D839.R4, v. 19

For years the United States, relying on its military power, pursued a policy of hegemony in the Mediterranean area and pressure on Mediterranean countries, especially the Socialist states. The pretext for the buildup of military power was the need to bolster the southeastern wing of NATO, which, although it did not seem important initially, gradually gained greater significance in U.S. strategic plans with the diminishing possibility of confrontation in central Europe. The Czechoslovak crisis and the appearance of the Soviet Fleet in the area forced NATO to consolidate its positions. On the other hand, the Soviet Fleet began to seek support along the Mediterranean shores, justifying its presence by the Soviet theory that Russia is a Mediterranean country. Although the Soviet Fleet seemed to enter the area temporarily to prevent further aggression by Israel, it seems to have decided to stay. Its presence shows new tendencies that will probably influence greatly the general development in the Mediterranian area, which is being transformed by the big powers into a focus for dangerous competition, the stockpiling of military power, and the acceleration of the arms race. This represents a great danger not only for the Mediterranean countries but for general peace and stability as well. Although the superpowers are trying to avoid a conflict, the small and medium-sized countries do not feel secure because an accident could easily provoke a conflict between the great powers. This situation leaves the Mediterranean countries powerless, and the only possible solution appears to be a gradual but complete withdrawal of all foreign fleets. Only after their departure will the Mediterranean countries be able to solve their local problems and start cooperating to bring about a stable and peaceful life in the area.

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension Areas

1373

[AFTER THE 21ST OF AUGUST] Nach dem 21. August. Osteuropa, v. 18, Oct./Nov. 1968: 697-824.
DR1.O8, v. 18

Entire issue is devoted to the background and consequences of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, August 21, 1968, and reactions to that event.

1374

AlRoy, Gil C. THE PROSPECTS OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Commentary, v. 47, Mar. 1969: 53-59.
DS101.C63, v. 47

Apprehension over the apparently deteriorating situation in the Middle East tends to support the contention that a Soviet-American settlement should be imposed upon this tension-ridden area. However,

there is a good deal of evidence that under existing circumstances the risk of a major war in the Middle East is highly overrated. Despite the Arabs' acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, their lack of a cohesive social structure prevents them from mobilizing their forces in large-scale combat. Thus "the Arabs are already waging war on Israel as best they can" with their sporadic attacks. The question of the outbreak of a major war in the Middle East then rests with Israel, which unlike its Arab adversaries is fully capable of waging modern warfare. There are a variety of fallacious theories that ascribe warlike intentions to Israel--including the argument that Israel is a tool of the imperialists, the belief that Jews are sinister and aggressive by nature, and the notion that Israeli expansionism in the Middle East is an inevitable consequence of "a grand Zionist design." Yet, in reality, Israel has gone to war only when provoked by "a convergence of indefensible borders, Arab brinkmanship, and international indifference." With their background of harassment and persecution the Israelis are particularly sensitive to Arab threats of annihilation; driven by fears of genocide, the insecurity of their geographical position, and a sense of isolation in the international community, they reacted violently to the acceleration of Arab hostilities in 1956 and again in 1967. Since the present cease-fire conditions give Israel an "unprecedented strategic depth," it is far more secure militarily now than in the past, which renders a major war in the Middle East less likely than ever before. Any U.S.-Soviet efforts to reinstate the pre-1967 conditions would only place Israel once again in an extremely precarious position.

1375
[THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE] Middle East forum, v. 45, no. 1 & 2, 1968: 3-124.
DS41.M45, v. 45

Partial contents.--Do you know? Twenty basic facts about the Palestine problem.--The tragedy of Palestine from the Balfour Declaration to today, by Anthony Nutting.--The fifty-year hate, by David Holden.--War and peace in the Middle East: The present situation and future prospects, by Nabih A. Faris.--The need for an understanding of the Arab case in the conflict with Israel, by Michael Rice.--Problems of American policy-makers in the Middle East, by Elmer Berger.--The Arab world: U.S. viewed as friend of the enemy, Israel, by Drew Middleton.--The Arab freedom fighter, who? why?, by R. F. and A. Z.--Force the faith of Al-Fatah, by David Hirst.--To whom does Palestine belong?, by Henry Cattan.--Short reading list on the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Articles on various aspects of the Palestine problem, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and American foreign policy in the Middle East. The intent of the articles is to clarify the issues in dispute between Israel and the Arab States and to make clear "the great injustice which has been inflicted upon the Arab population of Palestine."

1376
Buch, Peter. BURNING ISSUES OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. International socialist review, v. 30, Mar./Apr. 1969: 1-30.
HX1.F65, v. 30
Bibliography: p. 30

Blames Israel for the tension in the Middle East and criticizes the United States for not playing a larger role in persuading Israel to seek a peaceful settlement. Buch states that a new political movement, comprised of Arab and Jewish workers and peasants, must come to power in Israel to repudiate Zionism, which has tied Jewish working people to the construction of a capitalist state and divorced them from their natural allies among the Arab workers and peasants.

1377
THE GUERRILLA THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Time, v. 92, Dec. 13, 1968: 29-32, 35-36. illus.
AP2.T37, v. 92

Undaunted by their "humiliating defeat in last year's war," the Arabs are continuing their fight with Israel by means of clandestine raids carried out by the fedayeen, Arab commandoes who are highly revered by their countrymen for their daring exploits. The largest commando organization, Al Fatah, is based in Amman, Jordan. Primarily made up of Palestinian refugees, the fedayeen groups oppose any Arab settlement with Israel and by goading the latter into repeated reprisals "play a large part in keeping the Middle East on the edge of war." Although the exact strength of the secret organizations is unknown, there is evidence that the fedayeen have gained a good deal of popular and material support as a result of the stunning defeat the Arabs suffered in 1967. "If the fedayeen continue to grow, they could so embitter an already desperate situation that a peace settlement might become impossible." Thus, while to date Washington has been reluctant to intervene directly in Arab-Israeli affairs, the United States may be forced to join with Russia in attempting to impose peace in that area.

1378
Ivanov, O. WHO IS TIGHTENING THE MIDDLE EAST KNOT? Soviet military review, no. 2, Feb. 1969: 55-56. P&GP RR

Despite complete Arab acceptance of the U.N. Security Council proposal to restore peace in the Middle East, Israel steadfastly refuses to accept anything less than military victory. According to an article in the Economist, Israel's proposals for a settlement would allow it "to retain the territories captured in June 1967 and to force the Arabs to agree to the [demilitarization] of certain areas without undertaking any similar actions on its own territory." As Israel becomes increasingly intractable, world opinion even in the West finds it more difficult to condone Israeli acts of aggression although Israel's obstinate pursual of war against the Arabs is encouraged by the United States, West Germany, and other Atlantic states, which find it in their own interests "to bring pressure to bear on the Arab countries." Israel bases its rejection of the U.N. proposal on two unfounded arguments--that any troop withdrawal on its part would not be matched by actions of the Arab States and that the United Arab Republic would not negotiate for free international use of the Suez Canal. Underlying Israel's equivocal stance on a peace settlement is the realization that it has not achieved the goals of the war--destruction of the progressive United Arab Republic and Syrian Governments and firm control over captured Arab lands--which can be achieved in the future only by a continuance of military aggression.

1379
Kanet, Roger E. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH. Queen's quarterly, v. 75, winter 1968: 731-736. AP5.Q3, v. 75

At a time when the American and British influences in the Middle East are rapidly declining, the Russian position in that area is stronger than ever. Before the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War the Russians had been steadily building up their influence in the Middle East through economic and military aid programs and verbal support of the Arab countries' anti-Israeli policies. Their popularity suffered somewhat when they failed to intervene militarily on behalf of the Arabs during the war for fear that such action might lead to the outbreak of a major conflict. However, they have now more than made up for this loss of prestige. Since the war the Soviet Union has stepped up its assistance programs to the Arab States and increased its direct military involvement in the Middle East. In addition, Soviet propaganda organs have repeatedly denounced the Israeli incursions into Arab territory and criticized the United States for encouraging Israel's ventures. While it is endeavoring to enhance its "prestige, influence, [and] control" in the Middle East, the Soviet Union is also interested in keeping the "Arab hotheads" from renewing military hostilities. Thus the Soviet Union has "called for the political and territorial integrity of all the countries in the Middle East, including Israel." However, the Kremlin is not anxious to settle the political differences between Israel and the Arab States. It hopes that the continued Arab dependency upon Soviet support in the struggle with Israel will further enhance the Soviet position in the Middle East.

1380
Konstantin, Prince of Bavaria. [REFLECTIONS ON A POLICY FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE] Réflexions sur une politique de défense pour l'Europe. Politique étrangère, v. 33, no. 6, 1968: 561-574.
JX3. P6, v. 33

As a way out of the present impasse, the author proposes a regional East-West security system. The European members of NATO, while remaining within the alliance, should create a defense community to include Great Britain modeled after the Western European Union. Potential agreements on Franco-German cooperation could reevaluate the role of the French force de frappe by distinguishing between the nuclear and conventional elements and by dividing the tasks. The occupation of Czechoslovakia does not basically alter the situation although it retards a peaceful settlement and the chances for German reunification. Within the framework of this security system stretching from Brest to Brest-Litovsk, the Germans should eventually be ready to recognize the existence of a second German state. (Translation of supplied abstract)

1381
LAOS: THREAT TO S. E. ASIA STILL SEEN IN PATHET LAO. Eastern world, v. 23, Jan./Feb. 1969: 19.
DS501. E45, v. 23

By waging a successful winter-spring campaign that has driven almost a million Laotians into a near-refugee status, the Pathet Lao remains a major threat not only to Laos but also to Southeast Asia. The Communist-led guerrilla army could easily overrun the entire Laotian countryside and the largest cities but has not for fear that any such attempt would bring in the United States, which is already supplying large amounts of economic and military aid. In addition, the Communists do not wish to broaden the area of conflict as long as preliminary peace talks are underway in Paris, and they believe Prince Souvanna Phouma cannot ask for a large increase in U.S. aid and "maintain his posture of neutrality that saves his country, at least from direct assault by North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao."

1382
[PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST. ERNST BLOCH (AND OTHERS): ON ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT] Frieden im Nahen Osten. Zum arabisch-israelischen Konflikt; Ernst Bloch [u. a.] [Frankfurt a. M.] Europäische Verlagsanstalt [1967] 43 p.
DS127. F7

Collection of papers read by Ernst Bloch, Iring Fetscher, Rolf Rendtorf, and Heinz-Joachim Heydorn at a meeting "for permanent peace in the Near East and for the right to existence by the state of Israel," held on June 27, 1967, at the University of Frankfurt. Authors give historical background and consider the contemporary cultural, political, and strategic environment of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both Fetscher and Heydorn point out the relationship between the Vietnam and Near East crises.

1383
Podvoiskii, Dmitrii. ALTERNATIVE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. New times, no. 5, Feb. 5, 1969: 13-15.
D839. N483, 1969

In the effort to find peace in the Middle East one fact is becoming unalterably clear, even to those Western nations that have supported Israel in its aggression against the Arab States: Israel simply does not want to establish peace on any terms but its own. The most viable legal structure to date was formulated in the U. N. Security Council and offered as a resolution on November 22, 1967, more than a year ago. The resolution has been agreed to by several Arab States, but Israel flatly refuses to consider the proposal. All provisions could not be implemented at once, but the long process could be initiated by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab lands, leading ultimately to restoration of the territorial rights and governmental jurisdictions that existed prior to June 5, 1967. Just as it has rejected the U. N. proposal, Israel, along with its allies, continues to reject other serious ventures toward negotiations and demands instead direct talks with the Arabs, a situation completely unacceptable to the Arab States. Israel is no longer in a position to be able to force its demands upon the Arab nations, which are strongly supported by the Soviet Union in their struggle against Israeli aggression. A continuation of Israel's refusal to negotiate can only mean a continuation of the tenuous status quo and violence in the Middle East.

1384
Rondot, Pierre. [ESCALATION AND EFFORTS OF APPEASEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE] Escalade et efforts d'apaisement dans le conflit Arabo-Israëlien. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Feb. 1969: 239-253.
D410. R45, v. 25

Summarizes Arab and Israeli acts of reprisal and sabotage, which have escalated tensions in the Middle East. Rondot believes the Near East situation is so explosive that the major powers must find a solution amenable to the belligerents before the powder keg blows up.

1385
Rubinstein, Amnon. 'DAMN EVERYBODY' SUMS UP THE ANGRY MOOD OF ISRAEL. New York times magazine, Feb. 9, 1969: 24-27, 93, 96-99. illus.
AP2. N6575, 1969

Reports on the impact of Arab terrorism in Israel. The terrorists have failed to achieve their objectives of disrupting daily life in Israel and bringing about the collapse of the state. On the other hand, by initiating and sustaining the vicious circle of terrorist incident and retaliation, they have had a measure of success in isolating the Israelis from foreign friends and in increasing the already enormous defense burdens of the nation. However, their greatest success has been to destroy any prospect of a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab States. The present mood in Israel is a melange of "isolation and bitter indignation" and "open self-assured defiance." Convinced that they can depend only on themselves, the Israelis have determined to make their country self-sufficient in arms production, are now less willing than ever to relinquish military control over the western bank of the Jordan River, and generally are reconciled to a continuation of the present tense and tragic situation for a long time.

1386
Sabin, Albert B., and others. ARABS PREPARE FOR A SHOWDOWN: A REPORT. Midstream, v. 15, Jan. 1969: 3-22. DS149.A336, v. 15
"Impressions and Conclusions of the Mission of American Professors for Peace in the Middle East to Jordan and the United Arab Republic, June 24 to July 5, 1968."

Attempts to determine Arab attitudes toward the acceptance of Israel as a state, the Arab interpretation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and the Arab view of the future in case of a continuing impasse and concludes that the real obstacle to peace is the Arab refusal to accept the existence of Israel.

1387
Shepherd, Naomi. PERFIDIOUS GAUL. New statesman, v. 77, Jan. 17, 1969: 67-68.
AP4,N64, v. 77
First article in a section entitled "Tensions in the Middle East."

De Gaulle's embargo on the 50 Mirage jets that the French-oriented Israeli Air Force had been counting on "has put him right out of the running as Middle East peacemaker." The President's policy can be disastrous if the Arab States, believing that Israel will be weaker, try a surprise attack as a result of the embargo. The United States, Israel's one remaining ally, does not share its views on what concessions might be reasonable in a Middle East settlement, and despite the Phantom jets it has sent to the Jewish state there is no guarantee that America will become Israel's arms-supplier-in-chief. Meanwhile, France and the Soviet Union are now united "to press for what Israel regards as a suicidal retreat." By disturbing the balance of arms in the Middle East, De Gaulle's policy has raised the specter that Israel, alone but undaunted against Russia and the Arab world, might resort to another preventive strike against Egypt while in a position to win.

1388
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERS COMPLAINTS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 6, Apr. 1969: 13-36.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 6

Reports six meetings of the Security Council from March 27 to 29 at which complaints by Jordan and Israel were considered. Jordan complained that Israeli fighters had attacked Jordanian villages on March 26, killing and wounding a number of civilians, while Israel complained that the Jordanian Government supported terrorist groups operating from its territory. The Representative of Jordan stressed that the targets of this and other Israeli attacks had no military value and that Israel could expect to encounter continued resistance to its aggressive occupation of Jordanian territory. The Israeli Representative contended that the March 27 raid was directed against a guerrilla base on the east bank and that Israel had no choice but to continue reprisal raids as long as the terrorist attacks continued. All Council participants at the meetings condemned the Israeli attacks, although several were equally critical of Jordan's policies.

1389
Van der Kroef, Justus M. [THAILAND--THE NEXT VIETNAM?] Thailand--das nächste Vietnam? Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 48, Oct. 1968: 659-674.
AP32.S47, v. 48

Compares American commitments to Thailand with those to South Vietnam and points out the danger that local Thai rebellions may escalate into a major international conflict with active U.S. participation.

1390
Wagenlehner, Günther. [ESCALATION IN THE NEAR EAST. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF A CONFLICT] Eskalation im Nahen Osten. Die politische und psychologische Problematik eines Konflikts. [Stuttgart] Seewald [1968] 248 p. (Militärpolitische Schriftenreihe, 1)
DS127.2.W3
Bibliography: p. 269-271.

Partial contents.--Psychopolitical escalation, 1967. --Main factors of psychopolitical development.--The psychopolitical development during the war.--Immediate effects of the war.--Deescalation or a new war. --Possibilities of overcoming the crisis.--Documentation.

Underlines the dominant influence of psychopolitical factors on the Israeli victory in the June 1967 war. Wagenlehner contends that Europe's strategic and political situation is directly affected by the Near East crisis and points to the possibility of the eruption of a new conflict there due to Soviet arms supplies to the Arab countries. Since the Soviet position in the Mediterranean is growing stronger, the next Arab-Israeli war may easily expand to a confrontation between the Soviet Union and NATO. However, it may be possible to control the crisis with methods developed to better understand the psychopolitical background of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

1391
Yost, Charles. ISRAEL AND THE ARABS; THE MYTHS THAT BLOCK PEACE. Atlantic monthly, v. 223, Jan. 1969: 80-85. AP2.A8, v. 223

Argues that both Arab and Israeli claims contain elements of reality and of myth, which must be identified before a settlement is possible. Yost distinguishes these elements and stresses the need for an immediate settlement.

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

1392
Barrett, Raymond J. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY IN OPERATION. In U.S. Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Mar. 1969: 28-34. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Now approaching the 10th anniversary of its signing, the Antarctic Treaty, which reserves the continent for peaceful uses only, has completely fulfilled the expectations of its originators. Scientific research carried out in accordance with the terms of the treaty has contributed to progress in such fields as glaciology, meteorology, oceanography, marine biology, geology, and upper-atmosphere physics. In addition, the treaty has successfully provided for the preservation of flora and fauna in the Antarctic area. The signatories have cooperated in exchanging information regarding logistics and have cordially received inspection teams sent to verify compliance with the treaty's prohibitions against military activities. "The Antarctic Treaty has thus been a success in practice and spirit."

1393
Churba, Joseph. YEMEN: DISENGAGEMENT IN PROTRACTED WAR. Air University review, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1969: 100-112. illus.
TL501.A5574, v. 22

Evaluates the political and diplomatic efforts to limit the Yemeni conflict and relates these to the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. Following the military stalemate between republican forces supported by Egypt and royalist forces aided by Saudi Arabia, various attempts were made to resolve the conflict through negotiations. According to Churba, however, the eventual withdrawal of Egyptian troops was achieved not by these negotiations, which produced only temporary pauses in the fighting, but as a result of Egypt's disastrous defeat in the 6-day war with Israel.

1394
Erfurth, Siegfried. [FINLAND'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY] Finlands Politik der Neutralität. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Sept. 1968: 457-459.
D3.W396, v. 17

Since the end of World War II Finland has pursued a policy of strict neutrality, marked, among other things, by its continued refusal to maintain diplomatic relations with either part of Germany and by its habitually neutral stand within the United Nations on East-West issues. The 1948 Soviet-Finnish friendship and aid pact commits Finland to cooperate with the Soviet Union if Germany or one of its allies attacks or uses Finnish territory to invade the Soviet Union. The pact does not provide, however, for automatic aid. The need for and the form of aid are subject to a special agreement between the two countries. The "1963 Paris peace treaty" put some limitations on Finland's armaments, which were later removed by separate agreement. Finland procures arms from the East and the West, but for economic reasons it tries to rely on its own defense industry as much as possible. In May 1963 it proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia. It considers the seismological cooperation of Scandinavian countries to detect subterranean tests of nuclear weapons a possible step toward a treaty to ban all kinds of tests with such weapons.

1395
THE SUEZ CANAL. Survival, v. 11, Apr. 1969: 120-127.
U162.S9, v. 11

Reprinted from New Middle East Journal (London), Jan. 1969.

Contents.--The Soviet view, by George Mirsky. --No commercial future, by D. C. Watt.

Views on the closure of the Suez Canal. Mirsky acknowledges the losses the United Arab Republic has suffered as a result of the canal's closure but emphasizes the damage to international shipping. He argues that the canal continues to be vital to world trade despite the development of supertankers and insists that Egyptian sovereignty over the canal be restored so that it can be reopened as an international waterway. Watt contends that the advent of supertankers and "the container revolution for dry goods" threaten to make the canal obsolete. He notes that among the major powers Italy and the Soviet Union have suffered most from the closing of the canal and that the Soviet Union is "the only great power interested today in keeping the Suez route open." For its part, Britain will surely insist that the canal be made a truly international waterway.

D. OUTER SPACE

1396
Koelle, H. H. POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE PROJECTS. Raumfahrtforschung, v. 12, Jan./Mar. 1968: 1-7.
TL780.R3, v. 12

Discusses the probability [of] and reasons for an increased future international cooperation in space. The political incentives for such cooperation as well as the economical advantages for the individual partners seem to warrant a closer look at the possibilities open to the space faring nations of this planet. Before negotiations can take place, some technical alternatives of likely candidates have to be analysed in great detail to determine their feasibility, the expected return and the resources required. A model concerning the potentially available resources [for] international space projects is developed, which can be used to establish lower and upper limits for such efforts. A list of all those factors is presented which very likely will influence the intensity of international cooperation as well as the magnitude of such a program in the decades to come. (Abstract supplied, modified)

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

1397
American Geophysical Union. Transactions, v. 50, Apr. 1969: 233-253. QE500.A6, v. 50

Partial contents.--Abstracts--Section of Seismology: On detection of underground nuclear tests, by J. Gauger, D. V. Slade, and V. Vali. The seismic regime following a large scale nuclear explosion, by Eric R. Engdahl and others. Earthquakes following underground nuclear explosions, by Alan Ryall and others. Structural response to underground nuclear explosions, by John A. Blume. Transient and residual strains associated with large underground explosions, by Stewart W. Smith. Residual strains associated with Benham, by P. R. Romig and others. Analysis of Gasbuggy ground motions, by Joseph A. Lahoud and Roger W. Klepinger.

Abstracts of papers presented to the American Geophysical Union's 50th annual meeting, held in Washington, D. C., April 21-25, 1969.

1398
[CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FUELS AND THE WORLD-WIDE DEMAND FOR URANIUM] Kontrolle der Kernbrennstoffe und der weltweite Uran-Bedarf. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Sept. 15, 1968: 435-436. U3.W38, v. 12

Outlines the safeguards systems of the European Atomic Energy Community and of the International Atomic Energy Agency and provides information on the present and expected military and civilian demand for uranium. Included is an estimate of world deposits of uranium. The possibility of using fissionable radioactive materials present in natural gas is also considered.

1399
Eklund, Sigvard. DR. EKLUND BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. In International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, v. 10, no. 6, 1968: 3-7. QC770.I4955, v. 10

Excerpts from an address before the U. N. General Assembly on November 15, 1968.

Surveys the past activity and future programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Eklund discusses the IAEA's efforts to apply safeguards to nuclear activity under existing agreements, to prepare for its new safeguards responsibilities under the nonproliferation treaty, to promote the use of nuclear power in developing countries and the transfer of nuclear materials between countries, and to provide nuclear explosives for peaceful uses.

1400
Kaschak, George R. LONG-RANGE SUPERSONIC PROPAGATION OF INFRASONIC NOISE GENERATED BY MISSILES. Journal of geophysical research, v. 74, Feb. 1969: 914-918. QC811.J6, v. 74

Describes the use of U.S. Army infrasonic monitoring stations to detect missile launchings at Cape Kennedy, Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Infrasonic signals generated by missiles of 50,000 pounds thrust and greater were detected by monitoring facilities located at distances of 500 to 1500 kilometers from the launch sites.

1401
Liebermann, Robert C., and Paul W. Pomeroy. RELATIVE EXCITATION OF SURFACE WAVES BY EARTHQUAKES AND UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 74, Mar. 15, 1969: 1575-1590. QC811.J6, v. 74

The surface-wave magnitude (M_S) is used as the measure of the relative excitation of long-period waves by underground explosions and earthquakes in five distinct geographical and tectonic regions of the world: the western United States, the Aleutian-Kamchatka area, southern Algeria (presumed explosions), central Asia, and Novaya Zemlya. The M_S-versus-M_b data indicate that the underground explosions generated smaller surface waves than earthquakes from the same region of comparable body-wave magnitudes (m_b). For the events ($m_b > 5$) and regions studied, the most significant result is that it is possible to separate the earthquake and explosion populations on the basis of their surface-wave magnitudes if the events are analyzed on a regional basis. Theoretical considerations of the dimensions of the seismic source in space and time lead to M_S-versus-m_b relationships that account for the general trend of the observational data. Further elucidation of the diagnostic capability awaits the extension of such studies to events of lower body-wave magnitudes ($m_b < 4$). (Abstract supplied)

1402
Nuttli, Otto W. TRAVEL TIMES AND AMPLITUDES OF S WAVES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN NEVADA. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 59, Feb. 1969: 385-398. QE531.S3, v. 59

The underground Nevada explosions HALF-BEAK and GREELEY were unique in creating relatively large amplitude and long-period body S waves which could be detected at teleseismic distances. Observations of the travel times of these S waves provide a surface focus travel-time curve which in its major features is similar to a curve calculated from the upper mantle velocity model of Ibrahim and Nuttli (1967). This model includes a low-velocity channel at a depth of 150 to 200 km and regions of rapidly increasing velocity beginning at depths of 400 and 750 km. Observations of the S wave amplitudes suggest that a discontinuous increase in velocity occurs at 400 km, whereas at 750 km the velocity is continuous but the velocity gradient discontinuous. The shape and orientation of the radiation pattern of SH for both explosions are consistent with the Rayleigh and P-wave amplitude distribution of BILBY as given by Toksoz and Clermont (1967). This suggests that the regional stress field is the same at all three sites, and that the direction of cracking as well as the strain energy release in the elastic zone outside the cavity is determined by the regional stress field. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1403
Sarabhai, Vikram A. NEED TO SAFEGUARD IAEA'S PRIMARY ROLE OF PROMOTING PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. Nuclear India, v. 7, Oct. 1968: 1, 5-7. TK9103.A3, v. 7

Expresses fears that the International Atomic Energy Agency's increased inspection and verification responsibilities under the nonproliferation treaty will be detrimental to its work to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy and that political "pressures" and "overtones" will interfere with the performance of its technical functions. Sarabhai also warns of the difficulties that lie ahead in financing the safeguards system and in regulating the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

1404
Scheinman, Lawrence. NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, THE PEACEFUL ATOM, AND THE IAEA. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mar. 1969. 64 p. (International conciliation, no. 572) JX1907.A8, no. 572

Partial contents.--Dimensions of non-proliferation: Security. Disarmament.--Politics and the IAEA: Cold war tensions. Regional confrontation. Tensions between developed and developing states.--Safeguards and peaceful development: IAEA and Euratom. Internal problems of IAEA. Institutions to implement the NPT. Problems of institutional proliferation.--Conclusion.

Analyzes the difficulties--especially those surrounding the use of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--in implementing the safeguards and peaceful nuclear development provisions of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Scheinman maintains that the IAEA's ability to implement these provisions depends upon the

political consciences of the involved nations rather than upon institutional or structural innovations.

1405
Seyersted, Finn. [THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION, ITS LEGAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS] Die Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation, ihre rechtlichen Aufgaben und Funktionen. [Göttingen, Schwartz, 1966] 29 p. (Beiträge zum internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht und Atomenergierecht, Bd. 2, Heft 1)

Points out that, almost exclusively, research reactors of little military significance have been subjected to control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Only after output reactors able to produce plutonium in quantity are subjected to such control will the IAEA's safeguards system play an important role in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

1406
Thomas, David. EXERCISE "FIRST LOOK." NATO letter, v. 16, Oct. 1968: 16-19. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 16

Operation "First Look" was a 3-month test of more than 20 different arms control inspection techniques in an area of southern England densely populated by military bases. The demonstration operated with an official control compilation of data on the movement of men and machines in and out of the area to determine which of the inspection techniques is the least complicated yet most accurate device. While four similar tests have been conducted previously by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, this was the first to use non-American troops and thereby provide a more precise duplication of a potential situation. The results will require further analysis to "give a better idea than exists at present of the risk that a change in the forces being inspected might, by accident or design, go completely unnoticed by all possible forms of inspection."

1407
U.S. Treaties, etc., Feb. 29, 1968. ATOMIC ENERGY: APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE IAEA TO THE UNITED STATES-DENMARK COOPERATION AGREEMENT. Agreement between the United States of America, Denmark, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed at Vienna February 29, 1968. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968] 9 p. (Treaties and other international acts series, 6459)
JX235.9.A32, no. 6459

Authorizes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to establish safeguards to ensure that the nuclear materials furnished to Denmark by the United States under the Agreement for Cooperation of July 25, 1955, be used solely for peaceful purposes. The safeguards are to be based on an inventory furnished by the two countries to the IAEA of all materials and equipment transferred under the auspices of the agreement.

2. Enforcement

1408
Arzinger, Rudolf, and others. [EXPERTISE ON THE QUESTION OF THE BAN OF ANY POWER OF DISPOSITION OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ON THE NECESSITY OF AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER OBSERVANCE OF THIS PROHIBITION] Gutachten zur Frage des völkerrechtlichen Verbotes jeder Verfügungsgewalt über Kernwaffen und der Notwendigkeit einer wirksamen Kontrolle der Einhaltung dieses Verbots. Dokumentation der Zeit, Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 417, 1968: 2-13. DD261.D4, v. 20
Joint authors: Herbert Kröger, Peter A. Steiniger, Walter Poeggel, and Harry Wünsche.

Stresses the ban under international law for Germany to ever embark on the development of nuclear armaments or acquire a disposal power, including the power of joint control, over nuclear weapons in any form. The authors, professors of public international law or of international relations at East German institutes of higher learning, consider the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Charter, and the Potsdam Agreement and the decisions of the 1945 Crimean Conference to point out the validity of the ban for the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. They contend that the German Federal Republic tries to escape the responsibility resting on it from that prohibition and does its best to prevent the nuclear nonproliferation treaty from ever becoming effective toward it. Signing and ratification of the treaty by Bonn would facilitate international control over the West German nuclear power industry.

1409
Sohn, Louis B. ENFORCEMENT OF DISARMAMENT CONTROLS WITH RESPECT TO STATES WHICH HAVE NOT RATIFIED A DISARMAMENT OR ARMS CONTROL TREATY. Arms control and disarmament, v. 1, 1968: 99-107. JX1974.A1A72, v. 1

Since international law generally recognizes that a treaty can impose no obligations on a state not party to it, the question arises whether there may not be insuperable legal obstacles to any attempt by the international community to use the United Nations to enforce an arms control agreement when the actual or potential violator is a state that has not ratified it. The answer is that the international legal system poses no such obstacles. Some principles of law relating to international peace and security are so crucial to the survival of mankind that the world community is justified in demanding that they be complied with universally. The U.N. Charter obligates the United Nations to "ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." The violation of an arms control treaty by a nonmember of the United Nations or a state not party to the agreement would constitute a danger to peace sufficient to justify U.N. enforcement action. The specific action taken would depend on the circumstances surrounding the violation and could be initiated by the Security Council under Chapter VII or by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. In the latter case, the usual voting procedures would have to be modified in order to ensure that final decisions "represent the necessary universal consensus" of the world community.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1410
Dale, Edwin L. AFTER PEACE BREAKS OUT, WHAT WILL WE DO WITH ALL THAT EXTRA MONEY? New York times magazine, Feb. 16, 1969: 32-33, 64, 67, 69, 72, 74, 76, 79-80, 82, 84.
AP2.N6575, 1969

How much of an economic benefit can the Federal Government expect from peace in Vietnam? While there can be no certainty in calculations on these matters, if one assumes that peace comes this year and demobilization takes place over the next year and one-half and that the 10-percent tax surcharge is allowed to expire, adds the "peace dividend" from Vietnam to the nation's "growth dividend," and deducts normal increases in peacetime defense expenditures and the domestic budget, the total peace "sugarplum" will work out to about $10 million in fiscal 1971 and $20 billion in fiscal 1972. Of course, if the United States and the Soviet Union should reach an agreement for substantial arms reductions, then the amount would be even greater. What is to be done with this money --or, to put it another way, who is to get the sugarplums? Five major possibilities have been suggested: to raise the incomes of the poor, share Federal tax money with the States, increase Federal expenditures in the traditional ways, reduce the national debt, or reduce taxes. Each of these proposals has its advantages and disadvantages, and, since the choices are not exclusive, they can be combined in various ways. On the other hand, there will not be enough funds to act on them all as thoroughly as some would like, and, consequently, the urgent question is one of priorities. President Nixon apparently leans toward revenue sharing with the states and tax reductions; he has shown little sympathy for income maintenance or traditional spending increases. In any case, since not even tens of billions are enough to deal with all the problems, his will be the agonizing choice of where to spend the money.

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

1411
Alker, Hayward R., and Ronald D. Brunner. SIMULATING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A COMPARISON OF THREE APPROACHES. International studies quarterly, v. 13, Mar. 1969: 70-110. illus.
D639.B2, v. 13

Applies three simulation models to a hypothetical international crisis; compares their theoretical contents, plausibility, and purposes; and examines the potential contributions of these models to the study and practice of international relations.

1412
Borgese, Elizabeth M. THE REPUBLIC OF THE DEEP SEAS: A CENTER REPORT. Center magazine, v. 1, May 1968: 18-27. P&GP RR

Summarizes the recommendations of a conference sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions to study Malta's proposal to the United Nations that an international "regime" be established to oversee the exploration and exploitation of the seabed and ocean floor outside present national jurisdictions. The conference agreed on principles that should govern any approach to this problem--for example that the seabed and the ocean floor be reserved for peaceful uses only--and suggested that they be incorporated into a declaration of the 23rd General Assembly. It also considered a model of a "regime" in which these principles would be institutionalized.

1413
Dyson, Freeman. A CASE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Apr. 1969: 31-33. TK9145.A84, v. 25

The following points about ballistic missile defense ought to be kept in mind: First, the military effectiveness of a missile defense is somewhat independent of its technical effectiveness because what a defense system does "is to save those targets which are not attacked." That is, it forces the attacker, whose estimate of his own offensive capability is always conservative, to concentrate his attack on fewer targets and thus bypass certain others. Second, the Sentinel, which can defend missile sites much more effectively than cities, arrives at a very opportune moment, for, once the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) becomes operational, no country can be certain of its second-strike capability without an active defense. Third, opponents of missile defense are wrong to assume that it is inconsistent with deterrence because the cost-exchange ratio between the offense and the defense ensures that, while a defense system can significantly reduce casualties in case of war, it can never reduce them so far as to make nuclear war acceptable. Fourth, a defensive posture is preferable to an offensive one on moral grounds. Finally, as long as American officials continue to look askance at missile defense, while Soviet officials take the contrary view, it will be difficult to reach any kind of strategic arms control agreement. The prospects for such an agreement would be greatly improved if both sides were to assume a predominantly defensive posture in nuclear armaments.

1414
Frosch, Robert A. EXPLOITING MARINE MINERAL RESOURCES: PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND JURISDICTION. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Nov. 15, 1968: 68-71.
PN6121.V52, v. 35
"Delivered at the Naval War College Conference on Mineral Resources of the World Oceans, July 12, 1968."

Discusses the Navy's rescue and salvage operations in relation to seabed mineral exploration activities. Increased activity in seabed exploration and exploitation is creating problems both for rescue and salvage work and for protection of Americans carrying out commercial activities on the seabed and in the water column. Frosch classifies the military uses of the ocean into three categories: general uses, uses of the ocean stemming from its special properties, and those stemming "from uses generated in response to the military uses called out by the first two classes." The author surveys possible future military activities within these categories and concludes that the Navy is anxious to develop a national program for the oceans to enhance national security.

1415
Jack, Homer A. WHEN RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN PEACE GROUPS TALK PEACE. New York times magazine, Mar. 9, 1969: 28-29, 62, 64-65, 67, 70, 72, 74, 77, 80, 95. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1969

Excerpts from the edited verbatim transcript of 3 days of discussions on Soviet-U.S. relations between the Soviet Peace Committee and ten representatives of American peace organizations. Intervention in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, revolutions in the Third World, détente, the Middle East, and dissent in the United States and the Soviet Union were discussed. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia provoked the most serious disputes between the two groups; détente and arms control and disarmament were areas of the least disagreement.

1416
Koop, Jacob. PLOWSHARE AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. Orbis, v. 12, fall 1968: 793-815. D839.O68, v. 12

Critics of Project Plowshare believe its contributions toward such improvements in the designs and techniques of nuclear explosives as the eventual development of a "clean" bomb "will give nonnuclear countries an increasing incentive to develop or acquire nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, whether or not they renounce the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons." Opponents of Plowshare feel that the continued testing of nuclear devices in a variety of environmental conditions contributes to the creation of the Nth country problem by disseminating nuclear reactor technology. Furthermore, Plowshare's contributions to nuclear technology and its potential economic benefits are negligible compared with the possibility of achieving meaningful arms limitation agreements. However, despite the inherent conflict between the aims of Plowshare and arms control measures such as the test ban treaty and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Plowshare should not be curtailed or abandoned in the interests of nonproliferation because it does not represent the only or even the major difficulty in achieving arms control and because it holds enormous economic potential for many countries of the world. The achievement of arms control and disarmament agreements is beset by political, economic, and technological obstacles, and the problems engendered by Plowshare in the arms control area are minor in comparison and probably more easily soluble; nuclear stockpiling by the major powers is a far greater problem for nonproliferation than is Plowshare. Plowshare must be excluded from all test-ban treaties if its potential is to be developed and made available to all interested nations. The only conditions imposed on Plowshare would be to ensure that the release of radioactivity would be at a "permissible level" and that the detonations would not be used for testing military weapons. Within these two restrictions the superpowers should be urged to "advance the state-of-the-art with respect to Plowshare applications as rapidly as possible."

1417
Lough, Thomas S. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND DISARMAMENT. Peace research reviews, v. 2, June 1968: 1-66. P&GP RR
Selected bibliography: p. 61-66.

Partial contents.--Plowshare: Underground engineering. Excavation. Nuclear vs. conventional explosives.--Nuclear weapons/nuclear explosives: Technical distinctions; nuclear weapons, explosives, and reactors. Plowshare and proliferation.--Plowshare and nuclear testing: The Moscow test ban treaty and Plowshare. Plowshare and a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).--The question of international supervision of peaceful nuclear explosives.--Survey of information and articles on Plowshare and disarmament.

Describes Plowshare's effect on the nonproliferation treaty, the nuclear test ban treaty, and a possible comprehensive test ban treaty. Lough contends that it is practically impossible to set up a peaceful nuclear explosives program from which nations experimenting with explosives would not also learn about weapons development and believes the superpowers will continue underground nuclear experiments. Because of this, Lough outlines plans for incorporating Plowshare into a comprehensive test ban treaty. He concludes that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosion programs is not one of preventing the nuclear powers from advancing their weapons technology through such programs, but of preventing the distribution of these projects among noncooperating nuclear-weapon powers.

1418
Marx, Wesley. THE DEEP-SEA BED. Atlantic monthly, v. 223, Apr. 1969: 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 37-38. AP2.A8, v. 223

Considers the implications for U.S. policy of the Maltese proposal to the United Nations, reviews the controversy in the United States over the proposal, and discusses the alternatives to international control of the seabed.

1419
PAUSE ON WEAPONS. Nature (London) v. 221, Feb. 15, 1969: 597-598. Q1.N2, v. 221

It is difficult to determine whether the new U.S. administration's decision to delay the deployment of an ABM system was an act of "altruism or parsimony." Economic factors must have weighed heavily in the final decision, yet there certainly were other important issues crying for attention. The Sentinel plan was a "bastard compromise" from the beginning and as such could add nothing to U.S. security against Communist China, its ostensible target, or against the Soviet Union except perhaps as a defense against the accidental launch of a Soviet missile. Pressure to expand the thin Chinese-oriented system into a thick Soviet-oriented one would be difficult to resist but could endanger the existing strategic nuclear balance. It is essential, therefore, that the United States begin talks with the Soviet Union about the ABM problem. The new administration has also been active in pressing Congress for quick ratification of the nonproliferation treaty. It would be a mistake, however, for the United States to risk its reputation by urging this treaty on other countries. A number of states, among them India and Israel, almost certainly will not ratify it. One important reason, of course, is that the treaty perpetuates the present inferiority of the nonnuclear powers. It does not follow, however, that the further spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable. Certain technological and political factors may discourage it. There may be ways other than by treaty to halt proliferation; one of the great fallacies of recent years has been "the ready assumption that everything could be done with a single scrap of paper." An ABM agreement is still urgent though, after which the negotiators ought to turn to the matter of extending the test ban treaty to underground explosions.

1420
Popper, David H. U.N. SEABED COMMITTEE CONCLUDES SPRING SESSION. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 60, Apr. 21, 1969: 342-345. JX232.A33, v. 60

Outlines the objectives of a meaningful seabed arms limitation agreement. Popper believes there are many useful precedents in the outer space treaty that could be applied to a seabed agreement and concludes that one of the most difficult problems in such an agreement relates to defining boundaries beyond which the prohibition would apply.

1421
Smith, Gerard. AMBASSADOR SMITH PRESENTS U.S. VIEWS ON SEABED PROPOSAL AT EIGHTEEN-

NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 60, Apr. 21, 1969: 333-337.
JX232.A33, v. 60

An address before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on March 25, 1968, urging arms limitation on the deep ocean floor. Smith offers several criteria for consideration of a seabed agreement and concludes that such an agreement will place "nearly 70 percent of the earth's suface off limits to the arms race and will [achieve] a significant restraint on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction."

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